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The World Bank

Report No: ICR00001473

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(IBRD – 7010)

ON A

LOAN

IN THE AMOUNT OF US\$56.6 MILLION

TO THE

LEBANESE REPUBLIC

FOR THE

EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

June 24, 2010

Human Development Sector
Middle East and North Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective December 31, 2009)

Currency Unit = Lebanese pound

LP 1.00 = US\$0.00066

US\$1.00 = LP 1,507

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CDR	Council for Development and Reconstruction
CPPR	Country Portfolio Performance Review
ECRD	Educational Center for Research and Development
EDP	Education Development Project
EMIS	Education Management Information System
ESDS	Educational Secretariat for Development and Support
ESPISP II	Second Emergency Social Protection Implementation Support Project
GEP	General Education Project
GOL	Government of Lebanon
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ICR	Implementation Completion Report
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IMU	Information Management Unit
LAES	Lebanese Association for Educational Studies
MDG	Millennium Development Goal
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEHE	Ministry of Education and Higher Education
MNEYS	Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sports (became MEHE in 2002).
MOU	Memorandum of Understanding
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PBB	Performance Based Budgeting
PDO	Project Development Objective
PER	Public Expenditure Review
PHRD	Japan's Policy and Human Resource Development Fund
PMR	Project Management Report
QSA	Quality of Supervision Assessment
TVET/VTE	Technical and Vocational Education and Training

Vice President:	Shamshad Akhtar
Country Director:	Hedi Larbi
Sector Director:	Steen Lau Jorgensen
Sector Manager:	Mourad Ezzine
Task Team Leader-EDP:	Juan Manuel Moreno
Task Team Leader-ICR:	Jamal Al Kibbi

LEBANESE REPUBLIC
EDUCATION DEVELOPMENT PROJECT
(EDP)

CONTENTS

Data Sheet	
A. Basic Information	
B. Key Dates	
C. Ratings Summary	
D. Sector and Theme Codes	
E. Bank Staff	
F. Results Framework Analysis	
G. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs	
H. Restructuring	
I. PROGRAM CONTEXT, DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN.....	1
1.1 Context at Appraisal.....	1
1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO)	1
1.3 Revised PDO	2
1.4 Main Beneficiaries	2
1.5 Original Components	3
1.6 Revised Components.....	6
1.7 Other Significant Changes.....	7
II. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES.....	7
2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry	7
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation.....	10
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance	10
2.5 Post-Completion Operation/Next Phase.....	10
III. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES	11
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation.....	11
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives	11
3.3 Efficiency	12
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Ratings	12
3.5 Overall Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts.....	13
IV. ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME.....	14
V. ASSESSMENT OF BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE	15
5.1 Bank Performance	15
5.2 Borrower Performance	17
VI. LESSONS LEARNED	18
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing.....	20
Annex 2. Outputs by Component.....	21
Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis	25
Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes.....	26
Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results	28
Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results.....	29
Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR	30
Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders	34
Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents	35

A. Basic Information			
Country:	Lebanon	Project Name:	Education Development Project
Project ID:	P045174	L/C/TF Number(s):	IBRD-70100
ICR Date:	06/25/2010	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	SIL	Borrower:	GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON
Original Total Commitment:	USD 56.6M	Disbursed Amount:	USD 42.6M
Revised Amount:	USD 44.6M		
Environmental Category: B			
Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Education and Higher Education			
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:			

B. Key Dates				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	05/14/1997	Effectiveness:	10/06/2000	10/06/2000
Appraisal:	03/15/1999	Restructuring(s):		05/17/2004 05/18/2004
Approval:	03/30/2000	Mid-term Review:		06/20/2003
		Closing:	12/31/2005	12/31/2009

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Moderate
Bank Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Unsatisfactory	Government:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory	Overall Borrower Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Implementation Performance	Indicators	QAG Assessments (if any)	Rating
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	Satisfactory
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
	Original	Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
General education sector	100	100
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Access to urban services and housing	50	50
Administrative and civil service reform	50	50

E. Bank Staff		
Positions	At ICR	At Approval
Vice President:	Shamshad Akhtar	Kemal Dervis
Country Director:	Hedi Larbi	Inder K. Sud
Sector Manager:	Mourad Ezzine	Marlaine E. Lockheed
Project Team Leader:	Juan Manuel Moreno Olmedilla	Benoit Millot
ICR Team Leader:	Jamal Al-Kibbi	
ICR Primary Author:		

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)

The development objectives of the Project were to support the Government's ongoing efforts to: (i) enhance the capacity of the Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sport (MNEYS) to function as an effective manager of the education sector; and (ii) restore the credibility of the public education system through improvements in quality and efficiency, and increased access.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)

The revised objective of the Project was to assist the Borrower in building the knowledge base, analytical tools and the institutional capacity required to initiate reform of the general and vocational education systems while also enhancing access through a modest

program of school construction in priority areas of need. PDO and Intermediate Output Indicators, and the rate of achievement at completion, presented below are taken from the Project ISRs.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Net Enrollment rates gap between best served and underserved CAZA narrows			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	18%			
Date achieved	06/01/1999			
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This PDO was dropped after restructuring.			
Indicator 2 :	Number of cazas where the proportion of children 6 to 15 out of school is > 10%decreases			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	5 urban areas, 3 rural areas	2 urban areas and 1 rural area		
Date achieved	06/01/2000	06/01/2000		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This PDO indicator was dropped after the restructuring			
Indicator 3 :	Higher Scores on tests of core subjects in public 4th grade classes			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	50%	65%		
Date achieved	06/01/2000	06/01/2000		
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This PDO indicator was dropped after the restructuring			
Indicator 4 :	MEHE has developed its capacity to undertake education policy analysis and long term strategic planning, and has established a fully operational education MIS. (New indicator added at project restructuring).			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	11% of indicator completed			100% of indicator completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	the PMU developed this capacity, evolved to become the Educational Secretariat for Development and Support (ESDS), and was institutionalized within MEHE. MIS will become fully operational under transitional arrangements.			
Indicator 5 :	Resource flows have been documented and mechanisms developed for resource allocation, and a process of organizational strengthening has been agreed.			

Value quantitative or Qualitative)	16% of indicator completed			100% of indicator completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Resource flows in the sector were identified, and the necessary capacity and tools to develop and access alternative financing policies were developed. Organizational development of MEHE study was delivered and discussed with various officials concerned.			
Indicator 6 :	School leadership, pedagogical capacity and the assessment of academic achievement has been strengthened in MEHE. (New Indicator added at project restructuring).			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	4% of indicator completed (progress estimate at restructuring).			100% completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	ESDS, which was institutionalized in MEHE, developed practical capacity and expertise in those domains. MEHE implemented new efficient, transparent achievement assessment approaches in some domains (new indicator after restructuring)/			
Indicator 7 :	New schools in under-served areas have been constructed and classrooms, laboratories and workshops are equipped with essential furniture, tools and equipment (new indicator added at Project restructuring).			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	3 of indicator completed (progress estimate at restructuring).			100% completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Outputs were delivered for general education facilities as per the reduced scope upon project restructuring. Equipment and furnishings for vocational education facilities, added at Project restructuring, were later dropped.			

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Initiation of consensus building process and agreement on a medium term education strategy by project mid term review.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)				
Date achieved				
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was dropped at project restructuring.			
Indicator 2 :	Rorganization/restructuring of MNEYS in line with proposed changes in functional responsibilities			
Value				

(quantitative or Qualitative)				
Date achieved				
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was dropped at project restructuring.			
Indicator 3 :	Readiness of annual basic education data			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)				
Date achieved				
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was dropped at project restructuring.			
Indicator 4 :	Increase in completion rates in grade 6 and 9.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)				
Date achieved				
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was dropped at project restructuring.			
Indicator 5 :	Narrowing gap in achievements of public, subsidized private primary, and private schools as measured by robust national assessment tool			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)				
Date achieved				
Comments (incl. % achievement)	This indicator was dropped at Project restructuring.			
Indicator 6 :	A national education sector strategy for Lebanon has been prepared and endorsed by the Council of Ministers.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	20% of indicator completed			100% of indicator completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The Strategy was prepared by Project closing and was endorsed by the Council of Ministers in April 2010 shortly after project closing. This is the most significant project outcome.			
Indicator 7 :	An EMIS has been established at MEHE, together with an IMU and a program of end-user training. A SIS, linked to EMIS, is in place to support information needs at the individual school level.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	15% of indicator completed			100% of indicator completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/31/2009
Comments	A comprehensive EMIS was established at MEHE, IMU was folded into the			

(incl. % achievement)	ESDS, hardware+training provided to MEHE staff. At school level, relevant officials trained at all schools, and school connections were to be completed under transition arrangements			
Indicator 8 :	A comprehensive study of the financing of the general education and vocational education streams in Lebanon has been completed			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	10% of indicator completed			100% of indicator completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Following comprehensive situation analysis, all financial resource flows in and out of the sector were identified, and econometric model was designed to assess the implications of alternative policy options.			
Indicator 9 :	An assessment of the MEHE organizational structure and institutional capacity to implement an education reform program based on identified national goals and objectives has been completed.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	5% of indicator completed			100% of indicator completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/29/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	A detailed study on org. dev.of MEHE delivered, discussed with MEHE officials and Public Service Bureau, and a new org chart for MEHE was endorsed by the Minister. Needed laws to change MEHE org were being prepared in May 2010 to present to Parliament			
Indicator 10 :	School Principals and Training Center Directors have completed professional development program designed to improve leadership, motivational, and management skills.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0% of indicator completed			100% of indicator completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	450 Principals trained; top achieving Principals received trng to become Master Trainers to train/support other Principals. Training programs for Training Center Directors were delivered as planned.			
Indicator 11 :	A cadre of master teachers/trainers has received training in pedagogical, occupational skills, or ICT applications.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	3% of indicator completed			100% of indicator completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Training programs were delivered, occupational competencies were developed, and regional training centers were established to deliver tailored teacher-training programs as needed.			
Indicator 12 :	Institutional arrangements for administration of the assessment of academic achievement have been revised to enhance efficiency and consistency			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	10% of indicator completed			100% of indicator completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/31/2009

Comments (incl. % achievement)	Systems to store, generate, and manage exams were delivered and utilized. Initial experience points to enhanced transparency and efficiency of assessment of academic achievement.			
Indicator 13 :	Eleven new schools in priority areas have been constructed and are operational			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	10% of indicator completed			100% of indicator completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The eleven schools targeted upon project restructuring were constructed and operational by project closing.			
Indicator 14 :	Computer classrooms have been established in a majority of the secondary schools in general education, and in all VTE schools.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	0% of indicator completed			100% of indicator completed
Date achieved	06/09/2004			12/31/2009
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Outputs delivered.			

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs


No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	06/26/2000	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	11/30/2000	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.57
3	12/21/2000	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.57
4	06/21/2001	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.82
5	12/18/2001	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.14
6	05/16/2002	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.18
7	06/27/2002	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	1.29
8	11/08/2002	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	1.29
9	11/25/2002	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	1.38
10	04/18/2003	Highly Unsatisfactory	Highly Unsatisfactory	1.59
11	06/27/2003	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	1.63
12	12/04/2003	Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	2.26
13	06/08/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	3.22
14	12/10/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	4.92
15	04/29/2005	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	7.19
16	06/28/2005	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	7.52
17	12/01/2005	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	11.80
18	06/19/2006	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	17.10
19	12/22/2006	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	21.18

20	06/26/2007	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	25.84
21	12/25/2007	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	29.68
22	06/28/2008	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	34.29
23	12/30/2008	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	37.01
24	06/26/2009	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	40.37
25	12/23/2009	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	41.10

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in USD millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
05/17/2004	N	U	U	3.22	Based on implementation experience and existing institutional capacity, the project was simplified to prepare for - rather than implement - sector reforms; some vocational education activities were added to the project.
05/18/2004	N	U	U	3.22	This was merely to change project ratings in the system.

I. Disbursement Profile



I. PROGRAM CONTEXT, DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES AND DESIGN

1.1 CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

1. In spite of Lebanon's initial recovery from the effects of the 1975-90 civil conflict, profound challenges remained. Lebanon continued to face external hostilities and interference that set back the reconstruction effort. More importantly, perhaps, internal political conflict persisted to the extent that it established an environment of continued uncertainty and fragility which hindered the ability of institutions to function properly; the country suffered from the lack of a systematic institutional decision-making process. Efforts to rebuild the civil service were launched in 1993 with Bank support but could not gain traction; implementation experience revealed that the country was not politically ready for, or institutionally capable of, comprehensive reform efforts. Such was the context and working environment at project Appraisal, and indeed this context persevered all through the implementation period and the time of ICR preparation. The project and the ICR should be viewed within a post-conflict context which renders institutional capacity quite fragile – a view also expressed by QAG in its QSA-5 report on the Project in 2002.

2. Restoring basic infrastructure services proved to take more time, effort, and financial resources than initially envisaged. Restoring social services proved to be even more complicated. The immediate post-conflict priority of the Government in the education sector was the reconstruction and rehabilitation of damaged public schools, mainly under the leadership of the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR) that had rehabilitated or rebuilt 370 school facilities between 1992 and 1997. Within that period, the Education Center for Research and Development (ECRD)--an autonomous entity under the aegis of the Minister of Education in charge of pedagogic development, teacher training, developing evaluation tools, and education data collection--issued the Plan for Educational Reform in Lebanon, as well as reformed curricula, and produced new textbooks.

3. A steady decline in growth and incomes during the second half of the 1990s resulted in migration of students from private to public schools – against traditional norms. More than two thirds of Lebanese students were enrolled in private schools at the time. The Government increased its efforts to improve education quality in public schools and convened the First National Conference on Education in 1996 which identified the main challenges facing the sector to be (i) weak institutional capacity, and (ii) low quality and efficiency. The Bank was asked to assist Government efforts in this sector in 1997. The Education Development Project (EDP) – originally the General Education Project (GEP) - was prepared during 1998-2000 and became effective in late 2000.

4. The goals of the project were in line with a strategic focus of the 1997 Lebanon CAS - *to upgrade the human resource base by, inter alia, focusing on basic education, with a particular emphasis on improving quality and on supporting further expansion*. Project preparation benefited from a sector Public Expenditure Review (PER) prepared in 1998, and several background studies on teaching staff issues and obstacles to school attendance that were undertaken during project preparation. The previous Bank operation in general education in Lebanon dated back to the early 1970s.

1.2 ORIGINAL PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES (PDO)

5. The original development objectives of the GEP were to enhance the capacity of the Ministry of National Education, Youth and Sport (MNEYS, became the Ministry of Education and Higher Education in 2002 - MEHE) to function as an effective manager of the education sector; and (ii) restore the

credibility of the public education system through improvements in quality and efficiency, and increased access. Key Indicators were:

- a. Management and institutional development: (i) the reorganization of the MNEYS in line with functional responsibilities; (ii) the availability of accurate and timely annual education data; and (iii) the development, dissemination, and implementation of a national, long-term education strategy.
- b. Quality: (i) an increase in completion rates at grades 6 and 9; and (ii) the narrowing of the gap in learning achievements between public and private schools.

1.3 REVISED PDO

6. Implementation experience during 2000-2003, and political realities, demonstrated that the project scope and design were beyond the capacity of current institutions to implement. The project was thus simplified to prepare for, rather than implement, reforms as originally envisaged. The Bank's Executive Board approved the restructuring on May 17, 2004, with the same loan amount, cancelled the second phase of school construction, but expanded the scope of the project to include the VTE sub-sector and incorporated some components from the separate Vocational and Technical Education project that closed at the end of 2003. The project name was thus changed from General Education Project to Education Development Project.

7. VTE activities were incorporated at the strong request of an incoming Minister for a chance to implement reforms in the VTE sub-sector as well. Bank management had decided not to extend the VTE project beyond December 2003 upon review of the portfolio, Project compliance with loan conditions, and "assessment of the fragility of the institutional environment". The incoming Minister, at the time of restructuring in early 2004, stressed the adverse impact of this Bank decision on the ability of the Government to mobilize support from other donors to this sector and on the morale of VTE staff, and asked to incorporate some activities from the closed VTE project into the restructured GEP project. Based on demonstrated improvements in GEP implementation, the Bank obliged the incoming Minister's request.

8. The revised PDO, as stated in the Agreement Amending the Loan Agreement dated June 9, 2004, was "to assist the Borrower in building the knowledge base, analytical tools and the institutional capacity required to initiate reform of the general and vocational education systems in the Borrower's territory while also enhancing access through a modest program of school construction in priority areas of need."

9. Key indicators were revised as follows:

- MEHE has completed an integrated program of policy formulation, and ratified the elements of an education sector reform program.
- Statistical information is available to enable the efficiency and effectiveness of the education system to be monitored on a real time basis.
- Resource flows within the general education and vocational streams have been documented and mechanisms developed for equitable resource allocation.
- A process of organizational strengthening, and staff development has been completed.

1.4 MAIN BENEFICIARIES

10. The project originally targeted the following beneficiaries: (a) 20,000 primary and secondary pupils to benefit from extended or newly constructed schools each year; (b) 130,000 pupils (45 percent of enrollments) to benefit from the introduction of new technologies in secondary schools; (c) 20,000

teachers (50 percent of total) to benefit from in-service training in the public sector and 2,000 in the private subsidized sector; (d) an estimated 25,000 new pupils migrating each year from private to public schools, who tend to be from poorer households; (e) 4,000 pupils to participate in a pilot experiment; and (f) 2,000 administrative staff to benefit from professional development schemes. In the long term, the project aimed to revamp the quality of education in public schools, target the public education funding system towards poorer households, and ultimately overhaul public institutions in charge of the education sector. Upon restructuring, the project focused on preparing the analytical tools and institutional capacity needed to implement reforms and did not specify such information.

1.5 ORIGINAL COMPONENTS

Component 1: Management and Institutional Development

- 1.1 Education information management and planning: Introduction of an Education Management Information System (EMIS) to support timely and documented decision-making and developing a national education strategy.
- 1.2 Reinforcement of administrative capacity: Restructuring administrative units in the MNEYS to enhance efficiency and responsiveness; ensuring sectoral strategic capacity and securing professional development, including the creation of the Strategic Planning Unit.
- 1.3 Rationalization of teaching staff management: Identification of surpluses and deficits of teachers; definition and implementation of policy measures aiming at a better distribution of teachers and schools.
- 1.4 School empowerment experiment: Launching a pilot experiment aiming at involving school level actors and empowering school principals.
- 1.5 Equitable and efficient financing mechanisms: Completion of in depth and operational study and development of an action plan for a revised, more efficient and more equitable system of financing education.

Component 2: Quality Enhancement

- 2.1 Upgrading public supply of education facilities: Building, rehabilitating and/or extending and equipping a total of 24 schools in targeted areas.
- 2.2 Teacher training: Installation of a teacher training and professional development scheme.
- 2.3 Inspection and counseling: Reinforcement of inspection and counseling functions through redefinition of tasks and upgrading skills.
- 2.4 Examinations and evaluation: Enhancement of examination and systematization of evaluation functions for all agents and at all levels.
- 2.5 Introduction of new technologies: Introduction of new technologies to enhance the teaching and learning process, and related provision of equipment.

Component 3: Implementation

- 3.1 Project implementation and coordination.
- 3.2 Equipment and staffing of the Project Management Unit (PMU).

**Project Components before and after Restructuring,
And Achievements upon Project Restructuring**

Original Project	Restructured Project	Achievements
1. Management and Institutional Development	A-Policy Planning and Information Management	
1.1 <u>Education information management and planning</u> : Introduction of an Education Management Information System (EMIS) to support timely and documented decision-making and developing a national education strategy.	1. <u>Preparation of a National Education Strategy (NES)</u> which: (i) sets forth objectives, activities and an implementation plan for an initial three-year period; and (ii) addresses the reform of both the general and vocational education streams in an integrated manner.	NES covering general and vocational education was prepared and later adopted by the Council of Ministers in April 2010, shortly after project closing.
1.2 <u>Reinforcement of administrative capacity</u> : Restructuring administrative units in the MNEYS to enhance efficiency and responsiveness; ensuring sectoral strategic capacity and securing professional development, including the creation of the Strategic Planning Unit.	2. (a) <u>Development of EMIS</u> within the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) and the establishment of the Information Management Unit (IMU) within MEHE. (b) Provision of computer equipment for this Part A.2 (a) of the Project.	EMIS outputs were delivered but not fully operational by project closing. Adequate transition arrangements were in place to render these outputs fully operational. IMU duties were integrated into the ESDS which was institutionalized under MEHE.
1.3 <u>Rationalization of teaching staff management</u> : Identification of surpluses and deficits of teachers; definition and implementation of policy measures aiming at a better distribution of teachers and schools.	3. <u>Completion of a study of the financing of the general and vocational education streams</u> to: (i) identify and document all monetary and non-monetary flows; and (ii) enable effective and sustainable resource allocation strategies to be formulated.	Comprehensive financing study, detailed technical annexes, and computer model were delivered. MEHE capacity to formulate and assess alternative sector financing scenarios was developed within ESDS.
1.4 <u>School empowerment experiment</u> : Launching a pilot experiment aiming at involving school level actors and empowering school principals.	4. <u>Completion of a study to assess the organizational structure and capacity</u> of those agencies responsible for the administration of general and vocational education to determine the readiness and ability of the said agencies to implement a reform program arising from the preparation of an integrated sector strategy.	Organization Development of MEHE study (including the vocational education domain) was delivered and discussed with officials concerned. Needed revisions to legal texts started to be finalized upon adoption of the NES to be presented to Parliament.
1.5 <u>Equitable and efficient financing mechanisms</u> : Completion of in depth and operational study and development of an action plan for a revised, more efficient and more equitable system of financing education.		
2. Quality Enhancement	B- Strengthening of School Leadership, Pedagogical Capacity, and Assessment of Achievement	
2.1 <u>Upgrading public supply of education facilities</u> : Building, rehabilitating and/or extending and equipping a total of 24 schools in targeted areas.	1. Carrying out a <u>program of leadership development for school principals and directors of training centers</u> to: (i) improve their leadership, motivational and management skills; and (ii) enhance their understanding of international trends in competency based and contextualized learning.	Programs for School Principals and for Directors of Training Centers were completed.

2.2 <u>Teacher training:</u> Installation of a teacher training and professional development scheme.	2. Completion of a <u>program of teacher/instructor training</u> to develop the pedagogical, information communication technology (ICT) or occupational skills required for the effective implementation of an education reform program.	Envisaged training programs were completed.
2.3 <u>Inspection and counseling:</u> Reinforcement of inspection and counseling functions through redefinition of tasks and upgrading skills.	3. Completion of a study to <u>review the processes for assessment of academic achievement</u> for the general education stream and the establishment of databanks for the storage of electronic images, learning products and examination questions for general and vocational education.	Studies and IT tools for various steps of the achievement assessment in general education were completed and fully operational in some domains only by project closing. Transition arrangements were in place to render those outputs fully operational in all envisaged domains.
2.4 <u>Examinations and evaluation:</u> Enhancement of examination and systematization of evaluation functions for all agents and at all levels.		
2.5 <u>Introduction of new technologies:</u> Introduction of new technologies to enhance the teaching and learning process, and related provision of equipment.		
	C- Upgrading Education Facilities	
	1. Carrying out a program to <u>upgrade public education facilities</u> , including the construction, furnishing and equipping of eleven (11) new public schools in areas of priority need.	Construction of and equipment for 11 general education facilities was completed. Rehabilitation of vocational education facilities – added to the original project at restructuring - was dropped.
	2. <u>Acquisition of essential equipment</u> for VTE laboratories and workshops.	Activities dropped.
	3. <u>Establishment of core ICT infrastructure</u> to enable effective operation of EMIS.	Relevant school officials were trained and a modest number of schools were already connected by project closing. Activities will be completed under transition arrangements.
3. Implementation	D- Project Management	
3.1 Project implementation and coordination.	1. <u>Establishment and operation of PMU</u> to manage the carrying out of Project activities associated with general education and vocational education streams.	Completed except for some vocational education activities that were dropped.
3.2 Equipment and staffing of the Project Management Unit (PMU).	2. Acquisition of equipment, and the provision of consultant services, training and other necessary items of support for this Part D of the Project.	Completed.

1.6 REVISED COMPONENTS

11. The project was reorganized into four new project components, with added works, goods, and consulting services in the VTE domain as follows:

Part A: Policy Planning and Information Management

- (i) Preparation of a National Education Strategy (NES) which: (i) sets forth objectives, activities and an implementation plan for an initial three-year period; and (ii) addresses the reform of both the general and vocational education streams in an integrated manner.
- (ii) (a) Development of EMIS within the Ministry of Education and Higher Education (MEHE) and the establishment of the Information Management Unit (IMU) within MEHE. (b) Provision of computer equipment for this Part A.2 (a) of the Project.
- (iii) Completion of a study of the financing of the general and vocational education streams to: (i) identify and document all monetary and non-monetary flows; and (ii) enable effective and sustainable resource allocation strategies to be formulated.
- (iv) Completion of a study to assess the organizational structure and capacity of those agencies responsible for the administration of general and vocational education to determine the readiness and ability of the said agencies to implement a reform program arising from the preparation of an integrated sector strategy.

Part B: Strengthening of School Leadership. Pedagogical Capacity and Assessment of Academic Achievement

- (i) Carrying out a program of leadership development for school principals and directors of training centers to: (i) improve their leadership, motivational and management skills; and (ii) enhance their understanding of international trends in competency based and contextualized learning.
- (ii) Completion of a program of teacher/instructor training to develop the pedagogical, information communication technology (ICT) or occupational skills required for the effective implementation of an education reform program.
- (iii) Completion of a study to review the processes for assessment of academic achievement for the general education stream and the establishment of databanks for the storage of electronic images, learning products and examination questions for general and vocational education.

Part C: Upgrading Education Facilities

- (i) Carrying out a program to upgrade public education facilities, including the construction, furnishing and equipping of eleven (11) new public schools in areas of priority need.
- (ii) Acquisition of essential equipment for VTE laboratories and workshops.
- (iii) Establishment of core ICT infrastructure to enable effective operation of EMIS.

Part D: Project Management

- (i) Establishment and operation of PMU to manage the carrying out of Project activities associated with general education and vocational education streams.
- (ii) Acquisition of equipment, and the provision of consultant services, training and other necessary items of support for this Part D of the Project.

1.7 OTHER SIGNIFICANT CHANGES

12. Clear implementation momentum emerged upon project restructuring in the general education sub-sector. However, several attempts to start implementation of VTE activities (incorporated upon restructuring) demonstrated that institutional weaknesses and lack of decision-making in the VTE sub-sector were not surmountable. Following recommendations of the December 2005 Country Portfolio Performance Review (CPPR), the Government and the Bank agreed (as approved by the Country Director on June 21, 2006) to cancel some (mainly equipment procurement) VTE activities under the project and the corresponding loan amounts. The project loan thus decreased from US\$56.57 million to US\$44.58 million. Development Objectives were not formally changed to reflect this development.

13. The project closing date was extended for two years, from December 31, 2005 to December 31, 2007, at the time of restructuring during which implementation momentum picked up noticeably. Commitments reached 75% of the loan amount in early 2007. Based on implementation results, and to allow for complete delivery of project outputs, the closing date was further extended, first to December 31, 2008, then again to December 31, 2009.

II. KEY FACTORS AFFECTING IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOMES

14. Lebanon is well known for its rich human capital base and has demonstrated its ability to mobilize financial resources when needed to realize its development potential. However, Lebanon continues to suffer from the impact of old and new, security and political, external and internal conflicts long after the civil war officially ended in 1990. The social, political, and security environment that prevailed all through EDP preparation and implementation was effectively one of conflict and/or post-conflict even though Lebanon is not officially classified by the Bank as such for operational purposes. Protracted and repeated conflicts in the country established an environment of sustained fragility in the sense that institutions could not adhere to a systematic decision making process shielded from political and private interests. Furthermore, the political dynamic of the country continued to get increasingly complicated which exacerbated a prevailing sense of security, social, and economic instability. Broader civil service and administrative reforms, needed to provide a context for and institutional support to needed sector reforms, were attempted in the mid 1990s - after the civil war ended - with World Bank support but failed to gain traction. This is the context within which implementation effort and outcomes should be viewed and assessed.

2.1 PROJECT PREPARATION, DESIGN AND QUALITY AT ENTRY

15. Project preparation built upon Government initiatives to enhance sector performance, including the First National Conference on Education in 1996 and a National Committee created by the Minister of Education in 1999 to prepare the foundation for a comprehensive education sector strategy. Preparation efforts benefited from a Japan Policy and Human Resources Development (PHRD) preparation fund managed by ECRD and followed a highly participatory approach with a wide array of stakeholders. Background analytical studies included a sector PER prepared in 1998, several "high-quality studies on critical issues," and two series of case studies that were produced in preparation of the project. The project team benefited from the ongoing implementation experience of various UN agencies.

16. Project design was too ambitious and complex given the weak institutional capacity of MNEYS and the unstable political environment of the country which precluded major reforms in any sector. Those realities were clearly articulated in the PAD as follows:

- “The challenges facing public administration in general, and the public education sector (the most vulnerable sector) in particular, cannot be overcome through a single operation. This is especially true given the fact that the capacity of the education administration is still more part of the problem than part of the solution. Therefore, the project should be viewed as the first in a series of operations.”
- “Other aspects of the political and economic life (e.g., civil service) will have to change and improve in order to make sustained change possible in the education sector.”

17. Despite this clear assessment, the project team nevertheless chose “to attack on several fronts (rather than) focus on prioritized issues”, as stated in the PAD, based on the view that “Rehabilitating a devastated education sector cannot be undertaken by targeting only selected aspects; it requires action at several levels, on several functions, and with the involvement of several actors.” ICR interviews revealed that the Project Preparation Team decided to pursue such a high-risk approach based on Government Legislative and Executive encouragement to do so. The Team made this choice upon (i) direct dialogue with the Education Committee of the Members of Parliament who expressed strong support to timely, comprehensive sector reforms, and (ii) timely creation by the Minister of Education, during project preparation, of a National Committee to facilitate speedy completion and adoption of the NES. Furthermore, as noted in previous CAS Completion Reports, some Bank projects prepared during the same period were encouraged by the Prime Minister at the time, himself a very dedicated person with extremely ambitious reconstruction and development plans for the country, to be very ambitious.

18. A Quality of Supervision Assessment (QSA5) dated October 15, 2002 made the following statement as regards project design: “The project underestimated the severe weakness in the institutional and organization framework and the complexity of the political and decision-making system.” It added: “This project falls somewhere between a post-conflict operation and a regular sector investment operation.” Project design incorporated phasing, sequencing, and experimentation mechanisms as mitigation measures against inherent risks to such a comprehensive approach and to low institutional capacity. These mitigation measures were not adequate or sufficient to address institutional weaknesses identified by the Project Team.

19. Another clear element of complexity--also noted in the PAD--is the involvement of various agencies in project implementation, namely MNEYS, ECRD, CDR, and the Pedagogic Inspectorate. The PAD acknowledged the risk that each of those agencies could pursue a different approach to implement adopted measures and rated it Moderate; the PAD also acknowledged the risk of cooperation among them and rated it Substantial. Those risks were to be mitigated by preparing Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) clarifying respective roles, responsibilities, and coordination mechanisms to be signed by all those agencies. Implementing agencies could not agree on their respective roles which proved to be one of the main impediments to effective goods and works procurement; MOUs were not signed despite repeated Bank follow-up.

2.2 IMPLEMENTATION

20. Government effort to implement the project was not apparent prior to restructuring. Appointment of a new minister somewhat reticent about the project just after project effectiveness (as noted in QSA5) did not help. Implementation Progress rating was downgraded to Unsatisfactory in June 2002. Decision-making and implementation efforts marginally improved following a proactive suggestion by the Bank’s Task Team to establish: (i) an Executive Committee to facilitate and support strategic decision-making by the Minister; and (ii) a Coordinators Forum for heads of project sub-components to share implementation experience.

21. The QSA5 (which took place prior to restructuring) reported that supervision efforts by the Bank Team were intensive, opportunistic, focused on problem solving and entailed a substantial amount of technical assistance and capacity building; it also highlighted the need for realistic project ratings. The Assessment recommended that greater efforts be made to prioritize and streamline activities, and to gain more insights into political economy issues. The Panel reached the judgment that Bank supervision during the reviewed period was Satisfactory. The Team did act upon the recommendations of the QSA5.

22. By the time of the planned Mid-Term Review in 2003, and under a new Minister who focused on moving the project forward, the case for project restructuring was strongly advocated by the Bank Team. Project implementation effectively started after restructuring in 2004, then slowed down following political upheaval in 2005, after which it was back on track and performed very well until project closing. Implementation Progress maintained a Satisfactory rating since June 2006.

23. Following restructuring, implementation momentum was impressively maintained despite political, social, and security turmoil that started with the assassination of the Prime Minister in early 2005, military conflict with Israel in summer 2006, followed by an internal political stale mate and paralysis in Parliament and the Council of Ministers for three years (through 2009), along with an internal military clash in May 2008, Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2009, and uncertainty surrounding delayed formation of a new Cabinet through the end of 2009. Maintaining implementation efforts and showing good results under such circumstances reflects strong ownership, dedication, and courage by all Government officials involved in project implementation and by members of the Bank team.

24. Three implementation issues were notable during the post-restructuring phase:

- **First**, implementation of VTE activities added to the project upon restructuring was not possible. Aide memoires following restructuring noted the lack of readiness of the former VTE PMU Director to provide constructive support and share information, and eventually reported that it became progressively apparent to the Project Team that institutional weaknesses, lack of clear policy direction, lack of strategic priorities, and lack of transparency of decision-making prevented the Project Team from allocating additional efforts to VTE activities. The new Minister who requested incorporation of VTE activities at the time of restructuring was changed before he was able to show VTE implementation results as he did with the general education sector. Following a Country Portfolio Performance Review in December 2005, the Government and the Bank agreed to cancel VTE components from the loan (mainly acquisition of equipment), and project legal agreements were amended accordingly; however, there was no (second) formal restructuring of the project to take into account cancellation of VTE activities. Still, analytical outputs of the project (namely the NES, Sector Financing study, and Organization Development study of MEHE) did cover the VTE sector.
- **Second**, implementation of construction activities under CDR gained momentum following restructuring, but proved to be short-lived. CDR rules and procedures seem to have evolved in a manner that defeats the purpose of facilitating effective implementation of re/construction activities (as noted in the PAD and later in the QSA5). Agreement on the scope of CDR responsibilities under the project could not be reached. Implementation of a relatively small construction program under EDP would understandably become of secondary importance to CDR once major emergency reconstruction activities resulting from summer 2006 hostilities were launched.
- **Third**, effective implementation of a comprehensive set of EDP IT components seemed to require specific skills that were not easily developed by a PMU during the normal course of project implementation. Protracted delays in establishing and staffing a dedicated IT unit within the Ministry, delays in decisions on recruitment of needed PMU staff, and high IT staff turn-over

within the PMU delayed implementation of IT activities and prevented IT outputs from being fully operational before project closing.

2.3 MONITORING AND EVALUATION

25. Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) efforts under the project, both at inception and at restructuring, focused on monitoring implementation progress and reporting outcomes. This was deemed necessary by the Task Team at the time in order to support the generation of an implementation momentum and to facilitate coordination and horizontal integration among sub-components. Once implementation momentum picked up, the Task Team planned to build the PMU capacity to monitor outcomes and impact.

26. A detailed Project Implementation Plan was finalized during project preparation and ready to be used for output monitoring purposes. The monitoring system relied on accounting and project scheduling software. Task Team efforts in this domain were reflected in Project Aide Memoires that consistently showed detailed, updated implementation plans. Following project restructuring, a Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist was hired by the PMU who revised the Project Implementation Plan, prepared a Project Implementation Manual, and integrated those documents with the Project Procurement Plan. The restructuring follow-up mission of June 2004 focused on developing those implementation tools.

27. Once implementation momentum took hold, an international expert joined the Task Team and produced a report to help evolve existing M&E systems towards capturing outcomes. Unfortunately, PMU staff turnover and delays in recruitment prevented further progress. The ICR mission advised and worked with PMU staff to try to report some project outcomes and impact; these are presented in a table under Section VI of Annex 7.

2.4 SAFEGUARD AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

28. Safeguards compliance was satisfactory during implementation. There were no significant environmental or social safeguards issues reported in project Aide Memoires. Procurement and Financial Management generally posed no significant risks during implementation except towards the end of the project when CDR was not able to timely address arising construction and goods procurement issues and when the PMU was not able to introduce a fixed-asset management system that could record equipment and furniture procured under the project in an institutional and sustainable manner.

29. Adequate attention was given to capacity building in the fiduciary domain during implementation, and arising issues were addressed with effective assistance from the Bank. Procurement rules were simplified at the time of restructuring to facilitate selection of consultants and provision of training, procurement followed World Bank rules, and two Procurement Post-Review reports prepared in June 2005 and January 2010 confirm the above findings. Financial Management of the project was also simplified in the early implementation stages based on observed implementation capacity, and continued to be satisfactory during implementation. Internal controls were reported to be adequate except towards the end of the project as noted in the paragraph above.

2.5 POST-COMPLETION OPERATION/NEXT PHASE

30. Towards the end of the project, the Minister of Education officially asked the Bank to identify resources for a program of transitional support to EDP in order to maintain implementation momentum, and to initiate a second phase of the education sector reform program. The October 2009 aide memoire confirms that US\$1 million out of the US\$6 million Second Emergency Social Protection and

Implementation Support Program (TF092582) was available for this purpose. Transition arrangements were in place, for example, to render some of the IT-related outputs delivered under the project fully operational. A new education project, Education Reform for Quality Schools, was scheduled for Appraisal in early FY11.

31. ICR discussions with Ministry officials and PMU staff, stakeholders, and Bank staff after project closing confirm that EDP outputs are being utilized. Most notably, the new Minister of Education pursued a systematic political process to ensure political ownership of the Strategy by various stakeholders, which resulted in formal adoption of the Strategy by the Council of Ministers in April 2010. Following on this critical achievement, legal documents needed to implement the recommendations of the MEHE Organization Development study were being finalized. The Central Data Repository component of EMIS was being utilized for some administrative functions utilizing 2002-2008 data.

III. ASSESSMENT OF OUTCOMES

3.1 RELEVANCE OF OBJECTIVES, DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

32. Project objectives remain very relevant to the development priorities of the country. The objective of the 2005 CAS is to help Lebanon build its public institutions to transition out of its current macro-economic imbalances, to address the social and environmental implications of the transition in an equitable fashion, and to lay the foundations for job creation and growth. The project mainly focused on institutional development in a sector that was known for its weak institutional capacity – as reported in the PAD.

33. Human capital development was one of the pillars of the 2005 CAS which was reiterated in the 2007 Interim Strategy Note. The project directly supported this pillar by strengthening capacity, both at the Ministry and school level, to enhance the quality of public education services in the country. The project also enhanced access to education in targeted areas. Furthermore, project analytical outputs (NES and the Sector Financing study) were utilized by the authorities in 2007 to prepare a set of priority measures and actions to be taken in the education sector which were discussed at the Paris III donor conference.

34. The country continued to be in a fragile and uncertain environment that limited the ability of institutions to develop and function properly. The focus of the restructured project on providing assistance to prepare the needed tools and instruments for sector policy formulation and implementation proved to be necessary and adequate given local institutional capacity to prepare for sector reforms.

3.2 ACHIEVEMENT OF PROJECT DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

35. Original PDOs of the project were not achieved. The Ministry did not have the tools and instruments needed to become an ‘effective manager of the education sector’. The original Key Indicators became irrelevant after restructuring.

36. The EDP achieved to a large extent the revised PDOs of building the knowledge and capacity required to initiate sector reforms and completing a modest school construction program. Annex 2 presents in more detail the outputs achieved under the restructured project components. An important exception here is that some activities in the VTE sub-sector that were added at the time of restructuring were not implemented (due to Government internal reasons as explained in paragraph 23 above) and later dropped. New project objectives identified upon restructuring were achieved as follows:

- The National Education Strategy was delivered and adopted by the Council of Ministers soon after project closing. ESDS, which developed basic planning and policy capacity, was institutionalized within MEHE.
- The Organization Development study for MEHE was delivered and agreed upon among key officials. Draft laws to effect this organization change started to be finalized upon adoption of the NES by the Council of Ministers to be presented to Parliament.
- A comprehensive study on education sector financing was delivered along with the requisite capacity to formulate and assess alternative financing scenarios and mechanisms.
- EMIS and school IT connectivity components and activities were delivered and were partially operational by project closing; transitional arrangements were in place to render them fully operational.
- Various IT tools and systems for education achievement assessment were operational in several domains rendering assessments more efficient and transparent.
- Programs to empower school Principals and enhance the capacity of teachers were delivered with high demonstration effect stemming from the positive impact of empowering school officials on learning outcomes and school management.
- The (revised, smaller) general education school construction program, and related equipment and furniture, were delivered.

3.3 EFFICIENCY

37. The original loan amount of US\$56.6 million was not changed at the time of restructuring when the second phase of school construction was cancelled and some activities in the VTE domain were added. The loan amount was reduced to US\$44.6 million when some activities in the VTE sub-sector (mainly equipment procurement) were cancelled. Total disbursements amounted to US\$42.6 million. As the project is mainly geared towards preparing the analytical basis and building the institutional capacity to initiate reforms, no attempt is made to calculate economic or financial rates of return on project investments.

38. The Government's School Construction Technical Audit presented detailed data on school construction and concluded that the quality of construction is generally good or acceptable. It noted that average construction cost per square meter increased by 40 percent compared to original estimates, and lists several reasons for that including higher construction materials prices that soared concurrently with energy prices during the construction period. The Audit also noted that equipment procured under the project for schools such as water treatment equipment, water pumps, electricity generators, boilers, etc., were often over-dimensioned.

3.4 JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATINGS

Rating: Marginally Unsatisfactory

39. Following the ICR Guidelines on outcome ratings for projects with formally restructured PDOs, the Overall Outcome Rating is based on combined pre and post restructuring ratings weighted by the respective disbursement ratios net of any cancellation. In this case, disbursements pre-restructuring were around 5 percent only of the loan amount and thus do not materially affect ratings.

40. Outcome is rated Unsatisfactory against the original PDOs – which became not applicable upon restructuring.

41. Outcome is rated Marginally Unsatisfactory against the revised PDOs.

42. Outcomes post-restructuring are quite encouraging based on the following considerations: (i) the core aim to develop the necessary tools to prepare and implement reforms was fully achieved, especially after formal Government adoption of the Sector Strategy in April 2010; (ii) the high impact of the Leadership Development component on performance of school Principals and the positive demonstration effect of the impact of empowerment at the school level; (iii) evolution and institutionalization of the PMU within the Ministry as the ESDS; and (iv) outputs were delivered under a truly challenging environment.

43. However, some components were not achieved (VTE activities) or fully operational (IT related activities) by project closing. The project was extended for four years causing significant delays in delivering its outputs and outcomes. More specifically, there were: (i) minor shortcomings in ensuring IT-related components (EMIS, school connectivity, assessment of achievement) were fully operational by project closing; (ii) moderate shortcomings in building the PMU and MEHE's institutional capacity due to high staff turnover and delays in recruitment; and (iii) significant delays in implementation of the construction component. While some VTE activities, mainly related to equipment procurement, were cancelled, core analytical and policy-oriented activities of the project (NES, Sector Financing framework, Organization Development of MEHE) did address related issues in the VTE sub-sector which is why the Project Team believed there is no need for another formal project restructuring after some VTE activities (not directly related to core sector policy issues or directly impacting PDOs) were cancelled.

3.5 OVERALL THEMES, OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

44. A pillar of the 2005 CAS is human capital development in order to help mitigate the poverty and adverse social impacts of significant macroeconomic imbalances. This project aimed at preparing for sector reforms that would eventually improve learning achievement for students in public schools – who are traditionally from lower income families – so that they could better capitalize on available job opportunities. In addition, the school construction component directly targeted areas of higher demand for public schools when parents in those areas were not able to afford private tuition due to deteriorating economic conditions. There were no direct gender activities under the project; the PAD reported that gender disparities in the education sector were low at all levels.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

45. The EDP achieved a few critical results in this domain given the continuously fragile and uncertain environment in the country which hinders the ability of institutions to function properly:

- (a) Development of policy and planning capacity within MEHE: The PMU developed some policy, planning, and IT capacity during EDP implementation, evolved to become the ESDS, and was institutionalized within MEHE. The Ministry was not structured or staffed to perform such functions before EDP was implemented. ESDS will have a significant role in implementing the NES after it was adopted by the Council of Ministers, and will have a key role in preparing and delivering the new Bank follow-up project.

- (b) Development of leadership at the school level: This program was delivered with good impact on student achievement and school management, and prepared over-achieving Principals to guide and assist others. This is especially important in a fragile environment like Lebanon's where officials at the school level would be called upon to exercise leadership and take initiatives to complement efforts by Ministry officials.
- (c) Development of coordination mechanisms among implementing agencies: The Task Team assisted the creation and functioning of an Executive Committee, under a Minister who was reticent about collaboration with the Bank, to facilitate and support timely decision-making and coordinate implementation efforts at the top level. This approach proved extremely helpful in maintaining implementation efforts during frequent Ministerial transitions, and also quite effective while it was adopted under the school construction component managed by CDR.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)

46. The Government and the Bank were proactive and opportunistic in utilizing project outputs beyond project scope as follows:

- At the request of the Government, assistance was provided under the project to assess the damage to schools resulting from the 2006 hostilities thus providing the basis for donor assistance to emergency school reconstruction and rehabilitation.
- EDP analytical outputs (National Education Strategy, Sector Financing study) were used to prepare the education component of the Economic and Social Impact Assessment needed to coordinate donor assistance.
- Technical assistance was provided to MEHE to utilize the outputs of the Education Financing Study to prepare a performance-based budget framework for the period 2009-11 in cooperation with the Ministry of Finance.

IV. ASSESSMENT OF RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

Overall risk to development outcomes is Moderate.

47. Lebanon continues to suffer from an uncertain political environment and fragile institutions which poses significant risks to development outcomes of the EDP. However, encouraging signs and results have emerged which would mitigate existing risks to some extent and improve the sustainability of results achieved. Specifically:

- The Government formally asked the Bank to put in place transitional arrangements and prepare a follow-up operation well before project closing in late 2009 in order to maintain implementation momentum. This request reflected Government commitment to maintain implementation momentum and aim for reforms in the sector which has been noticeably sustained since project restructuring and across several Ministerial transitions.
- The EDP PMU evolved into the ESDS and was institutionalized within MEHE before project closing which preserved policy, planning, and IT management capacities developed under EDP.
- By April 2010, the Council of Ministers formally endorsed the NES following systematic political consultation with all parties concerned, and established a Ministerial Committee to prepare implementation arrangements. Lebanon did officially put in place a comprehensive

strategy for the sector to anchor future reforms. This is the most important achievement of the EDP.

- Along with NES adoption, the Council of Ministers appointed a Ministerial Committee to prepare for implementation of the NES. Consequently, draft legal amendments needed to implement the recommendations of the MEHE Organization Development study were being finalized.
- The Leadership Development component resulted in significant improvements at the school level in terms of student achievement and school management. MEHE also developed significant capacity and instruments to roll-out such programs which would be supported under the follow-up Bank project.
- Various EMIS, IT and Assessment Achievement outputs were being utilized and streamlined in regular MEHE operations even before becoming fully operational with good results on efficiency and transparency of affected processes. Transition arrangements already in place would ensure those outputs become fully operational and would further develop MEHE capacity to fully utilize those tools.
- As for construction outputs, the Audit report points to the need to allocate some resources to address construction design issues, and to provide adequate operations and maintenance expenditures, in order to ensure the longevity of school construction and installed heavy equipment. Still, the Audit judges the quality of construction as good or acceptable.

48. Those important developments bode well for a sustained reform momentum in the sector. MEHE would need continued assistance and strengthening to be able to sustain reforms in a fragile environment and without a parallel, supporting program of civil service and administrative reform. The World Bank will timely help maintain the emerging education sector reform momentum with a follow-up education project scheduled for Appraisal in July 2010.

V. ASSESSMENT OF BANK AND BORROWER PERFORMANCE

5.1 BANK PERFORMANCE

- (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Unsatisfactory

49. The PAD clearly pointed to serious political and institutional capacity risks in its detailed analysis of existing circumstances in Lebanon at the time of project preparation. Nevertheless, the Project Team chose to aim at far-reaching and comprehensive sector reforms following encouragement to do so by officials in the Legislative and Executive branches of Government. Section 2.1 above addressed those issues in detail and highlighted the conclusions of QSA5 as regards Quality at Entry issues. In short, the above rating is based on the following specific factors:

- Project design was far beyond what existing political and institutional capacity could handle.
- Far too many reforms were targeted by this operation when the PAD correctly concluded that a series of projects was needed to implement needed reforms.
- Roles and responsibilities of several agencies involved in project implementation were not agreed and finalized.
- Measures to mitigate project design risks were not sufficient or adequate.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Satisfactory

50. Supervision by the Bank since project launch showed sufficient understanding and flexibility to restructure the project, address arising implementation issues, and support implementation momentum under difficult circumstances. Continuity of several members of the Task Team is noticeable; effectively two Task Team Leaders led the project over 10 years both located in the Country Office. Transitional arrangements at the end of the project were orderly. The Team could have taken advantage of strong field presence to be perhaps more forceful in addressing implementation and recruitment delays – yet one needs to be mindful of the political and security turmoil during the implementation period. The above rating is based on the following specific factors:

- Bank supervision efforts were satisfactory – as noted in QSA5 - in the pre-restructuring period even when Government commitment and implementation effort were not evident. The QSA5 rating comprised Highly Satisfactory rating for both Focus on Development Effectiveness and Supervision of Fiduciary and Safeguards Aspects, Satisfactory rating for Adequacy of Supervision Inputs and Processes, and Unsatisfactory rating for Realism of Project Performance Ratings – which turned more realistic since.
- Formal project restructuring was initiated when circumstances allowed and proved to address the shortcomings of the initial project design; agreed procurement and FM arrangements were also adequately revised.
- Project Implementation Plans were clear, detailed and continuously updated.
- Supervision and implementation assistance took advantage of various CPPRs and adequately involved Country Unit Management, Sector Management, and various stakeholders.
- Bank Team proactively supported decision making at the Minister level through facilitating the establishment of high level committees to support decision making and coordinate implementation efforts among various implementing agencies.
- Bank assistance was readily available during outright security conflict(s) and under difficult political circumstances.
- Bank assistance took advantage of several arising opportunities to help the Government use project outputs beyond the scope of the project.

51. Bank management provided direct support to project implementation. Sector Management relocated the two TTLs who were responsible for most of the implementation period to the field and allocated sufficient supervision resources. Both Sector and Country Unit Management effectively participated in periodic country portfolio reviews that provided strategic guidance to implementation efforts, as reported in project aide memoires, and participated in the meetings of several missions. The Bank earned the trust of the authorities in this sector and became its main development partner. CMU Management noted that as a result of the effective working relationship with MEHE, the new education sector planned for Appraisal in July 2011 will be the first project to be delivered under the new CPS scheduled for Board discussion in early FY11.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

52. ICR Rating Guidelines for Overall Bank Performance when Quality at Entry is Unsatisfactory while Quality of Supervision is Satisfactory is to follow the Outcome rating (which is Marginally

Unsatisfactory in this case) “except when Bank performance did not significantly affect the particular outcome”. This is a case where Bank performance did not affect Outcome ratings.

53. Outcome rating would have been better than indicated in Section 3.4 had the Government been able to break long-standing institutional and decision-making gridlock in the VTE sector which prevented implementation of activities in this domain that were incorporated at Government request. These were issues well beyond the ability of the Bank or the Task Team to address. Furthermore, the Task Team effectively addressed Quality at Entry shortcomings through a formal restructuring and adequate implementation support that facilitated the eventual delivery of project outputs.

5.2 BORROWER PERFORMANCE

(a) Government Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

54. Government performance is an issue as regards lack of ownership during the pre-restructuring period and the inability to implement some VTE activities added to the EDP upon Government request at the time of restructuring. Delays in appointment of needed MEHE staff to take-over project outputs and ensure the transition of capacity from the PMU to MEHE persisted throughout the project. Clear signs of lack of ownership during the pre-restructuring phase were reversed post-restructuring and performance was very encouraging under several Ministerial transitions and even under unfavorable political and security circumstances.

(b) Implementing Agency Performance

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

55. MNEYS, ECRD, CDR, and the Education Inspectorate were the implementing agencies of the project. The PMU was originally under ECRD but was moved to MEHE around the time of project restructuring in 2004. Implementation effort varied across agencies and over time eventually leading to practical realization of envisaged outputs.

56. Strong commitment by the PMU to achieve project objectives was demonstrated throughout project implementation. Fiduciary arrangements were properly followed, the M&E system was developed and utilized to follow-up on implementation progress, and a participatory approach that adequately consulted stakeholders on studies prepared by the project was followed. The PMU evolved to become the ESDS and was institutionalized within MEHE by project closing. The PMU was not able to address delays in appointments and recruitment of key PMU staff, before and after restructuring, to address staff turnover.

57. Based on extensive experience in managing school and other construction activities financed by World Bank and many other donors, CDR was given the responsibility for EDP’s construction component. Signs of increasingly complicated bureaucracy at CDR at the time of project preparation, as noted in the PAD, eventually adversely affected implementation momentum: CDR was not able to timely address delays in implementation of EDP construction activities, and was not able to resolve a critical problem with a contractor. An effective coordination mechanism among CDR, PMU, and the Bank was put in place which demonstrated good and timely results in moving construction works forward around 2005 upon project restructuring; however, this proved not sustainable following change in CDR leadership and the need for CDR to focus on emergency reconstruction efforts following the 2006 hostilities.

58. ECRD was initially in charge of overall project coordination and housed the PMU which evolved from ECRD's unit that managed the PHRD project preparation grant. Based on early implementation experience and difficulties encountered in coordinating various implementing agencies, ECRD decided to re-focus its efforts on its areas of comparative advantage in the education sector and overall project coordination became the responsibility of the Ministry in 2002 upon a decision by the project Executive Committee. The PMU formally became under MEHE in 2004 around the time of project restructuring. ECRD was responsible for implementation of the Teacher Training and Pedagogical Development components which were among the components that moved well in cooperation with various stakeholders concerned. ECRD was also forthcoming in providing all the education data it collects within its mandate which allowed for practical testing and functioning of the Central Data Repository component of the EMIS, as confirmed by ICR interviews with ECRD, ESDS, and Bank staff.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

59. It is very difficult to make such an assessment for this project. While major shortcomings in ownership, coordination, and implementation efforts were evident in the early stages of implementation, a remarkable turnaround was quite apparent in (Government and implementing agencies) performance in the post restructuring period which made it possible to realize project outputs to a large extent and take advantage of arising opportunities to try to implement reforms. The Borrower certainly earned a better overall rating for its post restructuring performance than the rating given above; however, the rating has to cover the implementation experience during both pre- and post-restructuring periods.

VI. LESSONS LEARNED

60. There are two sets of issues and thus lessons learned emerging from implementation of this project. One relates to preparation and implementation of projects within a fragile and highly uncertain environment like that of Lebanon; the Lebanon CAS emphasizes 'transition' aspects perhaps to stress continuously evolving circumstances in the country. The other relates to implementation of education sector reforms in general.

61. As noted in the QSA5 report, protracted conflict in a country does affect institutional decision-making processes and inhibits the emergence of a culture of collaboration and coordination among various entities. In this regard, implementation experience of the EDP points to the following:

- A separate political consensus process is needed, after proposed reforms are ready, to explicitly address political sensitivities and develop political ownership. Technical and professional consultations on proposed reforms are necessary but not sufficient.
- A minimum degree and sufficient period of stability is needed following conflict for a country to develop its capacity to prepare, adopt, and implement sector-wide or far-reaching reforms. Until that capacity is in place, targeted reforms could be implemented on a step-by-step basis perhaps through ministerial decrees.
- Establishment and continuous functioning of a high level committee, including all heads of agencies involved in project implementation, with direct Bank assistance, proved helpful to: (i) facilitate decision making at the top level; (ii) coordinate implementation efforts; and (iii) maintain implementation momentum through frequent ministerial transitions.
- Dedicated emergency reconstruction Government entities, like CDR in Lebanon, might not be able to accord the same urgency to implement components of smaller, less urgent projects. Projects that choose to tap into the comparative advantage of such entities should (i) provide

dedicated staff from project resources to work with the staff of those specialized entities, and (ii) agree with those entities during project preparation to allocate sufficient staff and resources to implement the agreed components.

- Operational manuals for projects in a fragile implementation environment with high staff turnover need to be more detailed than usual in order to maintain implementation momentum. The manual should address the details of responsibilities of various implementation entities involved, processes, procedures, sequencing of operational steps, needed clearances, coordination mechanisms, etc. as well as set timeframes for various steps.

62. This Project, upon restructuring, focused on preparation of the needed foundations to effect sector reforms. Lessons of implementation experience point to the following:

- Simplicity and clarity of project design and goals, taking truly into account Government ownership and local institutional capacity, showed once again to be critical for satisfactory outcomes. Task Teams should be realistic in setting goals, and should not abandon the conclusions of assessments they make during project preparation.
- Development of the internal capacity to prepare and formulate a sector strategy and required policies requires the recruitment of new staff with the requisite skills along with building the capacity of existing staff and providing them exposure to policy issues. As noted in the PAD, there was an absence of central regulatory and policy-setting functions (and skills) in MNEYS that EDP tried to address.
- Effective implementation of comprehensive EMIS/IT components requires timely recruitment and continuity of a sufficient number of suitable staff - both at the PMU and the Ministry - to ensure outputs are delivered, fully operational by project closing, and to ensure requisite internal capacity is developed in the Ministry.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
C1 – Policy Planning and Information Management	9.40	9.80	104.2
C2 – Strengthening School Leadership, Pedagogical Capacity and the Assessment of Academic Achievement	9.30	5.30	57
C3 – Upgrading Education Facilities	41.2	23.60	57.3
C4 - Project Management	2.33	4.50	193.1
Total Baseline Cost	62.32	43.20	69.3
Physical Contingencies	4.66	0.00	0.00
Price Contingencies	3.95	0.00	0.00
Total Project Costs	70.93	43.20	60.9
Front-end fee PPF	0.00	0.00	.00
Front-end fee IBRD	0.00	0.00	.00
Total Financing Required	0.00	43.20	43.2

(b) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Cofinancing	Appraisal Estimate (USD millions)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD millions)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		12.7	0.00	0
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development		56.1	42.6	75.9
Bilateral Agencies (unidentified)		2.10	0.00	0.00

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Component A: Policy, Planning and Information Management

A-1 National Education Strategy

Expected Output

1. “A national education sector strategy for Lebanon has been prepared and endorsed by the Council of Ministers. The strategy includes a policy framework together with a series of enabling objectives for the general and vocation education streams. Each objective is supported by an identified action plan with lead responsibility assigned for implementation of all activities.”

Implementation Summary and Level of Completion

2. The Lebanese Association for Educational Studies (LAES) was contracted under the Project to prepare the NES. Following an extensive process of situational analysis and consultation with all stakeholder groups, LAES delivered a “National Education Strategy” that includes vision and mission statements for the Ministry, followed by detailed strategies and objectives for sector development under the following themes: (i) education available on the basis of equal opportunity; (ii) quality education that contributes to building a knowledge society; (iii) education that contributes to social integration; and, (iv) education that contributes to economic development.

3. *The output was satisfactorily achieved by project closing except for endorsement by the Council of Ministers – the Cabinet was not functional and practically did not meet during 2006-2009.* Following Presidential and Parliamentary elections in 2009 and formation of a new Cabinet in late 2009, the incoming Minister pursued a systematic, comprehensive political consultation process in early 2010 which did lead to formal adoption of the Strategy by the Cabinet in April 2010.

A-2 Education Management Information System

Expected Output

4. “An Education Management Information System (EMIS) has been established at MEHE, together with an Information Management Unit (IMU) and a program of end-user training. The EMIS is an integrated system that has been designed to meet the specific information needs of the general education and vocational education streams. A School Information System (SIS), linked to the EMIS, is in place to support information needs at the individual school level.”

Implementation Summary and Level of Completion

5. *EMIS components were delivered but not fully operational for use by the Ministry.* The EMIS includes multiple elements:

- i. **Business Processes:** The initial EMIS needs assessment reviewed existing processes and provided recommendations for improvements to allow efficient utilization of new technologies including necessary institutional support mechanisms. Project transition arrangements provide for a review of regulations and adaptation of processes to allow for streamlined use of the EMIS in the day-to-day administrative running of the Ministry.
- ii. **School Information System:** The SIS serves both school level requirements (i.e., student registration, grading, etc.) and sector-wide requirements for consolidation and analysis. The

- SIS software package was developed, equipment was delivered to all schools in Lebanon, relevant staff was trained, but SIS is operational in less than 10% of schools in Lebanon.
- iii. **Training of Human Resources:** As part of the EMIS consultant's contract, training was delivered to all concerned staff and departments in MEHE on the EMIS modules.
 - iv. **Infrastructure:** Significant progress was made in provision of personal computers to Ministry departments, networking of the headquarters building, as well as servers and related equipment (storage area network, etc.). One hundred schools were connected by high speed Internet to headquarters to allow online provision of data from schools.
 - v. **Institutional Mechanisms:** An Information Management Unit (IMU) was to be institutionalized in the Ministry based on a recommendation by the Organization Development study. Staff turnover and difficulties in recruitment led the Ministry to fold the functions of the IMU into the ESDS in 2007, supposedly an interim measure.

A-3 Education System Financing

Expected Output

6. *“A comprehensive study of the financing of the general education and vocational education streams in Lebanon has been completed. This study has identified and documented all monetary and non-monetary resource flows within the public and private education sectors in Lebanon. Outputs from the study would enable resource allocation strategies to be formulated in order to support universal and equitable access goals in a sustainable manner.”*

Implementation Summary and Level of Completion

7. A comprehensive situational analysis phase was completed, resulting in the identification of all financial resource flows into and out of the sector, and the building of an econometric model designed to enable assessment of the financial implications arising from the adoption of alternative policy options. Using this data, series of 6 Technical Papers were prepared to assess the costs associated with teacher distribution and rationalization, non-MEHE expenditures, student enrolment and distribution, and budgetary adjustments associated with priority funding requirements. A Budget Circular issued by MOF in June 2007 required the Ministry to prepare a Medium Term Expenditure Framework for the sector for the period 2009 – 2011, and to initiate the adoption of a Program Based Budgeting approach. Using this study, framework Program Based Budgets were prepared for the 2009 – 2011 period.

8. *The output from the Education Finance component has not only been fully achieved, but has been significantly expanded in terms of supporting MOF policy directions towards the adoption of PBB procedures.*

A-4 Organizational Development

Expected Output

9. *“An assessment of the MEHE organizational structure and institutional capacity to implement an education reform program based on identified national goals and objectives has been completed. A process for organizational re-structuring has been agreed and a staff development program initiated.”*

Implementation Summary and Level of Completion

10. An audit initially examined the legal, organizational and operational aspects of the Ministry then identified many ambiguities, functional duplications, legal gaps or constraints, and internal inefficiencies. A study was then delivered in four phases: (i) design of a recommended new organizational structure; (ii) definition of the proposed functionality of each organizational unit; (iii) development of work flow

diagrams for all major functions of the ministry; and (iv) delivery of staff training. Design of the proposed new organizational structure was undertaken in collaboration with an executive committee chaired by the Minister which included the three Director Generals, the ECRD President, and Directors of the Primary and Secondary Directorates. Output from this work was discussed with the Public Service Bureau to ensure alignment with other public service reform initiatives. A new organization chart was endorsed by the Minister, revised laws were prepared.

11. The output of this component was mostly completed. Following adoption of the NES by the Council of Ministers, draft laws and regulations needed to implement the recommendations of the study were being finalized to be presented to Parliament.

Component B: Strengthening School Leadership, Pedagogical Capacity, and the Assessment of Academic Achievement

B-1 Leadership Development

Expected Output

12. *“School Principals and Training Center Directors have completed a professional development program designed to improve leadership, motivational, and management skills, together with improved understanding of international trends in competency based contextualized learning. Principals and Directors are aware of, and participants in, the development of strategic education sector reform plans.”*

Implementation Summary and Level of Completion

13. Approximately 450 school principals over two phases enrolled in a Leadership Development program consisting of direct training program at the Leadership Institute, self study of four mandatory modules and two out of six elective modules, a practicum to formulate a school development plan for candidates’ respective schools. The 20 top achievers went on a study tour to Canada upon which they were designated as Master Trainers for subsequent rounds of program delivery and to help with on-the-job guidance for other principals. The expected output from this component has been fully achieved.

14. During the course of component delivery, extensive measures have been taken to ensure institutionalization and sustainability of the leadership development program. These include: (i) establishment of a formal relationship with the Lebanese University to support future delivery of the program; (ii) issuance of a Ministerial Decree institutionalizing the roles and responsibilities the Ministry, Lebanese University Faculty of Education, and ECRD as regards program delivery; (iii) issuance of a Ministerial Decree establishing a 15 percent salary incentive for personnel completing the Leadership Development program, and criteria for designation of School Principals.

B-2 Teacher/Instructor Development

Expected Output

15. *“A cadre of master teachers/trainers has received training in pedagogical, occupational skills, or ICT applications. A progressive program of upgrading for teachers/instructors has been implemented for the general education and vocational education streams.”*

Implementation Summary and Level of Completion

16. A teacher development program for the general education stream was collaboratively developed and subsequently financed by MEHE, ECRD and the *Bureau de Coopération Française* (later subsumed by *Agence Française de Développement*). Initially, a country wide needs assessment for teacher training by subject and by region was prepared, and a core group of teacher trainers was developed. Six regional training centers and 11 satellite centers were developed and equipped, and a teacher evaluation tool was developed and applied. Each regional training center now develops annual course offerings, which is accessed by teachers on an as needed basis. Upon request, training centers can offer training directly in the school. During 2005-2008, 25,000 teachers participated in training, typically of three days duration.

17. The output from the component was achieved except for VTE activities that were cancelled.

B-3 Assessment of Academic Achievement

Expected Output

18. *“Institutional arrangements for administration of the assessment of academic achievement have been revised to enhance efficiency and consistency. Databanks for the storage of electronic images, learning products and examination questions have been established. System users have been trained. Pilot testing has been completed at the GE secondary and VTE levels.”*

Implementation Summary and Level of Completion

19. The following systems were developed: (i) Question Bank System (QBS) housing all sample questions to be used for generating exams; (ii) Examination Generation System (EGS) to generate the official exams by subject, scope, and level of difficulty from QBS; and (iii) Examination Management System (EMS) to prepare, print, and process the issuance of examinations correction sheets. All technical and pedagogical services were delivered and were applied in 2008 and most recently in June 2009 to administer the General Science stream of the official exams. System application revealed some administrative and technical gaps that were covered under transitional arrangements put in place after project closing.

Component C: Upgrading Education Facilities

C- Civil Works

Expected Output

20. *“11 new schools in priority areas have been constructed and are operational.”*

Implementation Summary and Level of Completion

21. The Government’s School Construction Technical Audit of October 2009 reports that the 11 project construction activities were completed and were all functioning. The Audit notes that architectural aspects are good, quality of construction is good or acceptable, and all procured heavy equipment was installed. It highlights some shortcomings related to higher than planned costs, low student enrollments (Bank staff reported enrollments were as planned the year after), some detail mistakes that undermine the rational use of some constructed spaces, roof leaks were noticed in some schools, and finally notes that many heavy equipment installed under the project were not functioning as schools did not have the needed budget.

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis
(including assumptions in the analysis)

N/A

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

(a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Benoit Millot	Lead Operations Officer	MNAHD	TTL
Christian Rey	Manager	CFPTP	
L.S Christine Wong Shui Wan	Operations Analyst	MNAHD	
Rafika Chaouali	Senior Financial Management Specialist	MNAFM	
Imad Saleh	Procurement Specialist	MNALB	
Supervision/ICR			
Ghassan N. Alkhoja	Senior Operations Officer	MNSSP	
Hala Ballout	E T Temporary	MNCLB-LVL	
Robert Bou Jaoude	Sr Financial Management Specialist	MNAFM	
Diana C. El Masri	Consultant	MNAFM	
Mona El-Chami	Sr Financial Management Specialist	MNAFM	
Lina Fares	Procurement Specialist	MNAPR	
Celine Gavach	Operations Analyst	MNSHE	
Rock Jabbour	E T Consultant	MNAFM	
Rima Abdul-Amir Koteiche	Sr Financial Management Specialist	MNAFM	
Soren Nellemann	Senior Economist	EASPR	
J. Roger Pearson	Consultant	MNSHD	
Imad Saleh	Lead Procurement Specialist	EAPPR	
Haneen Ismail Sayed	Lead Operations Officer	MNSHE	
Sophie Urnechlian	Program Assistant	MNCLB-LVL	

(b) Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
Lending		
FY97		63.49
FY98		137.15
FY99		258.79
FY00	61	189.78
FY01	4	10.47
FY02-FY08		0.00
	Total:	659.68
Supervision/ICR		
FY97		0.00
FY98		0.00
FY99		0.00
FY00	2	18.53
FY01	12	41.01
FY02	10	65.29
FY03	16	77.07
FY04	19	113.72
FY05	19	94.26
FY06	19	92.33
FY07	19	102.10
FY08	15	91.54
FY09	3	0.00
	Total:	695.85

Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results

(if any)

N/A

Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

(if any)

N/A

Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

I. Development Objectives (DOs)

1. The “Education Development Project (EDP)” started as the “General Education Project (GEP)” subject of the Loan Agreement dated April 7 2000.
2. The objectives of the GEP were initially set to “support the Government’s ongoing efforts to: (i) enhance the capacity of the MNEYS to function as an effective manager of the education sector; and (ii) restore the credibility of the public education system through improvements in quality and efficiency, and increased access.”
3. In the year 2004 a restructuring process got implemented. The PDOs were revised to read as follows: “To enhance access and build the knowledge base and institutional capacity in MEHE that is necessary to initiate reform of the general and vocational education systems in Lebanon.”
4. In the year 2005, the World Bank in agreement with MEHE cancelled the financing of all components and activities related to the VTE sector.

II. Adequacy of the objectives

5. According to the GEP PAD, the initial GEP DOs were anchored in the overall CAS focus as articulated in the November 1997 document which is *to upgrade the human resource base by, inter alia, focusing on the basic education with a particular emphasis on improving quality and on supporting further expansion.*
6. The restructuring came as a response to extensive discussions with the MEHE and was endorsed by the Ministry of Finance. The PDOs were revised to reflect the new objectives of building the necessary capacity, knowledge base and analytical tools to initiate reform of the general and vocational and technical education streams instead of undertaking them. The revised DOs were in line with the Government priority to provide quality education in public schools for equity and access purposes while maintaining consistency with the CAS goal.

III. Design

7. The design of the project was successful in tackling some of the major issues that were inescapable in order to facilitate the initiation and implementation of a comprehensive plan for improving the education system in Lebanon. These issues included the “need to (i) adopt a system-wide approach to reform; (ii) to formulate a national policy framework for the education sector; (iii) to enhance the administrative capacity at the school level and at the ministry level; and (iv) to introduce and boost the use of the information technology advances to ensure an up-to-date approach to fulfilling the identified needs”.
8. Nevertheless, the project design showed some weaknesses at different levels which were partially addressed throughout the lifetime of the project. On the overall objective level, the AM of the 2004 restructuring mission stated that “both of the GE and VTE projects were over-designed in terms of institutional capacity to develop and implement complex activities in the fields of policy analysis, strategic planning, or organizational reform to achieve enhanced administrative efficiency.” Thus was the resultant need “to refocus investments from the Bank loan on building the knowledge base and institutional readiness upon which to design an effective reform program, as opposed to engage in reform activities themselves.”

9. On the components level, the design of some components showed weakness in terms of awareness of the administrative context. More specifically, the design of the EMIS component was stretched in and out repeatedly throughout the project lifetime¹. The design and implementation methods of the GIS were also revisited due to structural constraints and to the identification of available resources within the governmental structure in the year 2007, which lead to major cost savings and more sustainable implementation plans.

IV. Implementation

10. Having an independent agency in charge of the procurement process of major contracts and the entailed administrative stages at this agency introduced delays to the process and jeopardized the objectives of many projects. As a remedial action many contracts were revisited and amounts reallocated to allow the EDP team to process the procurement of some of the main contracts.

11. The commitment of the World Bank team and the dedication of the EDP team played a major role in supporting MEHE during the assault period in July 2006 and during the post-conflict stage. The active role of the World Bank in proposing and processing supportive solutions and solutions is acknowledged in terms of its substantial positive impact on the role played by MEHE during that stage.

V. Operational Experience

(1) “Experience gained during the implementation had identified the importance of decision-making at the most senior level as well as the importance of horizontal mechanisms to ensure collaboration between all stakeholders.”

(2) “Experience had shown the importance and necessity of strong management and leadership skills required in supervising and coordinating the various operational aspects of the project.”

(3) The delay in recruitment of specialists to positions such as procurement, planning, monitoring and evaluation, and economist, had major implications on the functions related to these positions and related projects objectives.

(4) The design of large components requiring critical changes (organizational, procedural) at different levels in a single component/project managed by a single consultant to be implemented simultaneously was found inefficient (e.g. EMIS).

(5) Options are available to make use of services provided by existing governmental agencies (e.g. MoD in the case of GIS) to ensure savings in cost and sustainability of the projects, it is important to explore in-depth available options for achieving objectives during the identification phase of the different projects.

¹ EMIS started as a decision support system designed to function on an underlying Central Education Database and Repository (CEDAR) in 2003. In 2005 it was re-designed to include, in addition to the DSS and the CEDAR, a full set of administrative modules aiming at the automation of the entire administrative processes within MEHE, and the needed hardware. The scope and design of EMIS were revisited one more time in 2007 at which point the scope was reduced again “to focus on the key systems required by MEHE”. (Aide-Memoires World Bank Missions, April 2004, October 2006, April 2007)

Activities (if applicable)	Main Outputs	Outcomes
	NES Document	1- Develop the priority programs of the Education Sector
IS Strategy	EMIS Strategy Document	1- Receive high management endorsement for the planned 2- Guide the work on the SIS level for data consolidation
IS Software	HR Module, DataWarehousing, Decision Support Training of Pilot Unit	1- Identify the workflows for the Public Services Office th 2- Support the efforts and provide needed information for
IS Hardware	Central Storage network data warehouse and application and database and backup servers	1- Host the EMS, EGS, EMIS, and GIS 2- Host MEHE website and Webmail 3- Providing internet access to several departments/unit
Information Technology (IT) Department (formerly IMU)	Operational IT Department (one director and three technical specialists) IMU- Purchase IMU equipment IMU - Recruit IMU Staff	1- handle the implementation of all IT initiatives 2- Provide MEHE staff with IT technical support 3- Prohibit redundancy in the planned projects
Hardware	1385 schools have available two computers and related accessories (printers fax and other) dedicated for the administrative use 95 administrators (MEHE, ECRD, ROs) were equipped with up-to-date computers 9 schools equipped with computer laboratories (81 computers to 868 students)	1- operate the SIS software 2- Operate EMIS and EMS modules at MEHE
Geographic Information System (GIS)	Agreement Signed between MEHE and MoD 17 end-users in the different departments of MEHE trained to benefit from the services of School Mapping system for administrative purposes.	1- support the administrative processes (Allocation of tea 2- support planning for new projects (ECE, other)
Connectivity	NEN Strategy Document Agreement with OGERO	1- Connect 100 schools to the internet through broadband
	An accounting team (3 from MEHE, 1 from ECRD, and 1 from the DGVTE) was trained to use a financial planning tool which enabled the assessment of different scenarios or policies (e.g. Drop-Out Prevention , Consolidation of Schools). A financial model developed which identified the cost per student in the current education system in addition to a comprehensive identification of the different sources of financing and expenditures High ranking officials (6 from MEHE and 1 from ECRD) were trained on PBB template designs, logic models and key performance indicators MEHE Leading the dialogue launched to disseminate the culture and thinking of PBB within the other line ministries and to expand the pilot further	1- prepare documents and set priorities for discussions w 2- utilized to design PBB and disseminate it within MEHE
	Restructured Organigram of MEHE Restructuring text of Laws and decrees Training of around 102 employees of high to mid ranks on new management trends, and quality assurance policies. Strategic Quality Management Plan and Manual Strategic HR manuel (profiles and job descriptions) Private Education Department received ISO certification and was equipped with computers and PCs accordingly	1- constitute the basis and organizational reference for a 2- simplify the public services processes and related adm 3- support the automation and the archiving systems at M 4- provide the structural framework for establishing the 5- update and develop the workflows and administrative m
Assessment of Academic Achievement		
	423 school principals trained (40% of public School principals) 45 master trainer trained to become Master Trainers LD Program officially adopted at the Education Faculty in the Lebanese university Amendment of the Laws to allow 15% salary incentive for principals who undertake the LD program at the Faculty of Education Official assignment of a committee (MEHE, ECRD, Faculty of Education) responsible for the institutionalization of the LD program.	1 - build management capacity and incent 423 principal 2- develop and adopt a leadership-based process for assign (the schools, personal file) 3- run a qualitative evaluation for the module by the Educa certified principals (more active involvement of the subject 80% of the trained principals adopted the planning appro 4- develop an evaluation process for theLD program in co
	Trilingual Glossary of competencies, French, English and Arabic 177 Master Trainers (french language) 57 master Trainers (English language) 70 end-users trained	1- adopt and implement the Continuous Training program

VI. Outcomes
VII. Lessons Learned

Borrower

- The GEP/EDP was launched in the absence of an education sector development strategy that is officially adopted. Actually, the EDP aimed among other objectives at the development and endorsement of a National Education Strategy (NES). One of the internal criticisms of the EDP at its earlier stages was that the EDP components are designed in the absence of a strategic plan to guide the design and planned objectives of these components. Currently the MEHE and all related institutions are benefiting from the outcomes of the EDP specifically the NES to develop the Education Sector Development Plan.
- The DOs of the GEP/EDP were clear yet its design was in some way complicated which reflected the fact the need existed to develop a better understanding of the context of MEHE during the conception phase of the project. This was revealed through (1) the restructuring process which repositioned the project on the right track; (2) the cancellation of the VTE related parts; and (3) the repetitive re-designing of some of the main components of the EDP.
- The first phase of the project was challenging due to the lack of expertise in procurement following WB guidelines. This led to slowness in the launching phase of the project. The EDP invested in building capacity in these areas, the accumulated experience allowed EDP to overcome such challenges and helped move the activities forward at a faster pace. This accumulated experience allowed the EDP team to provide MEHE with the assistance to become capable of overcoming obstacles when the need exists to implement projects of similar nature.

World Bank

- The GEP/EDP faced major challenges during the launching phase of the project. The intensive technical assistance provided by the World Bank and the team work approach which they encouraged by involving team members at GEP/EDP and MEHE stakeholders in the discussions related to the project preparation and implementation allowed a highly efficient capacity building mechanism to take place. It was observed that the higher the frequency of the missions and the close collaboration between the bank team members with the EDP team member were the faster is the progress. This close and direct collaboration allows the tackling of encountered obstacles in a given activity at earlier stages.

VIII. Arrangements for future operation

- Leadership outputs institutionalized and Leadership Committee in place through official ministerial decision to ensure sustainability of the outputs achieved
- IT Department officially in place and operational (financing options)
- Education Sector Development Plan under development and a second project under preparation to sustain and build on the outputs and achievements accomplished through the EDP

IX. References

- GEP – PAD- March 2007- Report No. 20152-LE
- Aide-Memoire World Bank Restructuring Mission April 2004
- Aide- Memoire World Bank Supervision Missions 2005, October 2006, April 2007, 2008, 2009
- EDP Progress Reports October 2007, May 2009
- EDP Achievements and Progress Presentation, presented to the World Bank in 2009

Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders

Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

1. Project Appraisal Document (2000)
2. Loan Agreement (2000)
3. Agreement amending Loan Agreement (2004)
4. Amendment to the Agreement Amending Loan Agreement (2006)
5. Quality of Supervision Assessment (QSA5, 2002)
6. School Construction Technical Audit, Draft Report (October 2009)

