



UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS (Habitat)
 CENTRE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES ETABLISSEMENTS HUMAINS
 CENTRO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LOS ASENTAMIENTOS HUMANOS



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AIR MAIL

HS/600/LEB/93/E01

Nairobi, 10 January 1995

Dear Mr. Van der Kloet,

Subject : LEB/93/E01 - Emergency Housing Reconstruction in Southern Lebanon

Reference is made to our fax of 10 January 1995.

Enclosed please find a copy of the Terminal Report of the above project.

We wish to thank you and UNARDOL for all the kind assistance extended to produce such a successful project.

Best regards.

Yours sincerely,

Heinz Kull,
 Officer-in-Charge

Unit I (Francophone Africa, Arab States & Europe)
 Technical Cooperation Division

Encl.: as stated

Mr. Van der Kloet,
 Resident Representative,
 UNDP
 P.O. Box 11-3216
 Beirut, LEBANON

Republic of Lebanon
 Office of the Minister of State for Administrative Reform
 Center for Public Sector Projects and Studies
 (C.P.S.P.S.)

OFFICE IN BEIRUT	
LEB/93/E01	
3 JAN 1995	
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Handwritten notes and signatures: 1/24/95, P.P., 2/2, 3/17/95



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***EMERGENCY HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION IN
SOUTHERN LEBANON***

TERMINAL REPORT

Tyre, July 1994

Report prepared by : Ms. Rima Habash, Programme Assistant

Final Drat revised by : Piet Goovaerts, Project Manager
(18 July 1994) Castors Consultants/Belgium

PREFACE by the PROJECT MANAGERS

It is important to realise that this was an emergency relief project and that under the pressure some errors were made. They finally did not affect the result of the project. The recommendations listed in the chapter (d) "Findings - Lessons Learnt" are very valuable, certainly in the light of the success of the project. It is important to remember that planning and close monitoring are the crucial elements to the success of a project of this kind.

It is the people of Southern Lebanon who were the main actors in this project. By our experience and standards, their acceptance of the project and their contribution have been outstanding. At the same time, we are very pleased to be able to praise the excellent performance of all the national project staff, in the Habitat office as well as in the NGOs. Their dedication and competence made us feel proud to be accepted to work in their country.

We also wish to thank all the people involved in this project for their support. In that regard the Final Reports by Save the Children and by YMCA speak for themselves. We very much appreciate this very last effort towards the project.

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(ii)

***EMERGENCY HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION
IN SOUTHERN LEBANON***

EU-LEB-93-EO1

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Note : # between brackets refer to articles/pages in full report

(a) BACKGROUND: (#1.1>6.2/P.1>5)

(i) Relief Problem (#1.1>1.5/P.1)

1. The Israeli attack in Southern Lebanon end of July 1993 resulted in numerous dead and injured and extensive damages to private houses and general properties as well as to public and community buildings. It was assessed that up to 1500 houses were totally demolished, up to 1000 houses were severely damaged and up to 15,000 had minor damages.

2. Housing was considered a first priority by the UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Assessment mission organized by UN-DHA early August. The UN Secretary General launched a US\$ 16 million appeal for housing reconstruction (out of a total appeal of US\$27 million) and made immediately available to UNCHS (Habitat) US\$ 5 million from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund.

**(ii) Immediate Problems Addressed : (#2.1>6.2/p.1>5)
Institutional Framework For Project Implementation :
(#2.1>2.14/p.1>2)**

3. The UN Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) was identified to prepare and implement the reconstruction project. A Habitat mission prepared a project document late August which was approved by the Lebanese Government (LebG) on 23 September. The project started the first assistance to selected beneficiaries in seven identified villages early October.

4. The project was under the direct supervision of the High Relief Committee (HRC) on behalf of the LebG and coordinated closely with another government department in charge of the development in Southern Lebanon : the Council for the South (CfS). An agreement was reached with the CfS which was also financially assisting the population, so as to avoid duplication of assistance.

5. A Habitat monitoring office was set up in Tyre (Southern Lebanon) and two NGOs (YMCA & Save the Children Federation/USA) were subcontracted by Habitat to implement the assistance in the field.

6. A sub-agreement was also made with UNIFIL which had been instrumental in the first phases of the humanitarian assistance right after the events. UNIFIL would be in charge to remove the rubble and the debris and would in a second phase contract some local entrepreneurs for the repair of social infrastructure. UNIFIL also played an important role as facilitator and ensured security for the project members (Habitat & NGOs) throughout the project period.

7. UNDP office administered local expenditure and supported the progress of the project.

*Programme approach according to Project Document & Reporting: (#3.1>3.24/p.2>4)
Removal of Debris; Rehabilitation of Social Infrastructure:
(#4.1>6.2/p.4>5)*

8. The project had primarily an emergency character. It was composed of 3 main components : the rehabilitation of social infrastructure, the reconstruction of totally demolished and the repair of partially damaged houses. Removal of rubble was another minor intervention.

9. The project was designed to channel financial assistance through NGOs to selected beneficiaries. The NGOs established reconstruction contracts with the beneficiaries enabling them to reconstruct their homes by their own means. The beneficiaries would organise the works totally by themselves or sub-contract them to a local contractor. (see programme on map p.6)

10. As defined in the Project Document the financial assistance provided to the beneficiaries would consist in financing approx. 60m² reconstruction for a family of 7 at a cost of US\$105/m². The assistance amount was adapted to the size of the family (max. 69m² for families of 10 or more and min. 51m² for families of 4 or less).

11. The socio-economic profile survey was conducted by the NGOs. This survey identified the size of the family and the level of assistance for the totally demolished cases. The survey also prioritized the beneficiaries in accordance with pre-defined criteria.

12. The partially damaged houses were designed to receive an average assistance of US\$2,200=.

13. The NGOs and Habitat engineers further provided technical assistance in the preparation of the plans and in the quality and quantity supervision of the works.

14. The NGO and Habitat engineers monitored the progress of the works in detail and instalments would be paid in accordance with the weekly physical progress reports.

15. The NGOs were to report weekly to the Habitat office : this procedure took some time to be installed but became the essential management tool of the project.

(b) OUTPUTS PRODUCED AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED :
(#7.1>25.2/p.5>19)

- (i) Outputs Produced : (#7.1>17.8/p.5>11)
Area of Operation; Demolition; Surveying; Selection;
Partially Damaged; Repair of Social Infrastructure :
(7.1>12.7/p.5>8)

17. The original area of operation consisted in 7 villages in the UNIFIL controlled area and 3 villages in the Nabatiyah area. SCF was responsible for the villages in the Nabatiyah area (Zone C) and in Zone A and YMCA for villages in Zone B. UNIFIL started the demolishing works in its area as well as seven repair works of social infrastructures.

18. Surveys started early September and ended for the first phase by 20 September, before the signature of the agreements with the NGOs. (showing their high commitment to the project). The last surveys were finalized end of December. The information was processed on computer. The first beneficiaries were selected as originally designed.

19. As the project progressed and more villages were added with approval of the HRC and the CFS, and as the CFS had distributed a first instalment for a parallel programme it became apparent that the partially damaged (minor damages) were already sufficiently assisted and the project therefore only selected totally demolished or severely damaged houses as beneficiaries. This made the selection criteria obsolete as the project could cover all the needs in the 33 villages of operation. Still 107 partially damaged cases remained in the project programme.

20. As the capacity of UNIFIL seemed not sufficient to cope with the repair works on the social infrastructure their direct involvement stopped mid of December. YMCA and SCF undertook the works on 18 other social infrastructures in the three zones of operation. They issued contracts with local entrepreneurs after a tender procedure early January. All the social infrastructure undertaken by the project was finished, including the reconstruction of the Majdal Silm community house. Unifil implemented programmes through the project for an amount of US\$ 96,650.

Project Management; Reporting; Coordination mechanisms;
UNIFIL : (#13.1>16/p.8>11)

21. Weekly coordination meetings were organised by the Habitat office where all problems in the field were thoroughly scrutinized and solutions proposed and later re-assessed. The NGOs and UNIFIL produced weekly progress reports on a case to case basis for village and zone levels. These reports were computerized and allowed strict progress monitoring and control over the financial disbursements to the beneficiaries.

22. These weekly reporting and coordination meetings were the essential monitoring and management mechanisms of the project. The monitoring of the physical progress in the field became efficient during the month of December. The access to detailed information on each case and on global progress statistics allowed for the early detection of delays or discrepancies in progress payments. Financial and budget control was thus equally assured. At the same time it ensured the frequent presence of the NGO engineers with the beneficiaries and contractors. This system has been the main stimulus and incentive throughout the project implementation. The detailed information on each case has also won the population's confidence with the project.

Additional Project Outputs : (#17.1>17.8/p.11)

23.1 A new project agreement has been signed the Ministry for Displaced Persons, UNDP, UNV and UNCHS-Habitat end of June. Replicability of the project mechanism, adapted to the context of the displaced persons in Lebanon, can be developed and applied in this new project.

23.2 The project subcontracted a study : "Findings and Recommendations on Housing-Construction and Urban Management Needs and Possibilities for Assistance" (March '94) to the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS). The study includes 4 project proposals which have been discussed with the relevant Government and Local Authorities. Several of these proposals are under active follow-up.

24. The project produced a report on the socio-economic profile of the potential and selected beneficiaries on the basis of the surveys conducted by the NGOs (Rima Habash, Programme Assistant/March '94).

25. A technical documentary (training material) as well as a promotional video film has been produced (incl. promotional clip) on the project (producer : Philip Bajjaly/Beirut).

26. The written press has visited the project in December 1993. A briefing note has been presented to them and an article has been published in L'Orient le Jour and in al-Nahhar (in Arabic). Mr. N'Dow, UN-ASG for UNCHS-Habitat during a visit to Lebanon between 13 & 16 June 1994 met with the Prime Minister of Lebanon to thank him for Lebanon's contribution to the reimbursement of the CERF (UN-Central Emergency Fund). Mr. N'Dow also held a project closing press conference during his visit.

(ii) Problems Encountered : (#18.1>20.11/p.12>15)
Operational Problems : (#18.1>18.8/p.12)

27. During the first months of the project the Habitat project office had to constantly supervise and guide NGOs in correct application of procedures related to surveying, selection, reporting and monitoring.

28. Delaying factors in the project implementation were related to the security situation (permanent shelling almost throughout the project implementation, especially in villages with high a caseload) and rain.

Technical Problems : (#19.1>19.18/p.12>14)

29. Lack of masons in villages with high caseload, lack of building equipment (f.e. wood for formworks), construction on deep slopes, large construction areas, multi-storey buildings with huge concrete works have caused some delay.

30. Legal problems also caused delay in very few cases.

Problem Solving Activities : (#20.1>20.11/p.14>15)

31. The weekly progress meetings were the main problem solving activity in the project. They have proven essential during the start up period (Oct-Nov) to get the monitoring procedures in place. Twice (early January and early February) they have guaranteed immediate and accurate intervention. This would have not been possible if the reporting periods had been longer as the problems would not have been identifiable as they would have averaged out in the reporting.

32. After the detection of a slow down of progress end of January a workshop was organised with all the engineers (Habitat & NGOs) to identify the delaying factors. Four groups of problems were identified, consisting in at least 15 reasons for delays and 15 actions were developed in order to achieve increasing progress within two to three weeks. In the reporting of the next six weeks it has become apparant that the workshop has resulted in positive effects. The main idea behind most of the actions was remotivation of the beneficiaries through an increased presence of the engineers on the building sites.

(iii) Habitat Office: Staffing & Equipment : (#21.1>22.2/p.15>17)

33. The Habitat office in Tyre was staffed with one International Project Manager, all other staff were Nationals. There were three engineers/architects, one programme assistant/sociologist, one admin-finance officer, one secretary, three drivers and an office cleaner. An expatriate UNV has assisted the project for five months on statistics and admin matters. The national staff has had an excellent performance throughout the project.

34. The project team was located in an office in Tyre equipped with two computers, one photocopier, the basic furniture, three cars and some small equipment. All this equipment is still in good condition and has been transferred to the UNCHS component of the UNDP-Displaced Peoples' project (LEB/93/001) (see annex 16).

(ix)

(iv)/(v)/(vi) Project Budget; Donor Contributions; Project Assessment Mission : (#23.1>25.2/p.17>19)

35. The project budget is US\$4,845,329. It has been revised four times, incl. the last time end of June (except for the Habitat-HQs component) : it shows an unspent balance of US\$263,504= which can be returned to the CERF which is approximative as the Habitat-HQs will finalize the budget revision.

36. Sweden (approx.US\$250,000) and Denmark (approx.US\$450,000) have contributed to the reimbursement of the CERF. The project has also received a contribution of US\$ 1 million from the Lebanese Government. A new appeal has been launched in April 1994 by UNCHS and DHA for the remaining US\$ 3 million.

37.1 Two senior staff of DHA/Geneva (Mr.R.Souriah & Mr.E.Haegglund) and Mr.D.Biau, UNCHS project supervisor and Unit Coordinator undertook a project assessment mission beginning of March. A joint report was issued after the mission which confirmed the success of the project based on field visits and on the positive commentary on the project from all sources met (LebG/UN/NGOs). It also recommended replication of the project's mechanisms, inclusive the project office and the NGO structures.

37.2 On request of LebGvt, UNDP and UNCHS, Mr. P. Goovaerts, Consultant Project Manager prepared in May a project revision on the UNDP-Displaced Persons project to integrate a Housing Reconstruction Unit in the project. After which Mr. Walid N'Dow, UN-ASG for UNCHS-Habitat and Mr. Jorge Gavidia, Sr.Research & Development Officer of Habitat (who had been involved in the pre-feasibility study and the prodoc design of the project) visited the project 13-16 June 1994 as a closing mission and in order to start up the Housing Reconstruction Unit within the Project for the Displaced (LEB/93/001).

(c) OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED AND SCOPE OF ASSISTANCE :
(#26>32.8/p.20>23)

(i) Objectives Achieved : (#26>30.3/p.20>22)

38. The project achieved its objectives. The project is finally assisting 106 severely partially damaged houses (average assistance amount US\$3,110) and 516 totally demolished houses (av.asst.amt : US\$5,952). It also repaired 24 social infrastructures (between US\$1,000 and US\$12,000) and reconstructed the community house in Majdal Silm which was totally destroyed (US\$41,865). It assisted more than 40 totally demolished houses in the removal of rubble and the reconstruction of their terraces.

39. As of 31 March 87 partially damaged houses and 228 totally demolished houses were totally repaired/reconstructed (average 60m2), the remaining constructions (307) are most of them in the final phases and will all be finished by 5 June. The project assessment mission beginning of March allowed for the extension of the project till 15 June on the basis of this positive

(x)

situation. At the closing date of the project (15 June) all partially damaged houses were finished (106), 504 totally demolished houses were also completely finished and 12 families (2 multi-storey buildings of 7 & 5 families) received final payment as they reached 51.5% & 69.7% progress respectively.

40. The improvement of the socio-economic situation, the application of community based approach, the community mobilization and the improvements of construction practices which had been stated as objectives of the project in the prodoc can be considered having been successfully achieved.

(ii) Scope of Assistance : (#31>32.8/p.22>23)

Numbers of Beneficiaries; Proportion of Assistance vs original assessments: (#31>32.8/p.22>23)

45. The project has assisted 616 beneficiaries, which represents approximately 95% of the needs in the area of operation of the project and approximately 70% of the total destruction of the July '93 events. The first assessment of the damages in August were actually overestimated.

47. It is the remaining caselaod, the success of the project and other destruction before and after the July events which explain why the LebG and the United Nations have suggested to re-launch the appeal of August up to a total amount of US\$ 10 million.

(d) FINDINGS - LESSONS LEARNT : (#33.1>33.19/p.24>25)

48. Local skills were upgraded thanks to close monitoring and technical advice which was a consequence of the roles of the Habitat office (monitoring) and the NGOs (supervision) who acted as financial and technical advisers. Rapid mobilisation was successful thanks to the involvement of NGOs. The fact that two NGOs had different approaches allowed for better analysis of the problems. Economic revitalization has been obtained thanks to the injection of approximately US\$ 4 million in the local economy through the beneficiaries. This has generated a reconstruction effort of approx. US\$ 10 million, because in average households were building larger houses by using other sources of assistance and their own savings. The monitoring mechanisms (contractual procedures, weekly progress reports & weekly coordination meetings) were the main incentives for the population to work intensely on the reconstruction of their homes (money was not the first priority).

(e) RECOMMENDATIONS : (#34.1>34.5/p.25>26)

49. Coordination with UNIFIL-type agencies include stand-by emergency arrangements from UN-implementation agencies (early response capacity).

50. Further recommendations concern the 60m2 surface of assistance which is low. The set-up and planning phase of an emergency project should receive more respect.

(f) CONTINUATION OF THE PROJECT : (#35>36/P.26)

51. It is recommended that this project finds some form of continuation or replication as the needs in Lebanon, particularly of displaced persons, are far bigger than what the project could meet. This recommendation has presently become reality with the collaboration of UNCHS-Habitat in the UNDP-Project for the Displaced Persons (LEB/93/001).

(g) COMMENTS ON THE NGO FINAL PROJECT REPORTS : (#37>44/p.26>27)

(i) SCF Final Project Report (#38>41/P.26>27)

(ii) YMCA Final roject Report (#42>44/P.27)

52. The presentation of the final reports by the two NGOs is another proof of their high commitment to the project and in general to their work. Their project managers in particular and their staff in general have performed an outstanding job.

53. SCF has a very comprehensive report with very interesting points on "constraints", "strengths" and "recommendations". Some of them are commented in this report. In particular, project management shares the opinion that this report should be made available to the NGOs for future interest.

54. YMCAs report is more consize and should have given more information about how the change of their project manager in december has made their share of the project successfull.

EMERGENCY HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION
IN SOUTHERN LEBANON

EU-LEB-93-E01

TERMINAL REPORT

(a) RELIEF PROBLEM AND IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS ADDRESSED

(i) RELIEF PROBLEM

1.1 The Israeli attacks on South Lebanon, Nabatiyah area and West Beqaa end of July 1993 resulted in 132 dead, 500 injured persons and extensive damages to private housing units and to a lesser extent to public and community buildings. The infrastructure in that area also suffered severe damages.

1.2 Housing, however, was the most affected sector. The damaged and destroyed housing units were dispersed over 70 villages and the town of Nabatiyah covering an area of 2000 km² in the regions of West Beqaa and South Lebanon, including the zone under UNIFIL's responsibility. Damage assessment undertaken by the Lebanese Army had identified some 1500 houses which were totally destroyed and 1000 houses with major damages. 15,000 houses were reported to have minor damages. (Other major government department, i.e Council for the South, had also carried out an assessment of damages). Typical housing units in the area consist of either a single unit or an apartment in a multi-story-building.

1.3 Families also suffered through the loss of private effects, through additional expenses for the procurement of alternative shelters, the interruption of their income from agriculture or home-based production.

1.4 Upon the Inter-Agency Emergency Humanitarian Needs Assessment Mission to South Lebanon and Beqaa, from 8 - 13 August 1993, US\$ 5 million from the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) were allocated by DHA to UNCHS (Habitat) to assist families whose houses had been totally destroyed or partially damaged and to make funds available for the repair or reconstruction of community buildings. The allocation of funds was disbursed as an advance against an appeal of US\$16 million.

1.5 The UN inter-agency mission identified three kinds of destruction: houses completely destroyed or that were unsafe to live in and therefore had to be demolished and reconstructed, houses with extensive partial damage and finally houses with minor damages that could be repaired by the owner himself.

(ii) IMMEDIATE PROBLEMS ADDRESSED

Institutional Framework For Project Implementation :

Various actors at different levels were involved in the project implementation.

2.1 The inter-agency mission was followed by a project formulation mission from Habitat, which selected the NGOs, designed the project and drafted a UNCHS-DHA project document.

2.2 The **High Relief Committee (HRC)**, a committee placed under the direct responsibility of the Prime Minister oversaw the coordination of Habitat's rehabilitation activities in South Lebanon and gave priority to the project.

2.3 The **Council for the South**, another Government Department in charge for the Development in the South of Lebanon, launched an assistance programme in the form of grants to all the affected populations, according to the damages the families suffered. The amount allotted was based on a damage assessment undertaken by the Council for the South (Cfs). Coordination with Cfs proved necessary to rule out duplication of assistance.

2.4 In September, two Habitat Consultants were selected to start up the project in the field.

2.5 The project started mid September and was formally approved on September 23rd by the Minister of Housing and Cooperatives and the High Relief Committee.

2.6 Furthermore, donations of cement by the Syrian government were channelled through the **Council for the South**. Coordination was also made through the HRC.

2.7 Habitat subcontracted the programme implementation in the field to **two NGOs (YMCA and Save the Children Federation)** who functioned as technical and financial advisors and controllers and as financiers for each required assistance. Their responsibility included conducting the socio-economic surveys and technical assessments of damages, the design of the housing solution according to family requirements and the allocation of rehabilitation funds to the beneficiaries. Their assignment included technical monitoring of construction works and controlling the correct expenditure of rehabilitation funds. The NGOs maintained close contact with the beneficiaries and the communities in the area of operation. Outside the UNIFIL area they were responsible for contracting the demolition works and the removing of rubble.

2.8 The **Habitat** project office was in charge of monitoring the proper application of the guidelines laid down in the project document. When necessary, the project office intervened to ensure the correct course of the works.

2.9 As to the rehabilitation of public buildings, especially schools, the **Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR)** had also started a rehabilitation programme. UNARDOL representative ensured coordination to avoid overlapping in the area of rehabilitation of the social infrastructure.

2.10 In the zone under control of **UNIFIL**, the latter's Humanitarian Cell assumed responsibility for the works related to demolition and removal of debris prior to the construction. Activities were carried out according to an agreement with UNCHS. These activities were sub-contracted under the usual UN procedures with the submission of three offers.

2.11 **UNIFIL** also took charge of the rehabilitation of 7 social infrastructure projects (schools, community centers, dispensaries etc) but terminated these activities at a later stage of the project. Initially the villages of Majdal Silim, Bra'shit, Yatar, Zibqin, As-Siddiqin and Al-Qulayla were foreseen.

2.12 **UNIFIL** provided - when required - security escorts and logistical support to project personnel.

2.13 **UNDP** closely monitored the development of the project and conducted several visits to the field. Weekly de-briefing meetings were held with UNDP and UNARDOL representatives, in which an up-date was given and further development outlined and discussed.

2.14 The programme was executed by **UNCHS (Habitat)** through its project office in Tyre in coordination with the government (through HRC) and the Council for the South and in cooperation with NGOs and UNIFIL.

Programme Approach according to Project Document

3.1 The "Council for the South", the "Ministry for the the Displaced" and the "Ministry of Housing" offer programmes in the public sector of housing, such as rehabilitation of housing or housing loan programmes. The above mentioned programmes are however limited to the provision of grants for house rehabilitation with almost no technical supervision and monitoring in the use of funds.

3.2 Habitat's programme had primarily an emergency relief character. Developmental objectives were secondary in significance and were a complementary positive output the project had in the area of operation.

3.3 Habitat's programme was composed of 3 main components: the rehabilitation of social infrastructure, the reconstruction of totally destroyed houses, and the repair of partially damaged houses.

3.4 The implementation strategy included three phases: an initial phase which covered immediate activities of demolition, removal of debris and repairs of social infrastructure; a first phase (rehabilitation in 7 priority villages, housing and social infrastructure) and a second phase (rehabilitation of housing and social infrastructure in the remaining villages of the UNIFIL area and the Nabatiyeh area, which was subject to the availability of funds)

3.5 The **average housing unit** was estimated at 120m². Habitat financed the reconstruction of a minimum housing solution consisting of an average of 60 m². This figure was calculated for an average family size of seven members and was adapted according to family size. That is 3 sqm/person were either deducted in case of a smaller family or added for bigger families reaching a minimum of 51 sqm or respectively a maximum of 69 sqm.

3.6 Habitat's **programme** aimed at channeling financial and technical assistance through **NGOs** to selected beneficiaries, to enable the latter to reconstruct or repair their houses. The project was outlined in such a way to ensure a core-house of an average of 60 sqm, which at a later stage the beneficiary could enlarge.

3.7 The **NGOs** were requested as per sub-contract to open a field office with specific staff requirements. (project manager, social workers, engineers, finance officer and administrative support staff).

3.8 The **household size** has been defined prior to the survey as the number of family members currently living in one household with the head of family. The definition of household implies that the family lives in the same house or in an annex, but sharing kitchen and bath. The area of the house also includes the food commodity store room and livestock rooms. Family members who have emigrated or are presently living in Beirut on a permanent basis were not included in the household.

3.9 For reconstruction the **assistance amount** was set in the project document at 105 \$/m² and should not exceed this amount per family. (60m² = US\$6,300)

3.10 In order to inform the target population Habitat organized - with the help and participation of UNIFIL and the NGOs - an **information campaign** in the villages beginning of October and met with village notables and potential beneficiaries.

3.11 The objective of the programme was to involve the **beneficiary** as much as possible in the process of reconstructing his house. Engineers from the **NGOs** consulted the beneficiary on the technical possibilities of reconstructing his house and the latter's wishes were included in the construction plan provided they did not contradict the guidelines of the programme.

3.12 In coordination with the government and UNIFIL the 10 most severely hit **villages** were selected. The area of operation was then expanded to cover more affected villages.

3.13 Social workers and engineers from the NGOs executed the **survey** applying standardized questionnaires.

3.14 The **socio-economic profile**, which was surveyed by social workers, referred to the economic situation (income, property value etc.) of the family as well as to the social one, i.e emphasis was put on vulnerable groups. (whether any family members were killed during the events of July 1993, or whether the head of family is a widow, etc). Families whose income exceeded a certain limit of income (eg. US\$1,500 for a family of 7 members) which was believed to be sufficient for the repair or reconstruction of their house were excluded from the project's assistance, since the UN focused on lower income groups.

3.15 Engineers from the NGOs carried out the **technical assessment** which was based on pre-defined technical aspects and included the assessment of damages on the house, both in descriptive and in financial terms.

3.16 Survey results were compiled in **survey fact sheets**.

3.17 Selection of beneficiaries was based on the **computer processed data**. Social and economic criteria were developed to meet on a priority scale the needs of the affected families, especially those who had not benefitted from any other emergency relief programme.

3.18 An **index of priority**, the addition of social and economic criteria was then developed to assess the priority of assistance.

3.19 The original objective as outlined in the Project Document was to start with the selection of approximately 10% of the surveyed beneficiaries 3 to 4 days after the beginning of surveying. The objective was to enable the NGOs to approach beneficiaries quickly and provide financial assistance to the first affected households in the first half of September. Habitat would control the selection through samples.

3.20 A **contract** was signed between the NGO and the beneficiary. This contract included a plan of reconstruction and a schedule of works (technical description of works that are to be executed with each instalment).

3.21 The **instalments** were limited to two to four steps depending on the amount of the funding. The owner was contractually committed to finish the entire work in a period of 4 to 8 weeks depending on the volume and the nature of the works. Any advance payment should be made contractually reimbursable if not correctly used to meet the objectives of the project and should not exceed US\$ 1000 per family.

3.22 The **beneficiary** was directly responsible for the organization of the construction or repair of his house.

3.23 **Habitat** and the **NGOs** supervised and monitored the appropriate use of the funds and the quality and progress of works. Release of financial assistance was directly linked to quality and quantity control mechanisms.

Reporting

3.24 In order for Habitat to follow up the financial and technical progress of the construction three types of **reports** were introduced according to the project document and in agreement with the NGOs: 1. weekly progress reports on all selected beneficiaries, with the technical and financial contractual agreements between the NGO and the owners; 2. regular progress reports on the contracted works; 3. regular financial reports (for both the latter the agreement set definite dates which however could not be kept). Applying the monitoring procedure needed some time to be followed.

Removing of debris

4.1 The Humanitarian Cell of UNIFIL was assigned to be in charge of removing **debris and of site clearance** in Zones A and B. These activities were planned to start in the first week of September upon approval of Habitat-HQ. Demolition specifically related to locations outside the UNIFIL area were contracted and supervised by one of the NGOs (MECC) according to contractual and technical conditions established by the Project Office.

4.2 At the beginning of the project an average of 850\$ was set for the removal of debris.

Repair of partially damaged

5.1 According to the agreement between NGOs and Habitat the **assistance** for partially damaged should not exceed 2,200\$.

5.2 The sub-contracting and Habitat's **monitoring** procedures were applied. Initially, the **selection** criteria were also the same.

Rehabilitation of social infrastructure

6.1 Social infrastructure applies to schools, medical and other facilities. None of these **infrastructure** buildings were considered totally destroyed. The repair of these facilities was a minor project intervention but of first priority and was planned to start in the initial phase of the project.

6.2 **Repair of social infrastructure** in Zone A and B (UNIFIL area) was to be managed by the UNIFIL Humanitarian Cell as to contracting and supervision of the repair works. Social Infrastructure repair in the Nabatiyeh area (Zone C) would be managed by MECC.

(b) OUTPUTS PRODUCED AND PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

(i) OUTPUTS PRODUCED

Area of operation

7.1 The **initial area of operation**, which included 10 villages (see Map p.6) in the UNIFIL and Nabatiyeh areas, was originally divided among three NGOs: Zone A for Save the Children Federation (SCF), Zone B for Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) and Zone C for The Middle East Council of Churches (MECC). The latter decided to withdraw from the project.

7.2 In the first week of October SCF took over **Nabatiyeh area** (Jibshit, Kafr Sir, Zawtar ash-Sharqiyah) which was originally assigned as Zone C to MECC as area of operation.

7.3 End of October the **village of Yatar**, initially in SCF's area of operation, was officially handed over to YMCA to balance the caseload between SCF and YMCA. Redistributions of areas of operation have been made through amendments to the contracts. The extension of areas were covered through three consecutive amendments. As a first step HRC agreed to the expansion of the area of operation to further 12 villages in the UNIFIL and Nabatiyah areas. The caseload indicated the necessity for further expansion of the area.

Demolition

8.1 Based on the quick mobilization capacity an agreement was signed with UNIFIL for the execution of demolition, removal of rubble and clearing grounds of the totally damaged houses, as well as for repair works on some social infrastructure buildings (schools, community centers, medical facilities,), which were going to take place in the villages of Majdal Silim , Bra'shit, Kafra, Yatar, Zibqin, As-Siddiqin, Al-Qulayleh.

8.2 A first agreement with UNIFIL was signed which covered the initial phase of the project and contained only demolishing, removal of rubble and clearing of the building site of totally destroyed houses in the above mentioned villages. This phase started on August 30th and ended on October 12th, 1993. This agreement was established on the basis that further agreements would be finalized at a later stage. UNIFIL would subcontract the demolishing, removal of rubble and clearing of the building sites and would report to Habitat on a regular basis. Mobilization of subcontractors should have not be later than September 1 .

Surveying

9.1 The **survey** is both in technical descriptive as in financial terms. The surveys which for the intitial phase were to terminate by 20 September were actually achieved with exception to the caseload taken over from MECC. These were finalised by SCF in the next three weeks.


9.2 The NGOs started the **surveys** one month before the agreements with them were signed. This reflected the high NGO commitment to the project.

9.2 The **survey** in the beginning included all potential beneficiaries. Beneficiaries were selected according to predefined criteria, but was at a later stage confined to beneficiaries with totally destroyed houses or houses with severe partial damages.



UNHCR (Habitat)

**EMERGENCY HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION
IN SOUTHERN LEBANON**



LIST OF VILLAGES & PROJECT PROGRAMME

01.	AL QLAYLA	10 houses	school
02.	ZIBQEN	10 houses	
03.	ASH SHIAYTIVAN	16 houses	
04.	HASAHAY		school
05.	ANTZET	16 houses	
06.	QHA	27 houses	
07.	AS SADDEGEN	20 houses	
08.	KHIREET SIL'	27 houses	
09.	YATEP	46 houses	school
10.	KAFRA	36 houses	community house
11.	HARIS	20 houses	
12.	HADOOTAH	12 houses	school
13.	AYTA A ZUTT	62 houses	school
14.	DRA'SHIT	29 houses	school; dispensary
15.	TIBHINE	21 houses	pt. security hse; hospital
16.	SULTANIYEH	27 houses	
17.	SHIHABIYAH		school
18.	SAFAD BATTIKH	21 houses	
19.	JUNAYJHEH	22 houses	school
20.	AS SAWANEH		school
21.	GABRIKHA	23 houses	
22.	HAJDAL SIL'	69 houses	community house
23.	SHAQRA	93 houses	
24.	MAARCUS	21 houses	
25.	K'AR SIR	53 houses	community house
26.	QAQIZET EL JISR	16 houses	school, welfare econ. house
27.	ZANTAR ALHARBIEH	11 houses	
28.	ZANTAR ASHARQIYAH	10 houses	
29.	EBBA	31 houses	community house
30.	JIBSHEET	72 houses	
31.	SHOUKEEN	23 houses	
32.	SHARQIYAH		community house
33.	DURH		dispensary
34.	MAROUF	25 houses	
35.	HABATIYAH ELTAMQA	25 houses	
36.	HABATIYAH		

9.3 **Surveys** in the selected seven villages located in Zone A and B were carried out by end of September for the first batch and by December for the three other batches.

9.4 The **technical assessment** for totally destroyed houses was not required. For partially damaged houses more detailed description of the damages occurred was undertaken.

9.5 The **location of the houses of beneficiaries** was indicated on a map, which was prepared by the architect/engineer.

9.6 The information was processed on the computer according to a unified system. For this purpose a computer specialist developed a **programme** which was extended according to needs.

Selection

10.1 The NGOs were in charge to evaluate on basis of the computer processed data the socio-economic situation of beneficiaries. The list of **pre-selected beneficiaries** had to be approved by Habitat. Prior to the approval these lists were compared with the lists of names benefitting from Council for the South's assistance. This caused in some cases difficulties as beneficiaries were sometimes registered at the Council for the South under a different name.

10.2 **Economic criteria** were developed to reflect income adjusted according to family size. **Social criteria** prioritized vulnerable groups. A priority index added the two criteria.

10.3 As the project progressed assistance based on **priorities** was cancelled, since the budget was able to cover all cases of totally destroyed houses, exclusive of those cases with an income exceeding US\$ 1500 and cases of minor damages, which were covered by the first instalments already disbursed by the CFS.

10.4 **Construction** works were usually done by the owner himself or with the help of skilled and semi-skilled laborers. In case of a multi-storey building the work was usually contracted.

10.5 The construction of **multi-storey buildings** was facilitated through the fact that in all cases people living in the same buildings are relatives.

10.6 Conventional **construction techniques** were applied. The technical input of the engineers guaranteed that design and quality of the core house meets local standards.

Partially Damaged

11.1 Comparison of Habitat's assistance with CFS list revealed that CFS assistance had reached almost all cases with minor damages (up to US\$2,400). Therefore, Habitat decided to put emphasis on the reconstruction of totally destroyed houses and houses with severe damages.

11.2 The cases of houses which were **partially damaged** were revised with the application of a new formula: assessment for the category of partially demolished was based on the remaining squaremeters. If less than 20 sqm of floor-surface was intact, the house was automatically categorized as totally destructed and the adequate assistance allotted. If the remaining number of floorsurface sqm exceeded 20m², this number was deducted from the average of 60 sqm and the difference was subject to assistance.

Repair of Social Infrastructure

12.1 Habitat engineers completed the technical assessment of damages on 25 **community buildings** (hospitals, community houses, and dispensaries) in the UNIFIL area. Damages ranged from US\$ 1,000 to US\$ 45,000 (Majdel Silim Community House, which is totally destroyed). The latter was not foreseen in the Project Document. (see Table p.9.)

12.2 UNIFIL had started repair works on the schools of Yatar, Bra'shit, Ayta az-Zutt and Haddathah and on the Yatar community house. After finalizing these works, UNIFIL withdrew from this part of the project as civil construction works is not their speciality.

12.3 Since the rehabilitation of school buildings has been also included in the programme of the Council for Development and Reconstruction Habitat had to coordinate through UNDP with the latter.

12.4 In Nabatiyeh area damages on **community buildings** were assessed by the NGO operating there, i.e. SCF.

12.5 The **repair of social infrastructure by the NGOs in Zones A, B and C** were contracted early January.

12.6 All these were finished end of March, except for the community house in Majdal Silim which was finalized on June 15th.

12.7 Very close **monitoring** similar to the one for the house reconstruction was applied for progress monitoring and payment procedures.

Project Management

13.1 Project **monitoring mechanisms** applied have not been static, but were adapted in the course of the project whenever needs seems to prevail or more adequate solutions were found.

13.2 **Mechanisms** were adapted specifically to tackle the various problems faced by NGOs. (see chapter (ii), paras. 18)

13.3 **Weekly coordination** meetings were organised by Habitat where the NGO project managers and the UNIFIL representative gave updated reports from the field.

13.4 These **meetings** were part of the monitoring and management system set up by the Habitat project office. Problems in the field which can range from delay in the progress of construction and issues pertaining to technical problems were discussed and either solved during the meeting or after the meeting in small groups consisting of the concerned staff members.

Reporting

14.1 Once the reconstruction of a house was started NGO engineers monitored the **progress** case by case on a weekly basis. From there the computer generated updates in a summarized format that reflected the progress of the construction works and the disbursement of instalments.

14.2 The **weekly financial reports** delivered by the NGOs allowed the monitoring of the cash-flow of the project. For this purpose a soft-ware was installed in the NGO computers in the field offices. The NGOs prepared financial progress reports per village and per zone. They reflected the number of beneficiaries, the amounts committed and disbursed, the physical progress and the percentile progress

LIST OF SOCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS IMPLEMENTED
WITHIN THE HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT IN SOUTH
LEBANON IN ZONE ZONES A, B, AND C

#	TYPE OF PROJECT	VILLAGE	ACTUAL COST
ZONE A:			
1.	PUBLIC SCHOOL	AL QULAYLE	\$ 17,740
2.	PUBLIC SCHOOL	HANAWAI	\$ 13,050
SUBTOTAL A :			\$ 30,790
ZONE B :			
1.	COMMUNITY HOUSE	KAFRA	\$ 7,445
2.	SECURITY HOUSE	TEBNIN	\$ 10,250
3.	GOVERN. HOSPITAL	TEBNIN	\$ 6,800
4.	DISPENSARY	BRA'SHIT	\$ 3,970
5.	PUBLIC SCHOOL	SHEHABYIEH	\$ 9,750
6.	PUBLIC SCHOOL	SOWWANEH	\$ 4,370
7.	COMMUNITY HOUSE	MAJDAL SILM	\$ 41,865
SUBTOTAL B :			\$ 84,450
ZONE C :			
1.	SECURITY HOUSE	NABATYIEH	\$ 8,474
2.	HEALTH CENTER	NABATYIEH	\$ 4,520
3.	SOCIAL CENTER	NABATYIEH	\$ 13,641
4.	DISPENSARY	DWEIR	\$ 825
5.	COMMUNITY HOUSE	KFAR RUMAN	\$ 1,035
6.	DISPENSARY	EBBA	\$ 1,818
7.	DISPENSARY	HABBOUSH	\$ 6,050
8.	COMMUNITY HOUSE	QAQAIET EL JISR	\$ 3,908
9.	SOCIAL CENTER	QAQAIET EL JISR	\$ 12,795
SUBTOTAL C :			\$ 53,066
PROJECTS BY UNIFIL :			
1.	PUBLIC SCHOOL	HADATHA	\$ 15,500
2.	PUBLIC SCHOOL	YATAR	\$ 5,000
3.	PUBLIC SCHOOL	JUMAYJUMEH	\$ 2,250
4.	PUBLIC SCHOOL	AYTA JABAL	\$ 4,000
5.	PUBLIC SCHOOL	BRA'SHIT	\$ 27,480
SUBTOTAL UNIFIL :			\$ 54,230
23 P	GRAND TOTAL :		\$222,536

versus the total of the instalments: payment of the next instalment was issued when the progress was 120% of the total of the previous instalments. This minimised the advances by the project and stimulated the people to work.

14.3 The **Weekly physical construction progress reports** were generated for every village, reflecting the compilation of information on each beneficiary. The information calculated on village level was compiled to zone level and then to project level. The Habitat project office produced a summary of this information, which was then conveyed to Habitat and UNDP on a weekly basis.

14.4 During the first weeks of mobilization and implementation the **reporting procedures** lacked discipline and accuracy. Continuous follow-up by the Project Office resulted in gradual improvement.

14.5 The engineers in the field and the Habitat project office had access to **detailed information** on each individual case and consequently were able to trace any irregularities (mistakes, lack of progress in payment of instalments, lack of physical progress). This weekly progress monitoring mechanism allowed for fast assessment of these irregularities which would have averaged out over longer monitoring periods. The irregularities would then not have been identifiable. Quick interventions beginning of January (over-disbursement) and beginning of February (serious drop in progress) are examples of the efficiency of the mechanism.

14.6 The production of **statistical progress reports** allowed financial control, budget monitoring and the overall project progress.

14.7 The **system** provided accurate information on construction progress and detailed control on financial progress of work executed in even remote areas from the project office.

14.8 The **system** also revealed that constant monitoring by the field engineer was essential for stimulating the beneficiary and consequently for the progress of the work.

14.9 Each beneficiary had his **schedule of works** entered in the computer. The NGO engineers had an Arabic version with them in the field and recorded weekly the progress made. On the computer outprint was indicated when the beneficiary was eligible for the next instalment, in accordance with the level of progress achieved.

14.10 The average progress was approximately 5% per week. In a fast developing programme as this one this **monitoring system** had one inconvenience: the reporting was one week old by the time it reached the project office and about 2 or more weeks by the time it reached Nairobi.

Coordination Mechanisms

15.1 The objective of coordinating with the **Council for the South (CfS)** was to rule out duplication of assistance. Coordination, however, was limited to the exchange of information and data. CfS submitted to Habitat the lists of beneficiaries, including the assessed damage and the first instalment. Habitat on the other hand submitted a list of beneficiaries to CfS, including the amount of assistance by the project.

15.2 The coordination with the **CfS** was confirmed through a letter of agreement.

15.3 **Several coordination meetings** were held with the **Council for the South** in which UNCHS submitted name lists of selected beneficiaries and name lists of cancelled cases. This became especially important when the Council for the South started paying their second instalment. The exchange of beneficiary lists allowed both the project office and the Council for the South to ensure that beneficiaries did not receive more than the CfS allocated maximum amount of LL. 20 million.

UNIFIL

16. The last progress report was submitted by UNIFIL on December 14 and concluded thus UNIFIL activities. The amount of the UNIFIL contract was US\$ 97,850 (US\$ 42,420 for demolishing works and US\$ 55,430 for rehabilitation of social infrastructure works). Finally only US\$96,650 was implemented through the agreement with Habitat as one component of US\$1,200 was cancelled end of February.

Project Related Outputs

17.1 The success of the project and its monitoring mechanisms and community based approach through NGOs has made the Government of Lebanon requesting that a housing reconstruction unit should be integrated in the UNDP-Ministry of Displaced project for Reintegration and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced (LEB/93/001). In May, the Consultant Project Manager prepared a prodoc revision proposal which was revised by UNCHS-Habitat (Mr. Jorge Gavidia on mission in Lebanon in June). Half of June, Mr. Walid N'Dow who was on visit in Lebanon for the closure of the project, agreed with UNDP and the Ministry for the Displaced on the early start of the Housing Unit (hich has started on 1 July 1994).

17.2 Within the project a study in close collaboration with the **Lebanese Center for Policy Studies (LCPS)** was conducted on the development of the construction sector in Lebanon and on possibilities of assistance through UNCHS. For the purpose of assessing interest and possibilities of UNCHS technical assistance to government departments, agencies and ministries various contacts were established. Generally, interest was expressed in the mechanisms applied to efficiently mobilize community capacities in a relative short period of time. Representatives from governmental and non-governmental organizations were met to compile the needed information.

17.3 A report : "Findings and Recommendations on Housing-Construction and Urban Management Needs and Possibilities for Assistance" was released in March '94 (see annex 8).

17.4 The Habitat programme assistant analyzed in detail the **socio-economic profile** of the beneficiaries by making use of the information available in the surveys, which were conducted for the purpose of selecting the beneficiaries. The project office believes that such an analytical report is a useful document for further UN and in particular UNCHS activities in the area.

17.5 The report on this socio-economic profile analysis was finalised by the end of May '94 (see annex 9).

17.6 A 30 minutes **video documentary** as well as a 13 minutes promotional video (incl. 3 min. clip) were made by the producer Philip Bajjaly on the project, which was presented to major donors. The film not only reflects the human aspects of the tragedy, but also pays much attention to the project management, monitoring and implementation mechanisms, showing the incentives these mechanisms have achieved in mobilizing communities to reconstruct their houses and how the correct use of donor funds was ensured. Besides, it shows several stages of the project implementation.

17.7 The written **press** visited the project office on December 16 and was briefed by the UNARDOL representative, the UNIFIL Humanitarian Cell Officer and the Habitat Project Manager. During a field visit houses under construction and the first finished houses could be visited. Furthermore, they visited the school of Yatar which was repaired by UNIFIL according to the agreement with Habitat. (see annex 10)

17.8 Mr. Walid N'Dow, UN-ASG for UNCHS-Habitat held a press conference for the closure of the project on Wednesday 15th of June 1994 after his meeting with the Prime Minister. Mr. N'Dow thanked the Prime Minister of Lebanon and the Speaker of the House for Lebanon's US\$ 1 million contribution to the reimbursement of the CERF.

(ii) PROBLEMS ENCOUNTERED

Operational Problems

18.1 During the months October, November and December YMCA had a lower **progress rate** than SCF, which was due to the poor management and the lack of compliance of the contracting and monitoring procedures.

18.2 In addition, YMCA's **selection of beneficiaries** was done in a haphazard way. The surveys proved in many cases inaccurate, which affected the contracting with the beneficiaries. As a consequence many contracts were rejected by the Habitat project office and several "total demolished" were transformed in "partial damaged". In the villages where these mistakes occurred YMCA continuously faced pressures by the local population.

18.3 Habitat Project Office also noticed lack of contact with the beneficiaries by YMCA. The Habitat management directly controlled this procedure throughout December and January. Thanks to the change of manager on the side of YMCA end of December major progress had been observed since then.

18.4 SCF opened two **field offices** : one in Zone C and one in Tyre. YMCA opened one office in Tebnine. While SCF office/Tyre had a computer YMCA directed all their business from Beirut, which made the weekly reporting system less efficient. This was equally corrected in January. SCF although understaffed managed to achieve the project objectives, however with some delay in Zone A.

18.5 Some delay in the work progress occurred through the withdrawal of MECC from the project. A redistribution of villages between SCF and YMCA became necessary.

18.6 Zone C was initially given to **The Middle East Council (MECC) of Churches**, when they decided to withdraw from the project, the surveys in this zone underwent some delays.

18.7 In the initial period of the programme-implementation the project management faced several obstacles and difficulties that had to be tackled. The most serious one was that in many cases the **information flow from the project office** to the field engineers and vice versa lacked consistency.

18.8 In addition it showed during the implementation of the project that the NGOs were applying **different approaches** in the field. Habitat's engineers had to intervene at the level of NGO field-offices as well as at field level to make the necessary corrections. Weekly coordination meetings in the field between Habitat and NGO engineers established quick responses to these difficulties.

Technical Problems

19.1 According to the prodoc the project was to end on 28 February. Several factors account for the delays.

19.2 An **obstacle to progress** for YMCA was the difficult caseload in four big villages, which were facing permanent security problems: Kafra, Majdal Silim, Bra'shit and Yatar, which is 66% of YMCA's caseload and 36% of the project caseload.

19.3 Delay occurred due to the **lack of masons**. The villages of Majdal Silim and Bra'shit (Zone B) had a serious shortage of masons and carpenters, and their supplies of building materials was difficult. SCF met similar problems in Khirbet Silim. There SCF had a very low progress in issuing contracts and several inhabitants refused the UN assistance.

19.4 Although highly motivated beneficiaries managed to finish their houses in the 6 to 8 weeks **construction period**. But the average construction of a core house of 60msq needs rather 12 weeks and many beneficiaries even exceeded this period. As is normal in construction the finishing works are a serious cause of delay.

19.5 There was a **lack of masons** (147 masons for 422 houses, as of December report), and equally of carpenters for the formworks in the villages. They rotated from one house to the other which did not achieve permanent progress in each individual house.

19.6 There was a **lack of equipment** (51 concrete mixers/422 houses) whereas in the first two phases of the construction big amounts of concrete had to be prepared .

19.7 There has been no really visible shortage of building materials, but there was not **enough timber for formworks**. Lots of formworks were made of new timber, whereas it is usual in the village that this timber moves from house to house. Investigations showed that there was eventually enough timber for 60m2 houses, but the beneficiaries built houses averaging 120/150m2. This timber was also blocked on each building site for at least 3 to 4 weeks. Timber is quite expensive and the beneficiaries were discouraged to purchase more.

19.8 Progress of construction was also delayed through the fact that beneficiaries were constructing **more than the 60sqm** which were subject to UN assistance, since the average house in the area was 120sqm before the events. The beneficiaries rebuilt houses averaging 142sqm.

19.9 Delay was also observed with beneficiaries shifting from the **first instalment to the second**, as this was the concrete structure phase in the project: the concrete needs at least 14 days to cure before further structural construction could be started, and the whole concrete work needed at least 3 to 4 weeks before the next phases could start.

19.10 For 5 **multi-storey buildings** with 13 families terraces had to be built, as their houses were located on steep slopes. This caused not only delays because it required construction time, but it exhausted the funds of the beneficiaries. The project has provided partial financial assistance to these cases.

19.11 **Multi-storey buildings** were evidently cause of delays for the average progress of the project. There were twelve multi-storey buildings and 59 families were assisted in these buildings. The committed assistance was for the amount of US\$ 276,570 or 7.9% of the total commitment. The average physical progress for ten of these buildings was 32.2% in December, which was far lower than the average progress of the project (54.2%) at the same time. Several of these buildings will only finish by May or June. Particularly the building in Maroub. This was one of the main reasons for the extension of the project till 15 June. In fact, the building in Maaroub (7 families) only achieved 51.5% progress by 15th of June, and another multi-storey building in Jibsheit (5 families) only achieved 69.7% progress. They were the only two buildings which were not finished at the end of the project. The project decided nonetheless to pay them their full instalments as they were making permanent progress.

19.12 In several villages the smooth course of the programme was significantly hampered by the frequent **shelling**. Surveying as well as construction were delayed. 6 out of 33 villages were suffering from a continuous tense situation. However, in the same villages and under the same circumstances some houses could be completed. The major effect of the bad security situation is the lack of labor. Outside labor was very reluctant to work in these villages.

19.13 The **security situation** which in these villages was precarious during the entire project period coincided with high case-loads (Majdal Silim, Bra'shit, Kafra, Yatar, Jibsheit, Zawtar Sharquiya) considerably slowing down the average weekly progress of the project. These villages were the front line villages which were the main target during the July events.

19.14 A serious case affecting the progress of works for both Habitat and the NGOs was the **village of Yatar**. This village presents a difficult socio-political situation, with a high percentage of destructed houses and several political factions struggling to get assistance according to their priorities, such as trying to include cases with damages prior to July 1993. In several meetings with representatives with Yatar and during an information campaign during which Habitat explained the procedures of assistance and selection, no serious climate of cooperation could be achieved with the community.

19.15 Some delay was also due to **rainy days**. Throughout the project period (average 500 X thirty) = 1,500 **beneficiary-working days were lost**.

19.16 Delay was also caused by **ramadan**, especially at the end of the fasting period (Eid al Fitr) which is a three day feast and which caused many of the Syrian labourers to be absent for more than three days.

19.17 Some beneficiaries were **reluctant** to construct or their progress was just very slow. These cases of slow progress were identified by the Project Office and listed separately for the NGOs so that they could pay special attention for their follow-up. The reason for their reluctance to build was partly their expectation that they receive assistance from the Council for the South or other sources of financing and were using the UN funds for other purposes/priorities. They expected that they would be able to compensate whenever this assistance came through which not always happened.

19.18 Furthermore, there were beneficiaries who had **work activities in Beirut** and the winter did not encourage them to undertake the efforts on their houses in the South. They did not conceive delays as being a "problem".

Problem Solving Activities

20.1 The weekly monitoring meetings analyzed in detail global project, zones, villages and individual beneficiary progress. Whenever this analysis was unsatisfactory NGOs were made attent and were requested to provide explanations and justifications. Proposals of solutions were developed and reassessed in the subsequent meetings. This type of exercises led to the understanding of some of the problems.

20.2 During the weekly progress meetings of late December/early January it became apparant that YMCA was disbursing without any relation to real physical progress in the field. Habitat project office decided to control every single disbursement of YMCA to beneficiaries and insisted on the YMCA engineer's closer contact with the beneficiaries. Within three to five weeks the over-disbursement was corrected and YMCA has since then reported higher construction progress than ever before.

20.3 As a consequence of a serious drop of physical progress in the last week of January from a previous average of 5% per week to 2.7% a **workshop on identification of delaying factors**, including their proposed solution was organised between UNCHS engineers and NGO engineers on 14 February 1994.

20.4 In this **problem solving work-shop** the causes of delays were grouped and analyzed. One group dealt with the multi-storey buildings. 59 cases in 12 buildings have been progressing very slowly. Causes for the delay were identified as follows: huge construction areas led to lack of money; huge foundations; concrete water tanks and commercial stores; lack of time for constructing several floors.

20.5 A further group of problems was identified in the construction management itself. Lack of labor, lack of construction related skills and know-how caused delay, as well as in the cases of elderly people and widows.

20.6 A third group of delaying factors consisted in the construction of huge areas. The delay in construction of multi-storey buildings was due to lack of money, lack of masons and labor, lack of construction management. These beneficiaries had planned for big areas under the assumption that they would receive assistance from other sources.

20.7 Finally, a group of delaying factors such as weather conditions, security situation (6 out of 33 villages suffered from a bad security situation) and cases of beneficiaries who did not want to construct and had in some cases received their first instalment were discussed.

20.8 Problems were also caused through construction on land not owned by the beneficiary (4 cases).

20.9 **An unexpected element became apparant** : a new national building code was going to be issued soon. This caused many beneficiaries to invest Habitat's assistance in construction areas which were bigger than the area assisted by Habitat, as they saw a unique opportunity for construction before the new law which would limit their building rights was issued. This suddenly explained why the permanent insistence in the previous months by the NGO engineers to focus first on the 60msq had not found any support amongst the beneficiaries.

20.10 Fifteen actions were decided to be undertaken to tackle this variety of delay causing problems. They ranged from intensive follow up of the slow cases, through higher flexibility towards cases with financial difficulties and multi-storey buildings, to pure cancellation of contracts if no significant progress was achieved within two to three weeks after the implementation of the measures.

20.11 **These actions and the information to the beneficiaries that the project was going to close within 6 weeks had remarkable results.** Villages which had been stagnant for more than 6 to 8 weeks suddenly started to show progress rates of close or over 10% per week. At the same time, the villages which were very close to full finishing contributed less and less to the average progress rates of the project as their works were minor and as the finished houses (which belong to the originally most motivated beneficiaries) stopped contributing.

(iii) STAFFING & EQUIPMENT

Staffing

21.1 The project was staffed with one international consultant/project manager, three local engineers/architects, a sociologist/programme assistant, an administrative officer, a UNV administrative assistant, one secretary, three drivers and an office cleaner. (see Table p.16) This was a reduction compared to the first prodoc staffing description : one national engineer, one secretary and one UNV engineer were removed in the first project revision late September.

21.2 At the start of the project (Sept-15 Oct) the two Consultants (Mr.F.Rietmeyer/IHS-Netherlands & Mr.P.Goovaerts/CC-Belgium) who had been recruited late August for the project document preparation were requested to start up the project and to provide continuity.

21.3 The project manager was recruited on a consultancy basis as the project had a short term temporary character. In order to further ensure continuity, the private consultancy firm (Castors Consultants/Belgium) of one of the first two consultants provided two short term consultants on a rotating basis. Mr.A.Schokker assumed the project management task from 1 October till 30 November '93, from 1 till 15 February '94 and in June 1994. Mr.P.Goovaerts assured the post from 1 December '93 till 31 January '94, from 16 February till 31 March '94 as well as to weeks in May.

21.4 The local staff was recruited in September, mainly from a roster provided by UNDP. The Sociologist/Programme Assistant and the Finance-Admin.Officer had previous UN experience. The Senior Engineer had longstanding experience with NGOs. One Architect was recruited from Tyre, and the third architect/engineer was recruited as an outside applicant. The secretary and the drivers were recruited locally.

21.5 The UNV administrative officer was originally recruited to supervise the admin tasks in the project. But as he arrived late in the project (20 Oct./which was beyond his control as the first candidate became unavailable), and as the national admin officer's previous UN experience was higher than his, his T.O.R. were changed and he provided serious assistance in the weekly progress monitoring by keeping track of all the statistics of the project. He left the project on his own request half of February when this task became routine.

21.6 The national staff was recruited under Special Service Agreements on fee scales equivalent to UN national officers. This included their displacement, travel arrangements and all social and medical insurance benefits. Their fees were higher than usual in the NGOs, but their competence and dedication has been exemplary throughout the project and was not more than rightly compensated.

21.7 The staffing in the project was adequate but also necessary for the monitoring task by the project office. Certainly, as at times the project office took over control tasks of the NGOs so as to ensure the adequate progress of the project. The competence and the dedication of the above national staff provided for good delegation during the absence of the project manager at Christmas and New Year (as per contract agreement) and allowed for extension of the project till 15 June without the permanent more expensive presence of the international consultants.

21.8 The project issued a consultancy for the development of the project monitoring software. The output was satisfactory, but the project would have benefitted more if a full time national computer specialist would have been available.

21.9 The national staff was gradually reduced in accordance with the programme reduction from 1 April onwards (minus the programme assistant, one engineer & one driver), were be further reduced end of April (minus one engineer) and end of May (minus one driver). The remaining skeleton staff ensured the project follow up till 15 June.

List of Staff Members

Name	Function	Duration
Piet Goovaerts	International Project Manager	25 Aug - 15 Oct 1 Dec - 31 Jan. 16 Feb - 31 March 24 - 29 April (Nairobi) 11 - 25 May
Allert Schokker	International Project Manager	1 Oct - 30 Nov. 1 Feb - 15 Feb. 5 June - 15 June
Fons Rietmeyer	Int'l Consultant	25 Aug - 15 Oct
Tareq Osseiran	Senior Engineer	15 Sept - 15 June
Mustafa Dbouk	Architect	1 Oct - 30 April
Dahouk Sbeiti	Architect/Engineer	1 Oct - 15 March
Rima Habash	Sociologist/ Programme Assistant	15 Sept - 31 March
Fouad Harb	Finance- Admin Officer	15 Sept - 15 June
Hanadi Fawaz	Secretary	15 Sept - 15 June
Emmanuel Gilles de Pelichy	UNV - Amin Officer	20 Oct. - 10 Feb

Equipment

22.1 The office equipment consisted in two computers, one photocopier, three small cars (not heavy duty), as well as some basic furniture, three calculators, three air-conditioners/heaters and one refrigerator. All this equipment was bought new. Except for minor repairs and maintenance this equipment has served the project adequately.

22.2 This equipment is still in very good condition and has been transferred to the UNCHS-Habitat project component in the UNDP-Displaced Project (LEB/93/001). The total value of the equipment is of the order of US\$55,000=.

(iv) PROJECT BUDGET

23.1 The project budget is US\$4,845,329= (see p.18/19).

23.2 The budget has been revised five times in the process of the project. But the budget amount has not changed. The first budget revision occurred late September to show lowered staffing requirements. The second budget revision was done in December to show the extension of the project from 31 December '93 till 15 February '94. The third revision was done in January to show the extension till 15 April '94.

23.3 The fourth budget revision shows the extension till 15 June '94 as well as the latest programme implementation elements (# houses, # social infrastructure) and reflects a balance of US\$263,504= which can be reimbursed to the CERF.

23.4 The last budget revision at the end of the project, but before finalization by Habitat HQS is attached on page 18/19 and reflects the final expenditures as known by the project in Lebanon and approximate balance for reimbursement to the CERF (US\$ 283,404=).

(v) DONOR CONTRIBUTIONS :

24.1 Sweden: The government of Sweden has contributed SEK 2 million (approx. US\$ 250,000) to the Central Emergency Revolving Fund.

24.2 Denmark: Denmark has made a contribution of DKK 3 million (approx. US\$ 450,000).

24.3 Lebanon: The Lebanese Government contributed US\$ 1 million to the reimbursement of the Central Emergency Fund.

(vi) PROJECT ASSESSMENT MISSION :

25.1 Two senior staff of DHA/Geneva (Mr. R. Souria & Mr. E. Haegglund) and Mr. D. Biau, UNCHS project supervisor and unit coordinator undertook a project assessment mission beginning of March. The mission met with various government representative to discuss the progress of the project and the possibilities of replication. Contacts were also made with NGOs, international and national organizations. The mission confirmed the success of the project through their field visits and feed back from Lebanese officials.

25.2 In June (6-16), Mr. Jorge Gavidia, who had been a member of the Emergency Assessment Mission led by DHA in August 1993, and later of the prodoc preparation team late August 1993, came on mission to prepare Mr. Walid N'Dow's mission (UN-ASG for UNCHS-Habitat : 13-16 June) to Lebanon. They came for the closure of the project in the South, for the preparation of the installation of the UNDP-Displaced project (Housing component) as well as for the preparation of the Habitat conference in Istanbul 1995 (Habitat wants to present Lebanon as a case study in the Conference).

UNCHS-HABITAT

Emergency Housing Reconstruction in Southern Lebanon

EU-LEB-93-E01

Tyre Office

LAST FIELD BUDGET REVISION (to be finalized by UNCHS-HQs)

B.L.	COMPONENTS	h/m	Tot.US \$	h/m	1993 US \$	h/m	1994 US\$	
10.00	PROJECT PERSONNEL							
11.50	International Consultants							
11.51	Project Manager	7	120,200	3	37,530	4	82,670	(1)
11.52	Short-term Consultant A	1	15,000	1	15,000	0	0	(1)
11.53	Short-term Consultant B	1	15,000	1	15,000	0	0	(1)
11.99	Sub-Total		150,200		67,530		82,670	
13.00	Administrative Support							
13.01	Secretary A	9	14,765	3,5	5,600	5,5	9,165	(2)
13.02	Secretary B	9	7,305	3,5	3,318	5,5	3,987	(3)
13.03	Drive A	8,5	6,816	3	3,516	5,5	3,300	unchangd
13.04	Drive B	7	4,700	2	1,800	5	2,900	(4)
13.05	Drive C	5	3,000	2	1,500	3	1,500	unchangd
13.06	Cleaner	8,5	1,349	3	459	5,5	890	unchangd
13.07	Guard	0	0		0	0	0	unchangd
13.99	Sub-Total		37,935		16,193		21,742	
14.00	United Nations Volunteers							
14.01	Finance & Administrative	0	0	0	0		0	unchangd
14.02	Civil Engineer	0	0	0	0		0	unchangd
14.99	Sub-Total	0	0	0	0		0	
16.00	Mission Costs	0	7,500		3,000		4,500	(1)
17.00	National Consultants							
17.01	Sociologist / Programme Asistant	6	12,488	3	5,550	3	6,938	(5)
17.02	Architect	7,5	15,000	3,5	7,000	4	8,000	unchangd
17.03	Engineer A	9	20,700	3,5	8,050	5,5	12,650	unchangd
17.04	Engineer B	6	10,526	3	4,976	3	5,550	unchangd
17.05	Engineer C	0	0	0	0		0	unchangd
17.06	Finance Assistant	0	0	0	0		0	unchangd
17.99	Sub-Total		58,714		25,576		33,138	
19.00	Total Personnel Component		254,349		112,299		142,050	
20.00	Sub-Contracts							
21.01	Survey Zone A		23,000		20,801		2,199	unchangd
21.02	Survey Zone B		36,612		15,216		21,396	unchangd
21.03	Survey Nabatiyeh		28,327		25,127		3,200	unchamgd
22.01	Demolition UNIFIL		37,420		37,420		0	(6)
22.02	Demolition NGOs		49,380		34,425		14,955	(7)
23.01	Repair Social Infrastructure UNIFIL		87,830		54,420		33410	(8)
23.02	Repair Social Infrastructure NGOs		156,634		0		156,634	(9)
24.01	Housing Reconstruction A		694,777		653,450		41327	(10)
24.02	Housing Reconstruction B		1,945,494		1,335,697		589,797	(11)
24.03	Housing Reconstruction Nabatiyeh		1,106,086		630,302		475,784	(12)
25.00	Needs Assessment / LCPS		4,118		0		4,118	unchangd
29.00	Total Sub-Contracts Component		4,169,678		2,826,858		1,342,820	

40.00	Equipment				
41.00	Expendable Equipment	2,600	2,600	0	unchangd
41.01	Non-expendable equipment	34,080	34,080	0	unchangd
41.02	Non-expendable equipment	10,588	10,588	0	unchangd
42.03	Non-expendable equipment	1,800	1,800	0	unchangd
42.00	Sub-Total	49,068	49,068	0	
43.00	Office Rent	7,768	6,243	1,525	(13)
49.00	Component Total	56,836	55,311	1,525	
50.00	Miscellaneous				
51.00	Operation and Maintenance	25,535	13,484	12,051	(14)
52.00	Reporting Costs	18,215	8,000	10,215	(15)
53.00	Sundry	0	0	0	unchangd
54.00	UNDP Filed Office support Costs	57,212	0	57,212	(16)
59.00	Component Total	81,062	21,484	59,578	
	BALANCE	263,504	42,968	220,536	
99.00	Project Operation Cost	4,845,329	3,058,920	1,786,409	

Justification

- 1) Budget lines to be finalized by Habitat HQs
- (2) +US\$365 - as per expenditure
- (3) -US\$15 - as per expenditure
- 4) -US\$100 - as per expenditure
- (5) +US\$463 - as per expenditure
- (6) -US\$5,000 - as per expenditure
- 7) -US\$2,820 - as per expenditure
- (8) +US\$33,410 - as per expenditure (see final agreement with UNIFIL)
- (9) -US\$33,410 - as per expenditure (see final settlement with SCF & YMCA)
- 10) +US\$41,327 - as per expenditure (see final settlement with SCF)
- 11) -US\$20,506 - as per expenditure (see final settlement with YMCA)
- (12) -US\$42,402 - as per expenditure (see final settlement with SCF)
- 13) +US\$25.20 - as per expenditure
- 14) -US\$4,465.33 - as per expenditure
- (15) -US\$85 - as per expenditure
- (16) +US\$19,900 as per UNCHS -Fax ref .HS 4223-07 dated 11 July 1994

Note that the savings on the budget now amount to US\$283,404 =

This is up from US\$251,235= in the previous budget revision

All budget lines marked (1) have still to be finalized by Habitat-HQs

(c) OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED AND SCOPE OF ASSISTANCE

(i) OBJECTIVES ACHIEVED

26. **Construction and rehabilitation** of housing units achieved: according to the project document at least 650 families would have either have a repaired house (200 units) or a new core house (450 units), that could be later upgraded.

26.1 As the Council for the South had already distributed its first instalment before the project started it appeared from the surveys conducted by the project that most of the partially damaged houses were sufficiently assisted by this mechanism;

26.2 As the project increased its area of intervention from the initial ten villages to the final 37 villages, the project surveys identified all totally demolished houses in these villages;

26.3 The project finally identified 107 houses which were partially damaged and 529 totally demolished houses which required project assistance. Out of these 636 potential beneficiaries 14 contracts were either cancelled or never signed and two were stopped after having executed works for only US\$1,000.

26.4 Contracts were cancelled either because there was an error of damage assessment which was later corrected, or because beneficiaries refused finally the UN assistance (6 cases), or because after 8 to 12 weeks waiting period the beneficiaries had not started working.

26.5 **The project finally assisted 106 partially damaged houses and 516 totally demolished houses to be reconstructed : or a total of 622 households.** In week #26 (30 March) the works in already 94 partial damaged and 251 totally demolished houses were totally finished.

Only 22 contracts had only received their first instalment, but of which 16 were already entitled for their second instalment (the reason for their delay was the late start of the contracting = early February). Another 150 contracts had yet to receive their third instalment (excl. 22 above). And 260 had yet to receive their fourth instalment but of which 38 were entitled for reception of their fourth instalment.

26.6 As of 1 April '94 only 25 partially damaged and 326 totally demolished houses remained under project supervision. The amount of funds remaining to be supervised is approx. US\$620,000= (25 + 326 last instalments, 127 third instalments and 22 second instalments). This amount will go down with approx. US\$75,000 to 100,000/week in the following weeks and it is expected that all the beneficiaries will have finished by the 15th of June.

27. **Infrastructure** rehabilitated : according to the project document, villages that have been affected by the damage to social infrastructure will be able to return to their normal activities and enable the social and economic development of their communities.

27.1 In the project document it was expected that the reconstruction and repair of this social infrastructure **would contribute to the socio-economic rehabilitation of the affected area** as a basis for further economic development.

27.2 Twenty five social infrastructures in 19 villages have been taken for repair works by the project. The repair works are generally minor and of the magnitude of US\$1,000 to 12,000. The infrastructures are schools, dispensaries, community houses, the Tibnin Hospital, social welfare and general security houses. The community house in Majdal Silm was totally destroyed and is under construction for a cost of approx. US\$41,865=.

27.3 The progress of the works in 10 contracts was 100% end of March, and was 70% for fourteen others which are expected to be finished by 15 April. The works at the Majdal Silm community house showed a progress of 26% by 31 March and finished on 5 June '94.

27.4 The full list of social infrastructure works is on p.9.

28. **Application of a community based approach and the execution of community based field activities** : in the project document it was expected that the experience of UNCHS (Habitat) in reconstruction and resettlement programmes applying community based approaches and activities and the use of cost-effective technologies would contribute to strengthen local capacities for the implementation of development activities, and enhance the technical capabilities of local contractors and entrepreneurs.

In addition, the participation of NGOs and the private sector in programme activities would contribute to develop a national capacity capable to implement similar programmes in other areas.

28.1 During the entire project the communities and their representatives have been permanent interlocutors who cooperated in the selection of beneficiaries and who were closely involved in the repairs of the social infrastructure.

28.2 Furthermore, through the contracting system between the NGOs and the beneficiaries, which put the beneficiaries in the responsible position for the implementation of the works on their homes, many villagers who were no beneficiaries of the project found employment on the project assisted construction sites.

28.3 It has been noticed that the Habitat project beneficiaries who were only assisted for an average 60m² core house in fact rebuilt houses averaging 150m². For that purpose funds were found in part from the Council for the South and from Hezbollah, but also private funds or loans. Beneficiaries found in the Habitat project the incentives to reconstruct a full and high quality house. This created improved housing conditions for the beneficiaries as well as increased employment opportunities for the non-beneficiaries.

28.4 The beneficiaries and many small contractors in the region were confronted by the project with simple professional construction contracts as well as with accurate and simple progress monitoring procedures. Contractors for the social infrastructure were equally confronted with these mechanisms. These mechanisms have made the relation of disbursement and work progress very clear and have clarified every conflict with beneficiaries. It is hoped that they have contributed to better construction management skills in the region.

28.5 The NGOs have both commented that the role of the Habitat project monitoring office in Tyre has been essential in this project. They have recognized that they had more experience of the field conditions in Southern Lebanon but that the construction management techniques which the project office installed were totally new to them and the key to the projects' success. They are in the opinion that a similar project should replicate this three layered management approach, notwithstanding the experience they have gained in this project as they consider the global managerial and monitoring function of the project office has been a permanent support to them rather than a supervision and policing instrument. The project has therefore also contributed to capacity and awareness building amongst the largest NGOs in Lebanon concerning construction management techniques with a community based approach.

29. In addition it was expected that the programme would **generate improvements to construction practices** in the region due to the introduction of enhanced quality in construction techniques. It was expected that the programme would act as a catalyst in stimulating further investment in housing improvements. Finally the principles applied could demonstrate a strategy to be followed in future actions.

29.1 As reflected in #28.3 above, the project has clearly enhanced construction management techniques as well as it has produced a higher quality of housing stock in the region.

29.2 Although - in the emergency - house design and structural calculations were not the first priority, all plans have been verified by at least one engineer and in some cases corrections/improvements have been suggested and accepted. The quality of the works has been controlled on a regular basis and both the NGO and the Habitat engineers have intervened when required. A higher than average quality building has resulted from these interventions.

29.3 Finally, the principles of project management and monitoring procedures have been openly appreciated by the NGOs, the UNDP and the Lebanese Government (the HRC in particular). Habitat has received a letter from the Prime Minister of Lebanon expressing his gratitude and appreciation for the project. The High Relief Committee and other Government Departments are interested in replicating the project mechanisms in similar housing and social infrastructure projects in Lebanon. And replicability is now ensured in the UNDP-Displaced project (LEB/93/001) through the Habitat Housing component.

30. The **community mobilization** and the immediate involvement of the beneficiary expected to make the construction more cost-effective.

30.1 It is certain that the assistance level at US\$105/m² is below the market rate (125 @ 150\$/m²) and that the beneficiaries have delivered a surprising quality of construction for it.

30.2 It should also not be forgotten that unit prices vary in the region due to insecurity, distance from main supply area and geographical situation (absence of water, high slopes, ...). The project did not adapt to this. The beneficiaries have not complained about this in a serious way, but some delays of construction are a consequence of this situation.

30.3 It is therefore very likely that the bulk of the beneficiaries have co-subsidized the construction of the 60m² UN-assisted part of their homes. No study has been done on this issue. The beneficiaries show in general - with a few exceptions - a great amount of satisfaction for the received assistance. They consequently did not consider the co-subsidizing a real burden.

(ii) SCOPE OF ASSISTANCE

Numbers of beneficiaries

31. According to the project document it was expected that approximately 400 new core houses will be provided and 250 houses repaired (total 650 units). The project is delivering 509 new core houses and 107 seriously damaged repaired housing units (total 616 units).

31.1 Calculations based on the information provided in the surveys reveal that the **average family size** in the area of operation is 5.72. The project document anticipated an average family size of seven.

31.2 The average amount of assistance of US\$6,300= became therefore US\$5,952= for the totally demolished houses. And as minor partial damaged houses were already sufficiently assisted by the Council for the South, the project assisted major partial damages for an average amount of US\$3,110= whereas the project document anticipated an average of US\$2,200=.

31.3 Also as a consequence of a lower expenditure in the demolishing works, and because of the lowered average assistance amount, the project was able to increase the number of total reconstructions with 29% and still show a balance of US\$221,500=.

Proportion of assistance versus original assessments

32. The United Nations Inter-Agency Needs Assessment Mission led by UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) in August 1993 reported that 1,500 houses were totally destroyed, that approx. 1,000 houses had serious damages and that another 15,000 houses had minor damages as a consequence of the violent Israeli attacks of late July '93. Subsequently to that assessment an appeal for housing reconstruction was launched for an amount of US\$16 million. The UN Secretary General approved an immediate release of US\$5 million from the Central Emergency Fund (CERF) to start the housing reconstruction programme as a top priority.

32.1 It is still not clear on which basis the original assessment was conducted. But on the basis of some available information it seems the damages were largely over-estimated.

32.2 According to the Army List there are the following damages per area:

Area	army # of totally destroyed houses	UN estimated figures
Nabatiyeh (15 villages)	181	164 (12 vill)
South Litani (38 villages)	667	368 (21 vill)
Total (53 vill)	848	532 (33 vill)

32.3 Comparison of the NGO survey results with the army list showed that the figures mentioned in the army list were over-estimated and inaccurate. This was most likely due to the speed with which these estimates were prepared.

32.4 During field visits the engineers verified the number of totally destroyed houses mentioned in the army list to the actual situation in the field and the figures were accordingly adjusted. Several villages which the project NGOs visited are not on the project lists as there were no total demolished houses contrary to the army list statements. Whereas the project included villages which were not on the army list.

32.3 The above table does not show yet the caseload in the West Bekaa. But in a field trip by the Habitat project manager and the senior national engineer on March 19th only very few houses could be identified (4 were accounted for by the local population!).

32.4 The project did not operate neither in the Iqlim Al Tufah area which accounts for at least 90 to 100 units (field trip on March 17th) but which are not yet reflected in the above army list.

32.5 In the emergency circumstances right after the events it was clear that numerous houses which had been destroyed long before the events (and which were never reconstructed since the inhabitants were probably not living in the area anymore) were taken into the lists. The NGOs have made a more detailed selection which has been a permanent conflict area with the local communities as there have also been mistakes made in that sense by the project. Consequently some families tried to obtain assistance although it was evident that their cases did not fall under the project mandate.

32.6 The project can assume having covered 95% of the caseload in the villages of operation. In total, including the Iqlim Al Tufah and the West Bekaa the project has covered more than 70% of the mandate.

32.7 It is clear that the destruction in the area is certainly larger than what the project has accomplished and even far larger if the mandate would be expanded beyond the events of July '93. It is in this sense that the Prime Minister of Lebanon is requesting a further expansion of the project activities with a second appeal of US\$5 million beyond the present US\$5 million.

(d) FINDINGS - LESSONS LEARNT

33.1 As an immediate **effect of technical advice** and close monitoring, local skills were subsequently upgraded. It is worth mentioning that technical assistance provided by engineers from UNCHS and NGOs were not only limited to the construction funded by Habitat. Comparison with the average house in the villages of operation revealed that through UN and NGOs' technical assistance a higher quality of construction has been achieved.

33.2 Habitat and the NGOs have functioned as **technical advisers** and as **financial controllers** for each assistance, thus ensuring the correct use of funds and technically sound construction. This mechanism has found almost general appreciation with the local population, has made them proud of their own results, has been an incentive for fast and qualitative high construction standards. The incentive has been such that most beneficiaries have voluntarily invested personal funds beyond the assistance provided.

33.3 The NGOs were expected, with their long experience in the area and their capability to **rapid mobilization** of qualified staff, to guarantee effective implementation. Although the speed of implementation - which was both desired by the NGOs and the UN system - did create some distortions in the beginning of the project, both the Habitat office as the NGOs have shown the necessary flexibility and willingness to adapt to local constraints and to project management imposed construction management mechanisms.

33.4 The fact that the two NGOs applied different methods and behaved differently, allowed for constant analyzing of their behaviour and output. This has led to increasing improvement of their job and the constructive competition positively affected the entire project up to the level of the beneficiaries. It is a prove of the need for diversification in implementing bodies as their differences worked stimulative.

33.5 The highly **community based approach** of the project meant a learning process for both NGOs and the local population. During the years of civil war the population was used to receive relief distribution by NGOs. The NGOs themselves were not acquainted with large scale construction management techniques. These techniques are basically simple in nature but require mainly a lot of discipline. The upkeep of this discipline is the major role of the monitoring unit (Habitat project office) whereas the NGOs have proven to be capable to implement the mechanisms in the field. The beneficiaries have also proven to be able to understand and accept the mechanisms and have found them the main incentive to their own work as they forced the NGO staff to be very close with the beneficiaries.

33.6 Furthermore, the construction activities in the South led to an **economic revitalization**, which should last after the project. Even through creating possibilities for employment labor force is scarce.

33.7 Habitat **has injected** some US\$4 million in housing in the region. It is estimated that the investment with funds from different other sources has been approx. two and a half times as much (60m2 UN assisted vs 150m2 average built), so that by the end of the project an estimated US\$10 million will have been invested in housing. The project management and technical advice delivered by the project were services addressing this last figure.

33.8 As a consequence of the **positive result** in the field, the project has become the focus of attention as it seems to be recognized as a role model for institutional strengthening and management capacity development with the objective of community development.

33.9 The set up of the project did **not occur in successive phases**. Planning, management, contracting and monitoring procedures were established at the same time. The first contracts with beneficiaries were signed in October 1993, during the month of November the selection of villages and beneficiaries was finalized. **The planning exercise** was complex but indispensable to allow for managerial and monitoring procedures to be able to keep control over the unpredictable developments.

33.10 At the level of the **Habitat project office** a solid management structure was needed in order to assess and plan correctly the inaccurate original estimates of the program case-load. At the **NGO level** there was equally the need of large NGO staffing in the field to address directly the largest caseload of beneficiaries the fastest possible way with contractual procedures which gave monitoring capability to the project.

33.11 The **set up of the Habitat management** structure took more time than the NGO's structure which consequently meant lack of guidance for the NGOs at the early stage of the project.

33.12 End of November witnessed a rise in the number of contracts from then 308 to 526 on December 21, 1993. In this month the **monitoring procedures** were fully put in place and became of great use for the management of the project. It was at this time that control was established over the construction progress. The reporting mechanisms were essential to detect mistakes and to focus on problems. They have proven essential for problem solving, especially in a big area of operation where the project office cannot always be present. The weekly reporting procedures was equally important as f.i. small changes in average progress would average out in longer reporting periods, but proved to be important indicators of problems.

33.13 The **Habitat project management**, which had not anticipated the conflicts and learning processes in the establishment of these systems, as they seemed so efficient and simple had assumed that anybody would be finding his role in the system. It is therefore needed to train the new local staff in these procedures. And a workshop organized half of February as a consequence of a sudden drop in progress proved so efficient that it should be considered as a regular management tool in similar projects.

33.14 Through the technical monitoring and advice the quality of the **finished houses rank far above the average quality** of construction in the villages: thanks to the clear technical specifications laid down in the contract and the payment in instalments the finished houses are totally plastered, plumbing and electricity is complete and the houses are painted inside and outside which is relatively rare in the region.

33.15 Previous assistance programmes without construction progress monitoring and technical advice did not result in physical evident construction investments, whereas the mechanisms of assistance of this project result in a booming construction activity.

33.16 The Habitat project office corrected too high disbursements by YMCA during the month of January. This over disbursement of money also proved that **money is not the first priority to motivate progress**, but rather the **constant presence of the engineers** as SCF has never overdisbursed and their progress has always been higher. And when YMCA under Habitat office pressure reduced the over disbursement their weekly progress started to increase thanks to their increased presence in the field.

33.17 **NGOs are needed** for the implementation of works, since it is the only way such projects can apply a community approach.

33.18 **Firmness in approach** in order to achieve clarity for the beneficiaries on the programme proved important.

33.19 **Constant contact** did not only consist in permanent presence of the NGOs with the beneficiaries in the field, but an information campaign and open office were important factors. In that Habitat's project quite differed from conventional grant programmes as the main actor in this project was clearly the local population.

(e) **RECOMMENDATIONS:**

34.1 **Coordination with UNIFIL:** notwithstanding UNIFIL's early response capacity and constructive efforts it would be recommendable that an independent

expert/consultant in construction should have been assigned to liaise between Habitat and UNIFIL. This person should have been assigned by the Inter-Agency Mission in the shortest time when it became apparent that housing was the highest priority action to be undertaken. The UN system in general should build up such an early response capacity in all its specialised agencies.

34.2 Although 60m² as the **average surface** to be reconstructed proved to low, the result of the Habitat intervention in coordination with other operators has proven successful as the population has decided to mobilise all other funds at their disposal in order to achieve their expectations. If other sources are not available a sample survey prior to the project design would be recommendable so as to provide the required assistance. Nonetheless it will always remain important that a project as this one is capable to stimulate other sources of investments in housing.

34.3 The planning phase and the **set-up of the project** - even in the case of emergency project - should receive more respect and time to limit corrections which were made in the course of the project. The political pressure at the start of the project of disbursing funds before the monitoring mechanisms were totally installed has been one of the major conflict areas with the final objectives of housing reconstruction and appropriate use of funds.

34.4 Equally, the surveying and damage assessments should receive some more time, and focus should be put on **standardized assessment** (in this case technical assessment, since the two involved NGOs have applied different approaches).

34.5 Several differences in construction works, as **multi-storey buildings** (as they are sub-contracted), or as some **construction works** which were not identified in the work schedule (concrete water reservoir, retaining walls) require more financial assistance. The schedule of works should have been prepared more comprehensively to incorporate these differences as well as the amount of assistance could have been adaptable to these special considerations.

(f) CONTINUATION OF THE PROJECT

35. As it was already mentioned in para.#32.8, the project has achieved its objectives with the appreciation of all actors involved, and in particular the beneficiaries and the Government of Lebanon. The caseload of beneficiaries is however not totally addressed and if the mandate of an extension of the project could be enlarged, which is certainly justifiable. And a duplication of the project in Southern Lebanon remains a big need to assist the people and the region to regain some sense of self-respect and dignity.

36. The project will be replicated in the UNDP assisted project of the Ministry for Displaced Persons (Reintegration and Socio-Economic Rehabilitation of the Displaced, LEB/93/001) through a Habitat assisted Housing Reconstruction Unit which will cooperate closely with the Socio-Economic Opportunities Unit. The Housing Unit will consist in several of the National and International staff of the Housing Reconstruction Project in Southern Lebanon.

(g) COMMENTS ON THE NGO FINAL PROJECT REPORTS

37. It is interesting to notice that both NGOs have done a very serious effort in the preparation of their final project report. It underlines again their full commitment to this project. Both the NGO project managers were outstanding.

(i) SAVE THE CHILDREN FINAL PROJECT REPORT :

38. The SCF report is very interesting as it points out some "constraints", "strengths" and "recommendations" of the project in a different way than does this report.

39. Concerning the "constraints" mentioned, it is necessary to come back on the subject of time given to beneficiaries to finish their works. As SCF mentions it

rightly, the 8 weeks planned in the project document was too short. This decision was taken in very close discussions with the NGOs (SCF, YMCA & MECC) and this was done under the pressure of time of this emergency project. Basically, this planning figure has never been respected by the beneficiaries and has never been an issue in the project management meetings.

40. Concerning "strengths" there is some new information which was never mentioned earlier : e.g. neighbours and relatives provided free assistance as well as discounts on building materials.

41. Concerning "recommendations" :

41.1 regarding the establishment of a Habitat unit, it is not realistic to believe that this unit could have started functioning earlier. After all most of the staff was recruited locally from "nowhere" and needed time to become operational.

41.2 regarding the separate monitoring by Habitat engineers : that SCF feels that the fact that NGO data were used for monitoring and reporting rather than independent information gathering is very surprising, as it was assumed from the set up of the project that it would be a collaborative effort (NGOs were always mentioned in the reports), it would assume a double administration which is pure inefficient bureaucracy and it would have required a much heavier Habitat office staff. This comment should be discussed with SCF.

41.3 regarding NGO cooperation, the project management believes that in the circumstances (emergency situation & competition between NGOs) very good cooperation has been achieved.

41.4 regarding "integrated programme", it should be remembered that Habitat was only responsible for housing reconstruction and that other activities by other UN-implementing agencies did not find funding from the International community.

41.5 regarding "information sharing" : the project management recommends - as SCF requests - that this terminal report be shared with them.

41.6 regarding "cash flow" : the delays which have occurred in availability of funds are linked to big international transactions and institutions, and have not resulted in any major nor minor negative effect on the project results. It has surely be cause of irritations at the time, but which are irrelevant in view of the achievements.

(ii) YMCA FINAL PROJECT REPORT :

42. It is regrettable that the report has not been presented in the same format as was submitted in May to both NGOs. The report provides a good list of "problems encountered" and of "recommendations". It is recommended that these points raised by the NGOs be taken in consideration when analysing the project.

43. UNDP has requested YMCA to provide some more information to its final project report.

44. The report should also highlight that the change of project manager (in december 1993) has been the turning point in the performance of YMCA. The first YMCA project manager was not an engineer and has not been able to ensure that his staff did the work with the beneficiaries as outlined in the prodoc and in the guidelines developed by the Habitat office. The next YMCA project manager has been outstanding in redressing a previous poor performance.

**EMERGENCY HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION
IN SOUTHERN LEBANON
EU-LEB-93-E01**

ANNEXES

- Annex 1** : Survey Format & Damage Assessment Format (4p)
- Annex 2** : Contract Format between NGO & beneficiary
Weekly monitoring Format (7p)
- Annex 3** : List of Sub-Contracts/Agreements w/NGOs (1p)
& w/UNIFIL
- Annex 4** : Example of comuter reporting of construction(5p)
and financial progress
- Annex 5** : List of economic & social criteria for the (2p)
selection of beneficiaries
- Annex 6** : List of multi-storey buildings with progress(3p)
at 31 March 1994 & at 5 June 1994
- Annex 7** : Example of weekly progress report (3p)
(wk#23 : 31 May 1994)
- Annex 8** : Executive summary of the report by LCPS : (3p)
"Findings and Recommendations on
Housing-Construction and Urban
Management Needs and Proposals
for Assistance" - March 1994
- Annex 9** : Executive summary of (2p)
"Study on surveyed potential and
selected beneficiaries" May 1994
- Annex 10** : Press briefing note of 26 January 1994 (1p)
- Annex 11** : Delaying factors : example of report (1p)
- Annex 12** : Statistics on family size of beneficiaries (1p)
- Annex 13** : Graphics of project progress by 5 June '94 (10p)
Table of weekly progress on 5 June 1994
- Annex 14** : List of project reports & documentation (1p)
- Annex 15** : Follow-up report on the workshop (Feb'94) (4p)
- Annex 16** : Inventory list of office equipments w/letter (5p)
of transfer to Project for displaced
- Annex 17** : DHA-Habitat joint evaluation report (10p)
- Annex 18** : NGO Final Report : Executive Summary SCF (4p)
- Annex 19** : NGO Final Report : Executive Summary (2p)

ANNEX 1

Survey South Lebanon Housing Reconstruction and Rehabilitation

Questionnaire

A) General Information :

Village :

Neighbourhood :

Caza :

Owner of House :

Registry Number :

Present Address :

If House Totally Destroyed Fill In Next Line :

Former Address :

Head of Family :

If Differs from Owner of House :

Mother's Name :

Place of Birth :

Date of Birth :

B) Family Members :

No.	Name	Relation	Age	Occupation	Monthly Income
TOTAL					

→

Did any member of your family die or was badly injured during the recent July 25 1993 shelling ?

Do you have any disabled in your family ? who ?

) Expenditures (total family expenditures) :

Please indicate how much you spend on the following :	Amount
Food (per month)	
Clothes (per month)	
Health (per month)	
School (per year)	
Transport (per month)	
Debts (per year)	
Religious Contributions / Feasts (per year)	

X

Income (total family income) :

Do you own your land ?

What is your estimated generated income per year ?

Do you own livestock ?

What kind and how many ?

Which members of your family are wage earners ?

What is their income per month ?

If self-employed, what is your monthly income ?

Do you receive financial assistance from family and/or relatives living abroad ?

If so, how much per month ?

Do you have any savings and how much ?

X

E) Property Value :

 Totally Damaged

 Partially Damaged

No.	Type of room	Area in square meters

- What is/was the 1993 value of your house in lebanese pounds ?
- How big is the plot of land your house is, on ?

F) Financial Assistance :

- Have you received any financial help from other organizations ?
- If yes, by whom and what amount ?

G) Additional Remarks :

.....
.....
.....
.....
.....

Interviewer :

Organization :

Date :

FORM 2

Annex 2 : DAMAGE ASSESSMENT FORMAT

Social Infrastructure :

location :
code :

Housing : name :

location :
code :

Use same code in Socio-economic FORM

SCHEDULE OF WORKS

Ref.	Description Work Item	U.	Qty	U.P. US\$	Cost US\$
01.	Excavation/Backfilling	m3		6	
02.	Reinforced concrete	m3		100	
03.	Massonry 10cm	m2		7	
04.	Massonry 15cm	m2		8	
05.	Massonry 20cm	m2		9	
06.	Cement plasterworks (1.5cm)	m2		3	
07.	Wood doors	m2		50	
07.	Wood windows	m2		60	
08.	Steel doors/primer	kg		1.25	
09.	Steel windows/primer	kg		1.25	
10.	Aluminum doors/windows	m2		40	
11.	Glazing 4mm	m2		12	
12.	Glazing 6mm	m2		15	
13.	Tiling (mosaic)	m2		7.50	
14.	Tiling (ceramics)	m2		12	
15.	Sanitary : lavatory	U		120	
16.	" : boiler	U		100	
17.	" : 1000l.w.tank	U		150	
18.	" : toilet	U		120	
19.	" : single sink	U		60	
20.	" : shower	U		50	
21.	" : connect. 3/4"	lm.		3	
22.	Electrical: fixtures	U		15	
23.	" : main fuse box	U		50	
24.					
25.					
30.	Painting walls	m2		3	
31.	Fencing concrete	m3		100	
32.	Fencing massonry 10cm	m2		7	
33.	15cm	m2		8	
34.	20cm	m2		9	
35.	Fencing plastering (1.5cm)	m2		3	
36.	Steel fencing	kg		1.25	
37.	Alluminum balconies	m2		40	
38.					
38.					
40.	Cement	50kg		4	
41.	Steel reinforcement bars	kg		0.35	
42.					
43.					
Total cost damage assessment :					US\$:

ANNEX 2 - ENGLISH VERSION

UNCHS/HABITAT
Emergency Reconstruction Housing
in Southern Lebanon
Project: EU-LEB-93-E01

AGREEMENT
FOR
HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION

First Party : _____ Represented in this
contract by _____.

Second Party: Mr/Mrs _____ Registry No _____

Witness : _____ Registry No _____

TERMS OF AGREEMENT

Whereas, the First Party, implementing agency for the UNCHS, Habitat Project " Emergency Reconstruction Housing in Southern Lebanon ", has agreed to provide assistance to inhabitants whose houses were severely damaged as a result of the July 1993 events and intend to reconstruct them.

Whereas, the Second Party owns a housing unit in _____ village, _____ caza, and whereas this unit was totally/partially destroyed at Party I estimated cost of _____.

Hence the Two Parties agree to the following terms:

1- The preamble of the agreement and the attached schedule of works are considered to be integral parts thereof.

2- The Second Party assumes the responsibility of submitting the legal documents regarding his/her ownership or certified residential status before signing the agreement.

3- The First Party is in charge to supervise and provide needed technical assistance to ensure the quality of reconstruction works, and has the authority to accept or reject performed works as per proper technical standards. The standard technical specifications are filed in the office of the NGO at _____ and can be consulted by Party II for his information and compliance.

4- The First Party is responsible for setting the unit prices for the work items included in this contract, and for accepting calculated quantities of required works.

5- The First Party and the Second Party agree to the assistance program reflected in the attached schedule of works.

6- The Second Party is responsible at his/her own expense, to supply and provide all needed materials, workmanship and tools required for the reconstruction of his/her house.

7- The First Party will provide cash assistance paid per installments according to quantities and prices set in the attached schedule of works. Any additional expenditures will be at the sole charge of the Second Party.

8- The second (and third) installment(s) will be issued when the owner has reached 90 % progress of works of the previous installment, and as per approval of the First Party on the basis of the progress reporting in the attached schedule of works. The (third/fourth) installment will be issued when the owner has reached 95 % of the assistance amount of this contract, and following same approval procedure by First Party.

9- The Second Party undertakes the responsibility to commence work within 3 days after signing the agreement.

10- The Second Party assumes the responsibility to carry out within 4 weeks the required works per installment, and to complete the total reconstruction in maximum 8 weeks.

11- The Second Party is responsible for the information given by him in the survey, and on which the selection priority was based.

12- The First Party retains the right to terminate this agreement if the Second Party does not abide by any of the above mentioned terms.

13- Any conflict arising during the existence of this contract, and related to the terms of this contract, will be arbitrated by the UNCHS - Office and the High Relief Committee.

14- This contract is established in three copies, one for the First Party, one for the Second Party and one for the UNCHS - office.

This agreement is signed by both parties, in witness of

Name / Function / Address

Signature _____ Date _____

First Party

Second Party

Sign:

Name:

Date:

1)

ANNEX 2 - ARABIC VERSION

برنامج الأمم المتحدة للاسكان مشروع اعادة بناء الوحدات السكنية في جنوب لبنان

عقد لتأقية لاعادة بناء وحدة سكنية

الفريق الاول _____ ممثل بهذا العقد بشخص _____

الفريق الثاني _____ رقم السجل : _____

لشاهد _____ رقم السجل : _____

بنود العقد:

بما ان الفريق الاول وهو المؤسسة المنفذة لبرنامج هيئة الامم المتحدة للاسكان مشروع " اعادة بناء الوحدات السكنية في جنوب لبنان " كان قد وافق على مساعدة الاهالي اللذين تضررت وحداتهم السكنية نتيجة القصف خلال شهر تموز 1993 ولديهم ائنة لاعادة بناءها .

وبما ان الفريق الثاني يملك وحدة سكنية في قرية _____ قضاء _____ ، وربما
ان هذه الوحدة السكنية كانت قد دمرت جزئيا / كليا بكلفة تقديرية _____ حسب دراسة للفريق الاول

لذلك تم الاتفاق على ما يلي :

- 1- تعتبر مقدمة هذا العقد وبرنامج الاعمال المرفق ربطا جزءا لا يتجزأ .
- 2- يقدم للفريق الثاني وقبل توقيع هذا العقد الاوراق الثبوتية لمالكه الوحدة السكنية . وفي حال عدم وجودها عليه تقديم اوراق مصدقة من الجهات المعنية تثبت حقه في اشغال الوحدة السكنية .
- 3- يكون للفريق الاول مسؤولا عن مراقبة الاشغال وتقديم المساعدة الفنية اللازمة للفريق الثاني وذلك لضمان نوعية اعمال اعادة البناء . وبحق للفريق الاول قبول او رفض الاعمال المنفذة اذا لم تكن حسب المواصفات الفنية المنفق عليها.

4- يكون للفريق الاول مسؤولا عن وضع لائحة الاسعار للوحدة بالنسبة للبنود المشمولة ضمن هذا العقد كما يحق للفريق الاول الموافقة على الكميات التقديرية لموضوعة لاعادة بناء الوحدة السكنية.

5- ولاق للفريق الاول والفريق الثاني على جدولة المساعدة حسب برنامج الاعمال المرفق ربطا بالعقد .

6- يكون للفريق الثاني، وعلى نفقته ، مسؤولا عن تأمين وتقديم كافة المواد ، اليد العاملة والالات اللازمة لاعادة بناء الوحدة السكنية .

7- يقدم الفريق الاول مساعدة نقدية على عدة اقساط وذلك حسب الكميات والاسعار لموضوعة ضمن برنامج الاعمال المرفق ربطا بالعقد. جميع المصاريف الاضافية لاكمال اعمال اعادة البقاء تكون على نفقة الفريق الثاني

8- يدفع تقسط اثاني/ الثالث بعدما يكون الفريق الثاني قد انجز 90 % من الاعمال المشمولة ضمن القسط السابق، وبعد موافقة للفريق الاول على تقدم سير العمل حسب برنامج الاعمال المرفق ربطا بالعقد. يدفع القسط الثالث / الرابع بعدما يكون للفريق الثاني انجز 95% من كافة الاعمال المطلوبة التي تضمنتها المساعدة وبعد موافقة الفريق الاول عليها.

9- يتعهد الفريق الثاني بالمباشرة باعمال اعادة البناء خلال ثلاثة ايام من توقيع هذا العقد .

10- يتعهد الفريق الثاني بتنفيذ الاعمال المطلوبة ضمن القسط الواحد خلال مدة اربعة اسابيع، على ان يتم تنفيذ كافة الاعمال لاعادة البناء ضمن مدة لا تتعدى ثمانية اسابيع.

11- يكون للفريق الثاني مسؤولا عن كافة المعلومات المقدمة من قبله والتي وردت في استمارة توضع الاجتماعى، والتي على اساسها تم وضع جدول الاولوية.

12- يحق للفريق الاول الغاء هذا العقد اذا ما لخل الفريق الثاني باي من البنود الواردة اعلاه.

13- اي اشكال من شأنه ان ينتج خلال مدة تنفيذ هذا العقد وله علاقة ببنود هذا العقد، يصار الى حله عند تحكيم مكتب الامم المتحدة للاسكان والهيئه العليا للاغاثة.

14- يوقع هذا العقد على ثلاث نسخ: واحدة للفريق الاول، واحدة للفريق الثاني، وواحدة لمكتب الامم المتحدة للاسكان.

Annex 3

List of Sub-contracts/Agreements with NGOs & UNIFIL

1. Subcontracts/agreements between UNCHS (HABITAT) and YMCA

Contract between UNCHS (HABITAT) and Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA)/Lebanon

Second Amendment to Contract #SC02

Third and Final Amendment (#3) to close contractual agreement with Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA)/Lebanon

Addendum to Contract Between UNCHS (HABITAT) and Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA)/Lebanon

2. Subcontracts/agreements between UNCHS (HABITAT) and SCF

Contract between UNCHS (HABITAT) and Save the Children Federation USA/Lebanon

Second Amendment to Contract #SC02

Third and Final Amendment (#3) to close contractual agreement with Save the Children Federation USA/Lebanon

Addendum to Contract Between UNCHS(HABITAT) and Save the Children Federation USA/Lebanon

3. Subcontracts/agreements between UNCHS (HABITAT) and UNIFIL

Project Agreement between UNCHS (HABITAT) and UNIFIL

Project Agreement #2 between UNCHS (HABITAT) and UNIFIL

ANNEX 4

Code		Assistance Amount				Total		Balance	
Owner's name	1st Instalment	2nd Instalment	3rd Instalment	4th Instalment	Total Amount Disbursed	Balance	Amount of Cancelled Work	10	
221001 Zaidan	7245	2622	2622	2622	15000	7245	0	7245	
Reconstruction & Rehabilitation Information System Financial statement for all beneficiaries in the village of TAMARA									
221002 Hussein	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221003 Ahmad	7235	2422	2422	2422	7000	7235	0	7235	
221004 Hassan	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221005 Abdulrahman Ibrahim	5885	1925	1925	1925	5500	5885	1000	4885	
221006 Mustafa	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221007 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221008 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221009 Ali	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221010 Mahmoud Ibrahim	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221011 Abdulrahman Ibrahim	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221012 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221013 Mustafa	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221014 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221015 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221016 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221017 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221018 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221019 Ali	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221020 Mahmoud Ibrahim	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221021 Abdulrahman Ibrahim	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221022 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221023 Mustafa	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221024 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221025 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221026 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221027 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221028 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221029 Ali	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221030 Mahmoud Ibrahim	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221031 Abdulrahman Ibrahim	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221032 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221033 Mustafa	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221034 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221035 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221036 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221037 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221038 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221039 Ali	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221040 Mahmoud Ibrahim	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221041 Abdulrahman Ibrahim	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221042 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221043 Mustafa	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221044 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221045 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221046 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221047 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221048 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221049 Ali	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221050 Mahmoud Ibrahim	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221051 Abdulrahman Ibrahim	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221052 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221053 Mustafa	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221054 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221055 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221056 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221057 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221058 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221059 Ali	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221060 Mahmoud Ibrahim	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221061 Abdulrahman Ibrahim	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221062 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221063 Mustafa	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221064 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221065 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221066 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221067 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221068 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221069 Ali	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221070 Mahmoud Ibrahim	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221071 Abdulrahman Ibrahim	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221072 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221073 Mustafa	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221074 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221075 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221076 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221077 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221078 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221079 Ali	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221080 Mahmoud Ibrahim	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221081 Abdulrahman Ibrahim	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221082 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221083 Mustafa	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221084 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221085 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221086 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221087 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221088 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221089 Ali	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221090 Mahmoud Ibrahim	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221091 Abdulrahman Ibrahim	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221092 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221093 Mustafa	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221094 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221095 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221096 Ahmad	5035	1677	1677	1677	5000	5035	1000	4035	
221097 Ibrahim	5985	1925	1925	1925	5500	5985	1000	4985	
221098 Hussain	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	
221099 Ali	6300	2120	2120	2120	6000	6300	1000	5300	
221100 Mahmoud Ibrahim	6615	2207	2207	2207	6000	6615	1000	5615	

#25 TO.

1157

UNIT'S NAME: Assistance Account 1st Instalment 2nd Instalment 3rd Instalment 4th Instalment Total Amount Disbursed Balance Account of Incurred Work

UNIT'S NAME	Amount	Date	1st Instalment	2nd Instalment	3rd Instalment	4th Instalment	Total Amount Disbursed	Balance	Account of Incurred Work
02A100C Robinson	1000	09/10/93	0	0	0	0	1000	0	1000
Pay. Voucher # 015									
02A100C Sachli	7245	09/10/93	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pay. Voucher # 029									
02A1001 Robinson	1000	09/10/93	0	0	0	0	1000	0	1000
Pay. Voucher # 021									
02A1002 Selman	1000	09/10/93	0	0	0	0	1000	0	1000
Pay. Voucher # 022									
02A1002 Robinson	5355	10/00	1577	1078	1000	1000	5355	0	5355
Pay. Voucher # 167									
02A1001 Ali	5355	10/11/93	1977	1078	1000	1000	5355	0	5355
Pay. Voucher # 101									
02A1002 Decc	5355	10/00	1677	1078	1000	1000	5355	0	5355
Pay. Voucher # 069									
02A1002 Ali	5355	11/11/93	1677	1078	1000	1000	5355	0	5355
Pay. Voucher # 105									
02A1002 Ali	5355	10/00	1677	1078	1000	1000	5355	0	5355
Pay. Voucher # 105									
02A1002 Robinson	5355	10/00	1932	1395	1000	1000	5355	0	5355
Pay. Voucher # 421									
02A1002 Ali	4615	10/00	2397	2308	1000	1000	4615	0	4615
Pay. Voucher # 422									

Total : 11805 2200 3602 2783 600 5225 2672 2719

Total Amount of Granted Assistance : 11805 Percentage

25

Y M C A - LEBANON

UNCHS - EMERGENCY HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

Report No. 22

WEEKLY FINANCIAL SITUATION AS AT MARCH 28, 1994

Item	Description	Budgeted Quantity (houses)	Unit Price US\$.	Amount Budgeted US\$.	Amount Disbursed US\$.	Amount Committed US\$.	Amount Balance US\$.	Percent Disbursed (%)
A)	Survey's	565	60	33,900	33,900	0	0	100.00%
B)	Houses for Construction	229	6300	1,578,237	1,217,390	330,918	29,929	77.14%
C)	Houses for Repair	105	2200	251,263	224,338	22,725	4,200	89.28%
D)	DEMOLISHING	0		9,100	6,100	0	3,000	67.03%
	INF. & SOCIAL	0	0	93,900	45,976	34,874	13,050	48.96%
	Sub- Total			1,966,400	1,527,704	388,517	50,179	77.69%
D)	8% Overhead for Operation and Management			157,312	122,216	31,081	4,014	77.69%
	Total			2,123,712	1,649,920	419,598	54,193	77.69%

Y M C A - LEBANON

Report No. 22

UNOHS - EMERGENCY HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

WEEKLY STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT MARCH 28, 1994

Item	DESCRIPTION	Debit (US\$.)	Credit (US\$.)	Balance (US\$.)
	Cash advance on hand at the begining of this reporting period	1,576.195	2,017.526	441.331
	Check advance(s) received during this reporting period		0.00	441.331
				441.331
A	SURVEY ANALYSIS			441.331
				441.331
	SUB-TOTAL	0		441.331
B	HOUSE RECONSTRUCTION	Baraashit	2.623	438.708
		Hadatha	2.465	436.243
		Hariss	1.000	435.243
		Ayta Zut	1.000	434.243
		Jumeyimeh	0	434.243
		Kabrikha	3.986	430.257
		Kafra	5.506	424.751
		Maaroub	9.287	415.464
		Majdel Silm	5.457	410.007
		Safad batikh	0	410.007
		Shakra	0	410.007
		Sultanieh	4.143	405.864
		Tebnine	3.835	402.029
		Yater	26.962	368.502
	SUB-TOTAL	66.264		375.067

ANNEX V

(iv) when a family has been selected for assistance, the amount of the financial assistance will be established on the basis of the survey fact sheet of the beneficiary with application of the guidelines below.

The NGO will send an engineer to the site to discuss with the family the required works. This can include making a drawing of the new house, but will certainly contain a schedule of works with bill of quantities and average unit prices for each work item which will allow to obtain the estimated cost of the required works.

The engineer will then agree with the owner which works will be taken into consideration for the financing assistance from the project. These works will be reflected in a contract document (signed by both parties) to which is attached the above schedule of works which will serve to control the progress of the works and to allow release of successive installments to the owner.

Successive installments should be limited to two to four steps depending on the amount of the funding. The owner should be contractually committed to finish the entire works in a period between 4 to 8 weeks depending on the volume and the nature of the works pending forefaithing his right on further financial assistance.

Any advance payment should be made contractually reimbursable if not correctly used to meet the objectives of the project and should not exceed US\$1,000= per family.

SELECTION CRITERIA:

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1. Economic criteria

- 1.1. Priority #1.: A family of seven members (average family size) earning less then US\$200/month;
- 1.2. Priority #2.: A family of seven earning less then US\$300/month;
- 1.3. Priority #3.: A family of seven earning less then US\$400/month;
- 1.4. Priority #4.: A family of seven earning less then US\$500/month;
- 1.5. Priority #5.: Families of seven earning between US\$500 & US\$1,500/month;
- 1.6. Excluded: A family of seven earning more then US\$1,500/month;

For each family member more or less the average family size of seven members the income is to be revised with 5% minus or plus to establish the level of priority.

2. Social criteria

2.1. Priority #1.: A family which has suffered deaths or badly injured members during the events;

2.2. Priority #2.: Widows with children, families with more than 10 members, and families with handicapped members;

2.3. Priority #3.: All others.

In order to establish the cross-criteria the two ranks are added, and the lowest total (minimum is $1+1=2$) has the highest priority.

3. Operational criteria

3.1 Priority #1.: Homes rendered uninhabitable receive priority #1 attention.

3.2 Priority #2.: For all habitable homes.

GUIDELINES FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AMOUNT OF FUNDING ASSISTANCE:

1. the financial assistance will be controlled with a detailed schedule of works, containing the bill of quantities, approved unit prices per work item, and approved work items (the project will only finance basic needs);
2. the financial assistance attempts to achieve that a maximum of 60m² of a house is reconstructed when the original house is totally demolished or that up to 60m² is made viable again, not exceeding the original volume of the house after repairs when the original house was only partially damaged.
The rule of 60m² applies to a family of 7 members, for each member plus or minus this surface can be revised with 3m² plus or minus, with a maximum of 69m² and a minimum of 51m²;
3. for reconstruction and for rehabilitation the square meter price of the works will not exceed US\$105/m²;
4. for rehabilitation, the NGO obtains a maximum budget of US\$2,200/family. Repairs below US\$400 receive last priority status.

ANNEX 6

MULTI STOREY BUILDINGS PROGRESS WEEK # 35

VILLAGE Multistor.# Beneficiaries Assist.\$ Phys.Progr.%

JIBSHEET # 1	CJIB 001	5,670	67.4
	002	5,670	65.9
	154	5,355	70.7
	155	5,355	70.7
	156	5,355	70.7
	157	5,355	70.7

Total : 32,760 69.3
Progress/week = 0

JIBSHEET # 2	CJIB 003	5,985	60.1
	149	5,355	70.8
	148	5,355	74.0
	150	5,355	74.0
	147	5,670	69.9

Total : 27,720 69.7
Progress/week = + 21.8%

JIBSHEET # 3	CJIB 017	6,300	100.0
	144	5,355	100.0
	145	5,355	100.0
	146	5,355	100.0

Total : 22,365 100.0
Progress/week = (finished).

JIBSHEET # 4	CJIB 129	6,930	100.0
	151	5,355	100.0
	152	5,670	100.0
	153	5,355	100.0

Total : 23,310 100.0
Progress/week = (finished)

MAROUB # 1	BMAA 001	5,670	49.4
	002	5,355	52.3
	003	5,355	52.3
	004	5,670	49.4
	005	5,355	52.3
	006	5,355	52.3
	007	5,355	52.3

Total : 38,115 51.5
Progress/week = +9.3%

MAROUB # 2	BMAA 009	5,355	100.0
	011	5,355	100.0
	012	7,245	100.0

Total : 17,955 100.0
Progress/week = + 2%

MAJDAL SLIM # 1	BMAJ 080	6,930	100.0
	084	5,355	100.0
	086	5,355	100.0
	087	5,355	100.0
	104	5,670	100.0
	113	5,355	100.0
	149	5,355	100.0

Total : 39,375 100.0
Progress/week = (finished)

KAFRA # 1	BKAF 025	5,355	100.0
	047	5,985	100.0
	048	6,615	100.0
	091	5,355	100.0
	098	5,355	100.0

Total : 28,665 100.0
Progress/week = +13.6 %

KAFR SIR # 1	CKAF 008	5,355	100.0
	022	5,355	100.0
	017	6,300	100.0
	104	5,355	100.0

Total : 22,365 100.0
Progress/week = +13.7 %

KAFR SIR # 2	CKAF 085	5,355	100.0
	112	6,615	100.0
	113	6,615	100.0
	114	5,355	100.0

Total : 23,940 100.0
Progress/week = +27.8 %

KAFR SIR # 3	CKAF 070	5,355	100.0
	108	5,355	100.0
	109	5,670	100.0
	110	5,355	100.0

Total : 21,375 100.0
Progress/week = (finished)

KAFR SIR # 4	CKAF 002	5,985	100.0
	101	5,355	100.0
	102	5,355	100.0

Total : 16,695 100.0
Progress/week = (finished)

ANNEX 7

10. Progress report week # 27: (P/T=partial damages/total demolished contracts
D= demolishing works. SI= social infrastructure)

of instalments Disbursements (US\$)

zone NGO #villages P/T 1rst 2nd 3th 4th issued committed phys.prog

A	SCF	7	P	9	9	9	-	23,520	23,520	23,520
			T	95	90	72	42	461,195	565,740	505,064

Subtotal A :	P+T	104	99	81	42	494,795	589,260	528,584
%		100	95.2%	77.8%	44.2%	83.1%	100	89.7%
	TER/D					7,655	9,955	9,955
	SI					28,790	30,790	26,055
	SI%					93.5%	100	84.6%

C	SCF	12	P	24	24	21	-	76,275	79,275	79,275
			T	164	164	123	68	787,452	959,490	816,788

Subtotal C :	P+T	188	188	144	68	863,727	1,038,765	896,063
%		100	100%	76.6%	41.4%	83.1%	100	86.2%
	D					18,900	22,900	18,900
	SI					31,493	53,066	48,916
	SI %					59.3%	100	92.1%

Totals SCF for housing										
this week	19	P+T	292	287	225	110	1,358,442	1,628,025	1,424,647	
%			100	98.2%	77%	42.4%	83.4%	100	87.5%	
last week	19	P+T	292	283	214	110	1,321,908	1,628,025	1,390,899	
%			100	96.1%	73.2%	42.4%	81.2%	100	85.4%	

prog. / wk	0	-	+2.1%	+3.8%	-	+2.2%	-	+2.1%
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B	YMCA	14	P	73	71	54	-	225,340	247,065	234,885
			T	257	246	194	83	1,240,566	1,548,287	1,267,611
			D					6,100	6,100	6,100
			SI					57,456	80,850	58,085
			SI%					71%	100	71.4%

Totals YMCA for housing										
this week	14	P+T	330	317	248	83	1,465,906	1,795,352	1,502,496	
%			100	96%	75.1%	32.2%	81.6%	100	83.7%	
last week	14	P+T	330	317	236	80	1,441,709	1,795,352	1,472,188	
%			100	96%	71.5%	31.1%	80.3%	100	82%	

prog. / wk	-	-	+3.6%	+1.1%	+1.3%	-	-	+1.7%
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Project totals for housing reconstruction & repair :

of instalments disbursements (US\$)

villages (P+T) 1st 2nd 3rd 4th issued committed phys.prog

this week	33	622	604	473	193	2,824,348	3,423,377	2,927,143
%		100	97.1%	76%	37.4%	82.5%	100	85.5%
last week	33	622	600	450	190	2,763,617	3,423,377	2,863,087
%		100	96.4%	72.3%	36.8%	80.7%	100	83.6%

prog./wk	-	+0.7%	+3.7%	+0.6%	+1.8%	-	-	+1.9%
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Project Habitat for Social Infrastructure contracts:

Zone A + B + C	18	98,609	126,441	117,556
Zone A+B+C (%)		77.9%	100	92.9%
Majdal Silm CH	1	19,130	38,265	15,500
M.S-CH (%)		50%	100	40.5%

Total SI	19	117,739	164,706	133,056
progress/week (SI)		71.4%	100	80.7%
				+4.6%

For your info and comments

* * * *

ACHIEVED.XLS

LIST OF ACHIEVED HOUSES PER VILLAGE							# 26	
VILLAGE NAME	Hses #		Achieved paid		Achieved unpaid		Grand total	
ZONE A	T	P	Totally	Partially	Totally	Partially	T	P
Al Qlaylee	7	3	7	3	0	0	7	3
Ayit	15	3	9	3	3	0	12	3
Khirbit silm	29	1	3	1	3	0	6	1
Qana	7	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Sadeqeen	23	0	13	0	4	0	17	0
Sheaytieh	5	1	4	1	1	0	5	1
Zibqeen	9	1	5	1	3	0	8	1
Total Zone A	95	9	42	9	14	0	56	9
ZONE C								
Adsheet	1	2	0	2	0	0	0	2
Choukeen	3	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Dweir	2	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Ebba	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Harouf	5	0	4	0	1	0	5	0
Jibsheets	64	5	19	5	16	0	35	5
Kafarsir	46	7	16	6	4	1	20	7
Kfartibnit	15	0	8	0	1	0	9	0
Nabatieh Fawka	5	0	2	0	0	0	2	0
Qaqaeit el jisir	8	6	6	6	0	0	6	6
Zawtar carkieh	10	0	10	0	0	0	10	0
Zawtar garbieh	4	4	0	2	1	2	1	4
Total Zone C	164	24	68	21	23	3	91	24
TOTAL Z (A+C)	259	33	110	30	37	3	147	33
ZONE B								
Ayta al jabal	2	0	1	0	0	0	1	0
Barashit	46	14	19	9	2	2	21	11
Hadatha	7	5	4	5	0	0	4	5
Hariss	14	7	6	7	2	0	8	7
Jumay Jumey	2	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Kabrikha	8	15	2	10	3	2	5	12
Kafra	22	12	9	11	0	0	9	11
Maaroub	21	0	3	0	0	0	3	0
Majdalslim	64	4	20	2	1	1	21	3
Safad el Batikh	1	0	0	0	1	0	1	0
Shqra	3	0	1	0	1	0	2	0
Sultanieh	6	1	3	0	0	1	3	1
Tebnine	18	2	7	0	2	0	9	0
Yatar	43	13	8	10	8	1	16	11
TOTAL ZONE B	257	73	83	54	21	7	104	61
TOTAL PROJECT	516	106	193	84	58	10	251	94

**PHYSICAL PROGRESS OF TOTALY DESTROYED HOUSES
PER VILLAGE PER WEEK**

VILLAGES	# of Houses	Progress# WK # 25	Progress# WK # 26	Prog./Wk
ZONE B				
BRA'SHIT	46	78	81	+3
HARRIS	14	92	93	+1
HADATHA	7	84	86	+2
AYTA	2	97	97	0
JUMAYJMEH	2	75	93	+18
KABRIKHA	8	86	87	+1
KAFRA	22	77	82	+5
MAAROUB	21	62	63	+1
MAJDAL SILM	64	79	81	+2
SAFAD AL BATIKH	1	100	100	finished
SHAQRA	3	88	90	+2
SULTANIYEH	6	79	87	+8
TEBNINE	18	84	85	+1
YATER	43	83	84	+1
ZONE A				
KHIRBET SILM	29	66	74	+8
AYTIT	15	94	95	+1
SADIQEEEN	23	94	96	+2
QLAYLAH	07	100	100	finished
ZIBQEEEN	09	98	98	0
QANA	07	79	84	+5
SHEAYTIEH	05	100	100	finished
ZONE C				
KFAR SIR	46	81	82	+1
JIBSHIT	64	82	84	+2
ZAWTHAR CHARKIEH	10	100	100	finished
QAQAIT EL JISR	8	97	97	0
ZAWTHAR GHARBIEH	4	84	89	+5
EBBA	1	100	100	finished
DWEIR	2	82	84	+2
KFAR TEBNIT	15	83	83	+0
HAROUF	5	97	100	+3
NABATIEH FAWKA	5	74	75	+1
CHOUKINE	3	84	84	0
ADSHIT	1	51	57	+6

25

UNCHS-HABITAT
Emergency Housing Reconstruction Project
in Southern Lebanon

MINUTES OF COORDINATION MEETING # 30

Presents : UNCHS = P.Goovaerts, D.Sbeiti, T.Osseiran, M.Dbouk, F.Harb.
UNDP = M.van de Velde.
UNIFIL = Colonel J.Troadec
YMCA = J.Kassab., T.El Mir.
SCF = H.Annan, K.Chaya.
Ministry of Displaced = Kamal Feghali, Loubna Haydar

Date : 30 March 1994.

Agenda of the Meeting.

1. Introduction;
2. Report from the field (UNIFIL-NGOs);
3. Work progress analysis;
4. Reporting problems (computer);
5. Final commitments : Schedule of works for finished houses;
6. Other issues;
7. Next coordination meeting;

1. **Introduction :** Mr. Goovaerts introduced Dr.Kamal Feghali, Assistant to the Minister of Displaced, to the attendants. Mr. Feghali was visiting the project to have a better idea about the procedures as the Ministry of Displaced is willing to undertake a similar future project in Chouf and Mountain areas. Mr.Goovaerts informed the presents about his departure on the 31st of March. Mr.Osseiran will act as Habitat Project Manager from April 1st till the end of the project.

2. Report from the field :

UNIFIL : Major Troadec gave a short briefing about the situation; The military actions are sometimes active and sometimes calm. Field people have to take maximum security measures. Major Troadec could be reached thru UNIFIL Offices in Beirut.

YMCA : Joseph inquired about the approval of the project extension which was not yet received by YMCA. 3 cases in Hadatha which are opposite to SLA checkpoint were informed not to have more than 5 workers at the site otherwise they will be hit at once. Majdal Silm was subjected to shelling on Sunday which caused 3 injured. This has delayed the concrete pouring of the first slab.

SCF : For the second week, SCF was not able to disburse money to the beneficiaries because of cash deficit. It is expected to have around 50,000 US\$ disbursements during the coming week. Work in Social Infrastructure projects is ending. 90 to 95 % of the works has been executed.

3. Progress Report: The project physical progress per week is 2.9%. YMCA has a progress of 3.3% while SCF:2.6%. The number of finished houses is for paid : 190(T) & 81(P) and for the unpaid houses : 38(T) & 6(P).

4. Reporting problems : The printout of reports of week #25 were received in a bad shape. The weekly technical and financial reports of SCF were not received on Time, while the financial report of YMCA did not include week #25. It was agreed in the meeting that YMCA computer officer will fix the program and will try to modify it in a way to get only one sheet with the last 12 weeks of progress.

5. Final commitments: YMCA did not yet submit a list with the final commitments regarding all activities of the project. The Housing and Demolishing budgets are final. The SI commitment will be changed as some additional works are required. A change order will be prepared for this purpose after finalizing the estimate of needed additional works.

- **Schedule of works for finished houses :** The signed schedules of works for completed houses are not yet being delivered to Habitat office. The SOW is the only document that proves the closure of contract. Both NGOs were requested to motivate their engineers for this matter..

6. Other issues : A quick evaluation brainstorming exercise of the project villages was done by the attendants. These information were asked by representatives of the World Bank who are intending to implement some future projects in the area.

7. Next meeting : Wednesday, April 6th at 9:00 am.

When the meeting was over, Dr.Feghali had some questions to the engineers about the procedures taken in the field and about the reaction of people against these procedures. He briefly informed the attendants about the project that has already started in the Mountain area. Dr.Feghali mentioned that he is hoping to apply the same procedures and system in their project.

**PHYSICAL PROGRESS OF TOTALY DESTROYED HOUSES
PER VILLAGE PER WEEK**

VILLAGES	# of Houses	Progress# WK # 24	Progress# WK # 25	Prog./Wk
ZONE B				
BRA'SHIT	46	75	78	+3
HARRIS	14	88	92	+4
HADATHA	7	83	84	+1
AYTA	2	97	97	0
JUMAYJMEH	2	74	75	+1
KABRIKHA	8	78	86	+8
KAFRA	22	74	77	+3
MAAROUB	21	59	62	+3
MAJDAL SILM	64	76	79	+3
SAFAD AL BATIKH	1	86	100	+14
SHAQRA	3	83	88	+5
SULTANIYEH	6	77	79	+2
TEBNINE	18	81	84	+3
YATER	43	81	83	+2
ZONE A				
KHIRBET SILM	29	62	66	+4
AYTIT	15	91	94	+3
SADIQEEN	23	90	94	+4
QLAYLAH	07	100	100	finished
ZIBQEEN	09	98	98	0
QANA	07	79	79	0
SHEAYTIEH	05	100	100	finished
ZONE C				
KFAR SIR	46	76	81	+5
JIBSHIT	64	77	82	+5
ZAWTHAR CHARKIEH	10	100	100	finished
QAQAIT EL JISR	8	96	97	+1
ZAWTHAR GHARBIEH	4	80	84	+4
EBBA	1	100	100	finished
DWEIR	2	82	82	0
KFAR TEBNIT	15	79	83	+4
HAROUF	5	96	97	+1
NABATIEH FAWKA	5	73	74	+1
CHOUKINE	3	83	84	+1
ADSHIT	1	42	51	+9

10. Progress report week # 26: (P/T=partial damages/total demolished contracts
D= demolishing works. SI= social infrastructure)
of instalments Disbursements (US\$)

zone	NGO	#villages	P/T	1rst	2nd	3th	4th	issued	committed	phys.prog
A	SCF	7	P	9	9	8	-	22,520	23,520	23,520
			T	95	87	66	42	444,050	565,740	485,166
Subtotal A :			P+T	104	96	74	42	466,570	589,260	508,686
			%	100	92.3%	71.1%	44.2%	79.1%	100	86.3%
			TER/D					7,655	9,955	9,955
			SI					28,790	30,790	19,965
			SI%					93.5%	100	64.8%
C	SCF	12	P	24	24	21	-	76,275	79,275	79,275
			T	164	163	119	68	779,063	959,490	802,938
Subtotal C :			P+T	188	187	140	68	855,338	1,038,765	882,213
			%	100	99.4%	74.4%	41.4%	82.3%	100	84.9%
			D					18,900	22,900	18,900
			SI					31,493	53,148	43,766
			SI %					59.2%	100	82.3%

Totals SCF for housing										
this week	19		P+T	292	283	214	110	1,321,908	1,628,025	1,390,899
			%	100	96.1%	73.2%	42.4%	81.2%	100	85.4%
last week	19		P+T	292	283	214	110	1,321,908	1,628,025	1,349,460
			%	100	96.1%	73.2%	42.4%	81.2%	100	82.8%
prog. / wk	0			-	-	-	-	-	-	+2.6%
=====										
B	YMCA	14	P	73	71	52	-	224,340	247,065	227,395
			T	257	246	184	80	1,217,369	1,548,287	1,244,793
			D					6,100	6,100	6,100
			SI					45,976	80,850	52,585
			SI%					32.1%	100	65%

Totals YMCA for housing										
this week	14		P+T	330	317	236	80	1,441,709	1,795,352	1,472,188
			%	100	96%	71.5%	31.1%	80.3%	100	82%
last week	14		P+T	330	315	210	71	1,373,445	1,795,352	1,413,576
			%	100	95.4%	63.6%	27.6%	76.5%	100	78.7%
prog. / wk				-	+0.6%	+7.9%	+3.5%	+3.8%	-	+3.3%
=====										
Project totals for housing reconstruction & repair :										
				# of instalments				disbursements (US\$)		
		# villages (P+T)		1st	2nd	3rd	4th	issued	committed	phys.prog
this week	33			622	600	450	190	2,763,617	3,423,377	2,863,087
			%	100	96.4%	72.3%	36.8%	80.7%	100	83.6%
last week	33			622	598	424	181	2,695,353	3,423,377	2,763,036
			%	100	96.1%	68.1%	35%	78.7%	100	80.7%
prog./wk				-	+0.4%	+4.2%	+1.8%	+2%	-	+2.9%

Project Habitat for Social Infrastructure contracts:										
Zone A + B + C	18							98,609	126,523	106,316
Zone A+B+C (%)								77.9%	100	84%
Majdal Silm CH	1							7,650	38,265	10,000
M.S-CH (%)								20%	100	26.1%

Total SI	19							106,259	164,788	116,316
progress/week (SI)								64.4%	100	70.5%
										+4.6%

For your info and comments
* * * *

ANNEX 8

Executive Summary

This report contains four sectoral reviews in the areas of housing, vocational training, infrastructure, and urban management. Each sectoral review contains a list of findings and recommendations. The second part of the report includes a number of project proposals based on the findings and recommendations of the first part. The report is based on a review of previously produced documents and reports regarding these areas as well as interviews with key individuals. The report was researched and compiled during January-February 1994.

Housing

Findings: Housing remains an area of acute and urgent need in Lebanon. The government is focusing most of its efforts on infrastructure rehabilitation, but nevertheless there are a number of government-sponsored efforts in housing--especially with reference to the South and the displaced. Among the government's efforts are the following. The Housing Bank was restructured and its capital increased. A loan program for low and middle income groups through the Independent Housing Fund was re-activated. The government has also secured partial funding for reconstruction of destroyed homes in the South and in the areas of the Shouf and adjoining villages to which thousands of displaced are intended to return.

Recommendations: The main needs in this sector include the following: a mechanism to technically supervise these loan and construction projects and to make sure that the initial investments being made by the government and foreign donor agencies are used economically and effectively; strengthening the national institutions responsible for housing like the Ministry of Housing, the Housing Bank, the Independent Fund for Housing, the Ministry of the Displaced, and the unit of the Council for Development and Reconstruction dealing with housing. Attention should also be paid to decentralizing housing-construction activities and involving local communities in the effort. Support for small-enterprise ventures related to housing and to the socio-economic revival of devastated settlements is also recommended.

Vocational Training

findings: Vocational training programs are being carried out by governmental departments, non-governmental organizations, local associations, and private training institutes. Programs offered, however, do not follow standardized and unified curricula. In addition, they often do not meet market needs.

Recommendations: There is an urgent need for training in construction-related skills in order to keep up with national, regional, and local reconstruction timetables. Special emphasis should be given to technical and management skills related to construction, as these are rarely provided in current programs. Training should be oriented more consciously toward market needs and should increasingly be offered on the job and as part of ongoing construction projects. Development of small and medium enterprises and the encouragement of local vocational and technical training for those enterprises should be given special regard as part of an overall strategy of involving communities and the private sector.

Infrastructure

Findings: The devastation of Lebanon's infrastructure as a result of the long years of war continues to negatively affect the economy and the population's health and educational standards. The effects of infrastructure problems touch virtually every household. In the water sector, despite Lebanon's fairly abundant water resources, problems in distribution, equipment, and management result in serious water problems both for irriga-

tion and household use. Problems in financing, equipment, and management also negatively affect solid and liquid waste disposal, especially in outlying areas. In the energy sector, the government is pursuing a vigorous national electric rehabilitation plan; small energy infrastructure work, however, in villages and small towns often lacks attention. The educational infrastructure suffers from problems of physical structures, curriculum/materials, and human resources. The health sector is receiving considerable government attention, but still has acute needs in rebuilding its physical structures and integrating local clinics and dispensaries within their regions and with the national health care system.

Recommendations: Whereas several government agencies are addressing the major national infrastructure problems, there is a need for assistance in small infrastructural work in settlements and villages that are being rebuilt. There is a need for urban management training to help handle infrastructural planning, development, and maintenance at regional and local levels. Overall assistance could also be offered in helping rebuild physical structures, especially in the educational and health sectors. This help could be in the form of technical assistance, training, monitoring, and project management.

Urban-Rural Management

Findings: In Lebanon, rapid urbanization has out-paced the capacity of the already weakened urban and rural authorities to provide basic services and maintain a healthy rural and urban environment. The centralized administrative system in Lebanon has made cost-effective and efficient planning and management on rural and urban levels difficult. The Taif Agreement has officially mandated administrative decentralization and decreed that municipalities and local authorities receive more responsibilities and authority. In addition, a Ministry of Municipal and Village Affairs was established to oversee this decentralization process. The Ministry, however, still lacks basic organization, legislation, staffing, training, planning, data-collection, and networking. In addition, the over-600 municipalities around the country suffer from lack of finances and equipment, and poor staffing, training, planning, revenue-collection, and expertise.

Recommendations: Urgent technical and urban management assistance should be offered to the Ministry of Municipalities and a selected number of key municipalities around the country. This assistance should be in the form of help in developing urban management skills, training, planning, data-bases, and regional and national networks. The Ministry should be helped to develop its own urban management advising and training unit whose expertise would then be available to all municipalities.

Project Proposals:

The establishment of a Technical Habitat Advisory and Management Unit. This Unit could provide management and monitoring services as well as policy advice to the Ministry of Displaced, the Council for the South (CFS), the Housing Bank, the Independent Fund for Housing, the Ministry of Housing, the Council for Development and Reconstruction (CDR), and other agencies involved in housing construction. This Unit could be established independently or as part of the Ministry of Displaced or the CFS. This Unit would also offer vocational training programs and advice in ongoing construction projects.

The establishment of an Urban Management Unit. This Unit would assist the Ministry of Municipalities and various municipalities around the country enhance their urban management skills and improve their delivery of basic services and their management of revenues and local development. In direct coordination with the CDR, this Unit could operate on two levels; with the Ministry of Municipal and Village Affairs on one level, and a selection of several other municipalities (such as Saida and Zahrani) on the other level.

CONCLUSION

Through all the needs listed in the findings, there is a common thread of need in (a) small infrastructural advice and assistance, (b) technical advice, monitoring, training, and project supervision in housing, and (c) enhancement of urban management capacities both centrally and in local municipalities. Habitat could play an important role in this area, and a number of local government and non-government agencies have indicated a willingness to cooperate with such a Habitat effort.

ANNEX 9

Executive Summary

A. Introduction

Following the July 1993 events in South Lebanon 5 million US\$ has been allotted to assist approximately 600 selected families with totally destroyed and partially damaged houses.

B. Area of operation and selection of beneficiaries

1. Area of operation

The area of operation in South Lebanon included in the beginning of the project 10 villages and was then extended to 33 villages.

2. Selection of beneficiaries

Beside the technical damage assessment, a socio-economic survey was conducted in the villages to assess the social and economic situation of the affected population.

C. Objectives and limitation of the study

1. Objective of the study

The objective of the study is to evaluate on the basis of all processed data the social and economic situation of the surveyed population.

2. Limitation of the study

The study is confined to the surveyed population in a specific geographic area (Unifil zone and Nabatiyeh area). The questionnaire includes several detailed questions concerning the social and economic situation.

D. South Lebanon as area of operation

The area in the South has lived successive waves of migration which affected the social and economic situation and conditions in the area.

E. Evaluation of the social situation of beneficiaries

General Social and Economic Conditions

The social and economic situation suffered during the war, especially the sector of agriculture which used to be the source of income for three quarters of the population.

1. Family Size

The average family size is 5.72 and only varies slightly in the different zones.

2. Quality of living

The average size of the house for totally destroyed and partially damaged houses is 122 m². The square meters per person range from 13 to 38 m².

Analysis of data revealed that higher income groups have in average a bigger house than lower income groups. A correlation was also established between income and the size of the house.

3. Reaching the poorest

The analysis of the relation between income and amount assisted revealed that the highest amounts of assistance have been calculated for the two lowest income groups.

- E. Evaluation of the economic situation of beneficiaries
1. Income distribution
The average income per village lies below the estimated Lebanese average. The average income per person decreases with every additional family member.
 2. Sector of Agriculture
Agriculture which has previously accounted for over 80% of the working population as source of income. The percentage of farmers has now decreased considerably.

Recommendations

In order to achieve a geographic, social and economic balanced development underprivileged and underserved areas, such as the South, have to receive special attention in the sectors of rehabilitation of infrastructure, upgrading and expansion of social and health facilities and the creation of better economic opportunities (through loans to small-scale enterprises, vocational training).

UNITED NATIONS CENTRE FOR HUMAN SETTLEMENTS (Habitat)
CENTRE DES NATIONS UNIES POUR LES ETABLISSEMENTS HUMAINS
CENTRO DE LAS NACIONES UNIDAS PARA LOS ASENTAMIENTOS HUMANOS



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ANNEX 10

Tyre, 26 January 94

BRIEFING NOTE

on the

EMERGENCY HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION IN SOUTHERN LEBANON

1. The United Nations Centre for Human Settlements-Habitat (UNCHS-Habitat), the United Nations agency responsible for housing and urban development, has been identified by the UNDP and the UN Department for Humanitarian Affairs (DHA) to implement the emergency housing reconstruction project in Southern Lebanon after the events of July last year. The DHA put at disposal of UNCHS-Habitat US\$5 million from the UN Central Emergency Fund to implement the programme.
2. The project started end of August and was formally approved by the Govt of Lebanon on the 23rd of September (Minister of Housing and Cooperatives & High Relief Committee).
3. At this moment 630 houses are under reconstruction by the inhabitants themselves. US\$1,722,048 has been disbursed to them and there is a physical construction progress of US\$1,633,688. This represents a progress of approx. 47% versus the project objectives. Thirty one houses are totally reconstructed and 30 to sixty houses will be finished every week. It is now expected that end of March about six hundred houses in forty villages in Southern Lebanon will be reconstructed. The remainder (30 to 40 houses) are either multi-storey buildings or beneficiaries which are delayed or slow and will be finished soon thereafter.
4. The project has also repaired 25 social infrastructures (schools, community houses, dispensaries, etc..) for a total value of US\$222,230= through UNIFIL and the two NGO's (SCF & YMCA) who are the representatives for UNCHS-Habitat in the field.
5. UNCHS-Habitat is very grateful for the contributions from the Swedish and Danish Governments (resp. US\$250,000 and US\$450,000) towards the reimbursement of the UN Central Emergency Fund in the framework of this project. It is important that more contributions can be found to this end.
6. The High Relief Committee and the Council for the South have expressed their interest and appreciation for the results of the project. Similar technical assistance as provided by the UNCHS-Habitat project in the reconstruction effort could be of interest for further housing reconstruction projects in Lebanon.

#	VILLAGE	FEBRUARY																																		
		WEEK I							WEEK II							WEEK III							WEEK IV							WEEK V						
		31	1	2	3	4	7	8	9	10	11	14	15	16	17	10	21	22	23	24	25	23	1	2	3	4										
1.	BRA'SHIT	R	R	R	S			R	T									R	R	R																
2.	YATAR	R	R	R	S			R	T										R	R	R															
3.	MAJDAL SILM	R	R	R	S			R	T				S						R	R	R															
4.	KAFNA	R	R	R	S			R											R	R	R															
5.	MAAROUN	R	R	R	S			R											R	R	R															
6.	KADRIKHA	R	R	R	S			R	T				S						R	R	R															
7.	HARISS	R	R	R	S			R											R	R	R															
8.	HADATHA	R	R	R	S			R											R	R	R															
9.	TEDNIN	R	R	R	S			R											R	R	R															
10.	SHAQRA	R	R	R	S			R					S						R	R	R															
11.	JUMAYJUMAH	R	R	R	S			R											R	R	R															
12.	SULTANYIEH	R	R	R	S			R											R	R	R															
13.	SAFAD EL BATTIKH	R	R	R	S			R											R	R	R															
14.	AYTA ZUTT	R	R	R	S			R											R	R	R															
	TOTAL																																			

S - CONSTRUCTION WORK HAS STOPPED BECAUSE OF SHELLING
R - RAINY DAYS CAUSING DELAY IN WORK
- NO MONITORING BECAUSE OF SHELLING OR RAINY WEATHER
W - WINDY WEATHER
T - TENGE SITUATION


Annex 12

LIST OF PROJECT REPORTS & DOCUMENTS


- (i) Weekly Progress reports (36 weeks from begin October 1993 till 5 June 1994)
- (ii) Minutes of the weekly coordination meetings (#: 36)
- (iii) Reports on delaying factors (started in december till end)
- (iv) Interim Report - November 1993
 - Monthly Progress Report - December 1993
 - Monthly Progress Report - January 1994
 - Monthly Progress Report - February 1994
 - Monthly Progress Report - March 1994
 - Monthly Progress Report - April 1994
 - Monthly Progress Report - May 1994
- (v) Terminal Report (Final draft edition - July 1994)
- (vi) Study on surveyed potential and selected beneficiaries (May 1994)
- (vii) Findings and Recommendations on Housing-Construction and Urban Management Needs and Possibilities for Assistance Lebanon, March 1994
The Lebanese Center for Policy Studies
- (viii) Monthly statement of account in the monthly reports
- (ix) Monthly financial statements by the NGOs (YMCA & SCF)
- (x) Some press briefing notes (December/January/June)

ANNEX 13


Progress of PROJECT (516T+106P)




Progress of ZONE C (164T+24P)




Progress of ZONE A (95T+9P)




Progress of ZONE B (257T+73P)




Progress of AZIB (28T+5P)




Progress of SADDIQIN (23T+0P)



Progress of KHIRBIT SILM (29T+1P)




Progress of AYTEET (15T+3P)




Progress of MAJDAL SILM


(64 T+ 4P)



Progress of YATAR (43+13P)




Progress of HAR/KAB/ SAF/SHA (26T+ 22P)




BHAD /JUM /AYT /SUL


T: 17+ P: 6




Progress of KAFRA (22 T+12P)




Progress of Bra'shit (46T+14P)




Progress of TEBNINE /MAROUB (39T+2 P)




Progress of KAFRSIR/DWEIR/HAROUF (53T+7P)



Progress of JIBSHEET (64T+5P)



Progress of KFART/ADCH/CHOU/EBAA/NF/QAQT/ZWC/ZWG (47T+12P)



WEEKLY PROGRESS RECORD OF THE PROJECT												
Since Week # 09 : 29-11-93 to 31 MAY 94												
column #1	#2	#3	#4	#5	#6	#7	#8	#9	#10	#11	#12	#13
WK #	Objective \$	Commitment \$	PhysProg	Total % Progress v	Obj/Lt.Obj	Comit.	Wkly %Pr.v.s	Obj. Comit	Hses achieved	P	T+P	Obs
#09-29-11/05-12	3,458,465	1,981,496	***	20.9	21.1	31.2	***	***	0	0	0	* 1
#10-06-12/12-12	3,458,465	2,311,481	721,155	26.4	26.7	31.4	***	0.2	0	0	0	
#11-13-12/19-12	3,458,465	2,907,040	912,626	31.6	31.9	37.2	5.6	5.8	0	0	0	
#12-20-12/26-12	3,458,465	2,940,640	1,092,512	36.7	37.1	41.7	5.1	4.6	1	2	3	
#13-27-12/02-01	3,458,465	3,040,610	1,268,774	41.5	41.9	46.4	4.8	4.6	3	4	7	
#14-03-01/09-01	3,458,465	3,092,890	1,433,882	47.2	47.7	50.0	5.8	3.6	12	7	19	
#15-10-01/16-01	3,458,465	3,266,665	1,632,588	51.5	53.3	52.1	5.6	2.2	24	15	39	* 2
#16-17-01/23-01	3,543,600	3,496,825	1,823,311	54.2	56.1	54.9	2.8	2.8	36	22	58	
#17-24-01/30-01	3,543,600	3,497,815	1,920,458	57.4	59.5	58.1	3.4	3.2	48	28	76	
#18-31-01/06-02	3,543,600	3,501,340	2,035,413	61.0	63.2	61.8	3.7	3.6	71	41	112	
#19-07-02/13-02	3,543,600	3,501,340	2,162,457	66.5	67.2	66.5	4.1	4.8	78	58	136	* 3
#20-14-02/20-02	3,458,762	3,458,762	2,301,597	70.1	70.1		2.8		99	65	164	
#21-21-02/27-02	3,453,337	3,453,337	2,398,084	74.1	74.1		4.0		158	82	240	
#22-28-02/04-03	3,460,967	3,460,967	2,535,678	77.5	77.5		3.4		191	83	274	
#23-05-03/11-03	3,457,767	3,457,767	2,679,407	80.7	80.7		3.2		217	86	303	
#24-12-03/16-03	3,423,377	3,423,377	2,763,036	83.6	83.6		2.9		228	87	315	
#25-17-03/23-03	3,423,377	3,423,377	2,863,087	85.5	85.5		1.9		251	94	345	
#26-24-03/30-03	3,423,377	3,423,377	2,927,143	88.0	88.0		2.4		269	96	365	
#27-31-03/06-04	3,423,377	3,423,377	3,010,969	89.9	89.9		2.0		313	97	410	
#28-07-04/13-04	3,423,377	3,423,377	3,079,228	91.6	91.6		1.6		347	97	444	
#29-14-04/20-04	3,423,377	3,423,377	3,135,648	92.5	92.5		0.9		358	98	456	
#30-20-04/26-04	3,423,377	3,423,377	3,166,674	93.4	93.4		0.9		372	99	471	
#31-27-04/1-05	3,423,377	3,423,377	3,199,431	94.7	94.7		1.3		390	100	490	
#32-2-05/8-05	3,423,377	3,423,377	3,244,057	95.9	95.9		1.7		417	107	514	
#33-9-05/15-05	3,418,392	3,418,392	3,278,998	97.1	97.1		1.2		453	106	559	
#34-16-05/22-05	3,418,392	3,418,392	3,322,221	98.8	98.8		1.7		498	106	604	
#35-23-05/29-05	3,418,392	3,418,392	3,380,378									
Latest Objective LtObj(*)	3,418,392								516	106	622	
									96.5	100	97.1	
									15	1	16	

Total # houses: 516
 Progr. % achieved hses: 96.5
 # Cancelled contracts: 15

Note : LtObj(*) : latest objective = latest commitment

ANNEX 15

FOLLOW-UP MEETING ON THE FIELD ENGINEERS WORKSHOP

Presents : **Habitat :** Piet Goovaerts, Allert Schokker,
Tarek Osseiran
YMCA : Joseph Kassab
SCF : Haytham Annan

Date : February 21, 1994.

The follow-up meeting was held to finalize the issues which were identified by the field engineers during the workshop and to agree on a unified plan of action that would be applied in the field by HABITAT and NGOs within the coming few weeks.

The following 15 actions are the outcome of the workshop which are being undertaken as solutions for problems :

I. Multi-storey buildings:

As families (traditionally fathers and sons) are used to share the same house together, and as the project aims at housing the families within the short project period, it was approved, as a temporary solution for the multi-storey building, to assist people [action #1] who want to share the same unit under the following conditions :

- a. Two or more kitchens on the same floor - 60m² per family is horizontally an acceptable area.
- b. One kitchen for two or more families - 75m² are required per one family.
- c. Families who agree to share the same floor on a temporarily basis have to submit a legal document which shows their agreement to :
 - Temporary residency.
 - Disbursement of Habitat assistance on the first floors.
 - Commitment to co-finance for the completion of the other floors.

II. Huge areas :

Three categories were classified within the problem of constructing huge areas :

A. Concrete works completed :

Problem : The remaining amounts (3rd, 4th instalments) are not sufficient to finalize the scheduled works.

Solution: Rescheduling of the remaining works according to money and time. This should be done by the field engineer in agreement with the owner. [action #2].

HABITAT will make sure that the rescheduling of works will keep the reconstructed house liveable (incl. 60m²). Works that could be deleted are by sequence : painting, inside doors and tiling. The engineer will not suggest this solution but, he will make the owner come out with the idea of rescheduling works.

Rescheduling needs final authorization by HABITAT Engineers.

B. Concrete works not yet done :

Actions required from the engineers :

- Prepare a detailed bar chart in agreement with the owner showing the process of implementation of works in time. This chart can be done on the same sheet of the schedule of works and it will enable the engineers to monitor the works according to the new time frame. [action #3].
- Submit a copy of the bar chart to HABITAT.

C. On going units - delay in time because of huge areas :

Engineers should make sure that the owner finishes the works as per schedule (60m²). Habitat engineers will convey a clear message to the owners that the required works should be executed by the end of March, otherwise they lose the balance amount of the assistance. [action #4].

III. General measures that will be considered by the engineers:

1. [action #5] The engineers should change their concept and attitude towards the delayed cases. It is required that Habitat and NGO engineers, and for two consequent weeks, give more attention to the delayed cases, by visiting them more often and by spending more time than before to convince them to work harder. After these two weeks, cases that do not show any cooperation will be ignored by the project and will not be monitored by the engineers. This decision should be applied immediately.

2. Cancellation (theoretically) of one of the most delayed cases in each village to make it as a precedent for others.
[action#6]: Eleven cases have been selected : 5 immediately as they had only achieved less than 5% over 6 or more weeks in total progress. The others are warned for the same action next week.

3. [action #7] Organize group meetings at the Moukhtar's house in all the villages for the delayed cases. In this meeting, HABITAT engineers will try to explain to people that the engineers are there to assist them and that they should cooperate for their own benefit. The meeting will focus on the fact that the project will end by March. These meetings should be organized at once.

4. [action #8] Support people, whenever it is possible, in finding masons and other skilled labour. Action should be taken immediately.
5. [action #9] Support social cases in construction management. Immediate action by the engineers.
6. [action #10] For cases who have not started yet and who are found outside their villages, the engineers should help in finding a contractor who is ready to implement the works as scheduled in money and time. Proceed immediately.
7. [action #11] HABITAT have rescheduled the field work of its engineers in a more focused way to be less time consuming and more efficient.
8. The HABITAT engineers will also focus on the slow cases, as well as authorize 3rd & 4th instalments. They will supplement the work time of the NGO engineers rather than spent the time with them. The HABITAT and NGO engineers will only meet once a week. [action #12].
9. The HABITAT engineers have a new geographical task distribution such that the NGO engineers correspond only with one HABITAT engineer any more (time management). [action #13].
10. In Zone B (YMCA) a supplementary engineer will be hired by YMCA to support the slow high caseloads in Yatar, Majdel Silm and Bra'shit. [action #14].
11. A short meeting for taking actions will be held at Habitat Office with the presence of all engineers on Wednesday February 23rd at 02:00 pm.
12. Please find attached the list of slow cases between 2nd and 3rd instalments which have been identified for priority action [action #15]. The cases are presented per village in a first list and per cause of delays in a second list.

Note from the Project Management:

a) The comment made by the field engineers regarding the timing of the workshop (should have been earlier according to them) is relevant as the workshop has proven to be a very adequate management tool.

However, such workshops were not initially planned and the one organised on Monday 14th of February was a crisis management decision as a result of the dramatic slow down of the project programme at the end of January (WPR # 18- from 5.3% to 2.7%). The lesson learned is that such workshops should be organized at frequent intervals during the project period (ex. every 6 weeks).

b) Note that the workshop has identified about 15 causes of slow progress (second list attached). Some of them are very individual, but others are overlapping with one another. This justifies why the number of slow cases is relatively high (193 identified cases between 2nd and 3rd instalment).

c) One of the main causes of delays and slow progress is the construction of huge areas. The project has been combatting this issue since long and the impression was that the beneficiaries were stubborn. A new legislation has now been found which makes sense and which justifies why the project's influence was so minimal on this. Very soon a new building legislation will be put in place (March/April 1994) which will strongly limit the sizes of houses. Whatever built before will not be affected. Knowing that, the beneficiaries are building too big although it affects their budgets (and this is another cause of slow progress). They prefer the more longer term advantage of a bigger house than their immediate interest of a 60m² finished house.

ANNEX 16

FAX MSG

FAX #: 603460/1

TO: Miss Van de VELDE
J.P.O-UNDP
Beirut-LEBANON

REF. #: 109/94

FILE #: EU-LEB-93-E01

FROM: T.Osseiran
~~Project engineer~~
UNCHS-HABITAT, Tyre Office

DATE : 15.06.94

AUTH: P.Goovaerts
Project Manager
UNCHS-HABITAT, Tyre

PAGE : 04 (inc.this one)

SUBJECT: Inventory lists

Please, find attached the inventory of expendable and non
expendable items.

Best regards.

UNCHS-HABITAT
Emergency Housing reconstruction in Southern Lebanon
EU-LEB-93-E01
TYRE - LEBANON

INVENTORY OF EXPENDABLE AND NON-EXPENDABLE PROPERTIES

ITEMS	QTY	VALUE IN US \$ per unit	TOTAL VALUE US \$
WOODEN BIG TABLES	2	25.00	150.00
WOODEN SMALL TABLES	2	15.00	30.00
WOODEN SHELVES	4	20.00	80.00
PLASTIC CHAIRS	10	5.00	50.00
GAS COOKER WITH ONE BOTTLE	1	35.00	35.00
NEON	10	10.00	100.00
CURTAINS	16 (pc)	10.00	160.00
CURTAIN RAILS	8 (pc)	10.00	80.00
PLANNING BOARD	1	50.00	50.00
DOORS	5	40.00	200.00
CLOCKS	2	8.00	16.00
WOODEN BOARDS	10	12.00	120.00
FLIP CHART STAND	1	150.00	150.00
FILING CABINETS	3	175.00	525.00
METALIC CUPBOARD	1	175.00	175.00
CHAIRS	7	100.00	700.00
EXECUTIVE DESKS	6	100.00	600.00
SECRETARIAL DESKS	4	125.00	500.00
REFRIGERATOR (220 VLT)	1	375.00	375.00
AIR CONDITONERS (220 VLTS,1.5 KVA)	3	650.00	1,950.00
CALCULATORS	4	90.00	360.00
PHOTOCOPIER NASHUATEC 8115 PC, 220 VLT	3	1,000.00	3,000.00
PERSONAL COMPUTERS 368	2	1,629.00	3,258.00
UPS 1000 W. 220 VLT	1	650.00	650.00
UPS 2000 W. 220 VLT	1	1,300.00	1,300.00
LASER PRINTER EPSON II 110 VLT	1	1,185.00	1,185.00
PRINTER SWITCH BOX	1	25.00	25.00
STABILIZER , 220 VLT	1	110.00	110.00
CARS: KARTAL LX	2	12,125.00	24,250.00
CARS: KARTAL L	3	3,000.00	9,300.00
		TOTAL	49,484.00

UNCHS-HABITAT
 Emergency Housing reconstruction in Southern Lebanon
 EU-LEB-93-E01
 TYRE - LEBANON

INVENTORY OF EXPENDABLE AND NON-EXPENDABLE PROPERTIES

ITEMS	QTY	VALUE IN US \$ per unit	TOTAL VALUE US \$
REFRIGERATOR (220 VLT)	1	375.00	375.00
AIR CONDITONERS (220 VLTS,1.5 KVA)	3	650.00	1,950.00
CALCULATORS	2	180.00	360.00
FOTOCOPIER NASHUATEC 8115 PC, 220 VLT	1	3,000.00	3,000.00
PERSONAL COMPUTERS 368	2	1,629.00	3,258.00
UPS 1000 W, 220 VLT	1	650.00	650.00
UPS 2000 W, 220 VLT	1	1,300.00	1,300.00
LASER PRINTER EPSON II 110 VLT	1	1,185.00	1,185.00
PRINTER SWITCH BOX	1	25.00	25.00
STABILIZER , 220 VLT	1	110.00	110.00
CARS: KARTAL LX	2	12,125.00	24,250.00
CARS: KARTAL L	1	9,300.00	9,300.00
		TOTAL	45,763.00

UNCHS-HABITAT
 Emergency Housing reconstruction in Southern Lebanon
 EU-LEB-93-E01
 TYRE - LEBANON

INVENTORY OF EXPENDABLE AND NON-EXPENDABLE PROPERTIES

ITEMS	QTY	VALUE IN US \$ per unit	TOTAL VALUE US \$
WOODEN BIG TABLES	6	25.00	150.00
WOODEN SMALL TABLES	2	15.00	30.00
WOODEN SHELVES	4	20.00	80.00
PLASTIC CHAIRS	10	5.00	50.00
GAS COOKER WITH ONE BOTTLE	1	35.00	35.00
NEON	10	10.00	100.00
CURTAINS	16 (pc)	10.00	160.00
CURTAIN RAILS	8 (pc)	10.00	80.00
PLANNING BOARD	1	50.00	50.00
DOORS	5	40.00	200.00
CLOCKS	2	8.00	16.00
WOODEN BOARDS	10	12.00	120.00
FLIP CHART STAND	1	150.00	150.00
FILING CABINETS	3	175.00	525.00
METALIC CUPBOARD	1	175.00	175.00
CHAIRS	7	100.00	700.00
EXECUTIVE DESKS	2	300.00	600.00
SECRETARIAL DESKS	2	250.00	500.00
		TOTAL	3,721.00

file

ANNEX 17

Emergency Housing Reconstruction Project in Southern Lebanon

Technical and Financial Review Mission

United Nations Centre for Human Settlements
(Habitat)
United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs

5 - 11 March 1994

INTRODUCTION

1. The tension which had built up in Southern Lebanon as of early July 1993 erupted on 25 July into massive and sustained attacks by Israeli Defence Forces on local town and villages. 350,000 people, in shock, were forced to flee their homes in South Lebanon and West Bekaa and seek refuge in safer areas, particularly Beirut, its southern suburbs and Saida. The numbers of population involved and the conditions of displacement were simply alarming.
2. This brief, but large scale and intensive, conflict occurred at a particularly difficult juncture for Lebanon, as the Government had recently stepped up efforts to evacuate illegally occupied buildings and to resettle and reintegrate the large number of displaced persons of the post-war period, on the one hand, and implement the National Emergency Rehabilitation Programme (1993-95), on the other.
3. The United Nations Secretary-General sent on 7 August 1993 an inter-agency mission led by DHA to Lebanon for the preparation of a consolidated appeal for the population in the conflict-affected areas. The appeal launched on 20 August 1993 amounted to a total of USD 28,745,200 covering inter alia the areas of housing (main appeal component), emergency food aid, agriculture, health care, water supply/sanitation and education.
4. The housing reconstruction component of the appeal was the major and most urgent component. In order to permit rapid commencement of reconstruction, DHA advanced USD 5 million through its Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF) to the United Nations Centre for Human Settlements (Habitat) with whom a letter of understanding was concluded on 27 August concerning this advance.
5. As stipulated in the project document LEB/93/E01 signed by the Government of Lebanon, UNCHS (Habitat) and DHA on 23 September 1993, UNCHS (Habitat) and DHA should perform a final review of the project. A joint mission was therefore undertaken from 5 to 11 March 1994 in order to visit sites of reconstruction, exchange views on lessons learnt from this project with all parties concerned (local authorities, Government, UN agencies, UNIFIL, NGOs), confer with governmental authorities in view of a possible replication by UNDP and UNCHS (Habitat) of this type of project in Lebanon, and to discuss with the national government and the UN Resident Coordinator the appropriate strategy to adopt in order to raise further funds to repay the CERF advance and to replicate this type of reconstruction project elsewhere in Lebanon.

PROJECT REVIEW

Project implementation

6. Due to the relative weakness of national authorities and the need for strict technical and financial supervision, the project has been managed by a UNCHS (Habitat) Project Office established in Tyr in September 1993. The Project Office works in collaboration with UNARDOL/UNDP, UNIFIL, two NGOs and the Council for the South.
7. UNARDOL/UNDP plays an administrative and financial role as an intermediary between UNCHS headquarters and the Project Office. The UN Coordinator also plays a political role as the official representative of UNCHS and DHA in Lebanon.
8. UNIFIL was responsible for minor demolition activities and repair of schools at the beginning of the project and provides continuous security information and advice to the Project team.
9. The two NGOs (YMCA and SCF) have been selected on the basis of their managerial experience in the country. Each of them is the implementing agency in a particular area, under a sub-contract with UNCHS. Over 80 per cent of the project budget is actually channelled through the NGOs, which work under close supervision of the Project Office.
10. The Council for the South represents the Lebanese Government in this part of the country. It provided financial assistance to all families affected by the events of July 1993, for a total of USD 25 million. This assistance has been coordinated with the project in order to avoid any duplication.
11. Affected house owners receive technical and financial assistance from the NGOs. The financial assistance takes the form of a grant representing the cost of a core house of 60 sq.m. for a family of 7 (69 sq.m for a family of 10, 51 sq.m. for a family of 4, 1 sq.m = 105 USD). The beneficiaries receive this grant in 4 instalments, upon clearance of the concerned NGO. They are free to organize the work as they wish, usually by contracting local entrepreneurs.
12. The funds are therefore channelled and controlled as follows: from UNCHS (Habitat) to NGOs to house owners to local contractors. This management structure has proven to be very effective. It allows a smooth monitoring of project activities, both at NGOs and Project Office levels. In addition, weekly coordination meetings help clarifying unforeseen issues.

13. The Project Manager has also established adequate and systematic reporting procedures which give a permanent view of work progress in the 33 villages covered by the project and in the meantime are used to identify operational problems in the field. Weekly and monthly reports are submitted to UNCHS, DHA and UNDP, and are used by UNCHS for technical and financial backstopping on a day to day basis. The project can therefore be considered as an example of efficient monitoring and reporting practice.
14. The Project Office is under the responsibility of an international Project Manager, while all other members are Lebanese nationals. NGOs are also entirely nationally-managed. A total of approximately 20 Lebanese professionals are involved in project implementation, including a significant number of women. The project has therefore built a national capacity in the area of emergency housing management, which could be mobilized for similar projects in the future.
15. The project has also benefitted from a strong support and interest from part of all concerned communities. This demonstrates on the one hand that housing reconstruction was considered as their most pressing need and on the other hand that they were ready to understand, accept and follow strict rules and procedures, only based on technical and social criteria.
16. As far as work progress is concerned, it has to be noted that initial project objectives - as stated in the project document - were to build 400 new core houses and to repair 250 partially damaged houses over a 6-month period, starting with 10 priority villages. These objectives have been reviewed and extended after a survey carried out in September-October 1993. The present (and final) objectives are to build 516 new houses and to repair 107 partially damaged units, in a total of 33 villages.
17. On 8 March 1994, 240 houses were totally finished and 383 were under construction, representing an overall physical progress of 73.2 per cent. A progress of 80 per cent was expected by the end of March (i.e. 6 months after the signature of the project document). However, as almost 300 houses would still remain under construction, the evaluation mission recommended an extension of the project until mid-June 1994 (see Recommendations for Project completion).
18. 25 social infrastructure (schools, dispensaries, community houses) have also been repaired by the project. The biggest one - Majdel Silm community house - will not be finished before May.
19. As far as expenditures are concerned, the USD 5 million budget has been approximately utilized as follows:

- Technical assistance (project office): 8%
- Sub-contracts (UNIFIL, SCF, YMCA): 84%
- Agency management fees: 3%
- Savings: 5%

20. A detailed budget will be presented in the terminal report to be prepared by the executing agency in April 1994.

21. To conclude, it has to be mentioned that the evaluation mission has been impressed by the visible impact of the project's activities in the villages as well as the satisfaction expressed both by the beneficiaries regarding the quality of the work and the policy-makers regarding the broad coverage and quick implementation of field activities. Actually, this reconstruction project is very much appreciated not only at the village level but also at the regional and national levels (Council for the South, High Relief Committee, etc.).

Problems and solutions

22. As there was a drop of progress at the end of January, the project management organized a workshop on 14 February, so as to remotivate the NGO-engineers, to identify the causes of delay and suggest appropriate actions. 15 actions were decided and implemented, resulting in an immediate speeding up of field activities. This kind of workshop constitutes a good example of timely initiative on the part of the Habitat project management.

23. Other problems have been identified and successfully solved by the Project Office, in particular regarding its relationship with several key partners:

- a) close collaboration with UNIFIL was established from the very beginning of the project. However technical and managerial capacities of UNIFIL were over-estimated in the project design. The agreement between UNCHS and UNIFIL was therefore amended to reflect this situation;
- b) three NGOs were supposed to be involved in the project. One of them (MECC) withdrew in September 1993. YMCA and SCF agreed on assuming broader responsibility and a new geographical distribution was made and implemented without major delay;
- c) YMCA has had some management problems at the end of 1993. The appointment of a new field coordinator and a closer supervision from the Project Office resulted in a clear improvement of the association's performance;
- d) coordination with the Council for the South was established, competition and duplication of financial

assistance were avoided and the project played a leverage role vis-à-vis assistance from the Council.

24. UNCHS (Habitat) headquarters also showed its flexibility, for instance by amending several times the NGO sub-contracts in order to take into account the evolution of the situation in the field. Recruitment and procurement were made on time and operational activities have not been delayed by administrative procedures.
25. The main remaining problem at the date of the evaluation mission is still the funding of the project and the need for mobilizing voluntary contributions (see Fund-mobilization).

Recommendations for project completion

26. Due to the extension of the project's quantitative objectives, there is a need to extend the duration of the project from 6 to 9 months. The project would then be closed on 15 June 1994.
27. All beneficiaries have started the work. On 8 March 595 have received their second instalment. The project will not select any other beneficiary and will not commit any other fund. However, according to the Project management 278 houses would still be under construction on 15 April, representing a remaining value of USD 466,000. It is felt that the completion of these units should be monitored and supervised by the NGOs and the Project Office. Obviously, they would only require a reduced staff, tailored to the decreasing workload.
28. The evaluation mission therefore recommends the following actions:
 - a) to extend a core national team to run the Project Office for 2 additional months (15/04 to 15/06/94);
 - b) to repatriate the international Project Manager at the end of March, and to field him in May and June for two one-week monitoring missions;
 - c) to amend the NGOs' sub-contracts in the same way (reduced staff from 15/04 to 15/06/94).

The total cost of this extension would not exceed USD 50,000.

29. Other recommendations for orderly project completion are the following:
 - a) to prepare a new version of the video-movie, of approximately 10-12 mn, which could be used for fund-

raising purpose and on Lebanese and international TV networks;

- b) to prepare a brochure on project objectives and achievements for international and national dissemination;
 - c) to transfer non-expendable project equipment (cars, computers, etc.) to another UNDP/UNCHS project in Lebanon (see Proposals for UNDP/UNCHS follow-up projects);
 - d) to transfer classified project archives to UNDP Beirut, to be stored for a 5 year-period.
30. In case voluntary contributions exceeding USD 5 million are received by UNCHS (Habitat), the project would be extended to cover other affected villages. The same project structure, management and procedures would have to be adopted.

Lessons learnt

31. Several lessons can be drawn from the experience of LEB/93/E01 - Housing reconstruction in Southern Lebanon.
32. For future UNCHS and DHA housing activities in countries affected by human-made disasters, three main lessons have been learnt:
- a) strict and clear procedures should be established from the beginning of the intervention, for both financial and technical assistance;
 - b) a small but highly qualified and motivated project monitoring team, or Project Office, should also be created as soon as possible so as to supervise, control and monitor all implementation activities;
 - c) a close collaboration between UNCHS as executing agency and locally-based NGOs should be considered as a powerful tool for quick delivery of outputs and for extensive community participation.
33. Another lesson has been learnt regarding the first stage of such an emergency project, i.e. the short period between the events and the creation of a full-fledged Project Office in the field. During that relief period, peace-keeping bodies already present in the affected area should play a crucial role for providing temporary shelter, removing debris, demolishing dangerous buildings and repairing key infrastructure. Even at this early stage, they could call upon their sister UN specialized agencies for immediate technical support.

A last lesson concerns the replication of this project in Lebanon. As already indicated the project is monitored by a Project Office which is autonomous vis-à-vis existing Lebanese institutions. This institutional independence was an asset for emergency activities funded by external donors. However any replication would have to more closely involve national and regional authorities. Therefore a future Habitat Project Office would be best located within an existing institution (see Proposals for UNDP/UNCHS follow-up projects), provided that UN rules, regulations and operating procedures could still be enforced.

Fund-mobilization

35. Advances made by DHA to an operational organization should be reimbursed by being charged on contributions received by this organization with regard to the project concerned. UNCHS (Habitat) has undertaken several fund-raising efforts in meetings with potential donor government representatives informing them of the objectives and the progress of the project. Two governments have so far responded positively: Denmark (DKK 3 million) and Sweden (SEK 2 million) totalling almost USD 700,000.
36. During the weeks preceding the mission a strategy was discussed between DHA and UNCHS (Habitat) to raise the funds necessary to (a) reimburse the CERF and (b) to finance replication by UNDP and UNCHS (Habitat) of this type of project elsewhere in Lebanon. The mission discussed further fund-raising action with the UN Resident Coordinator, the representative of UNARDOL and representatives of the Lebanese Government.
37. The mission finally recommended that a letter signed by the Heads of DHA and UNCHS (Habitat) be addressed to potential donors including the Arab States. The letter would refer to the reimbursement of the CERF advance as well as to further housing reconstruction in other parts affected by military attacks in Lebanon.
38. To this joint letter will be attached a letter signed by the Prime Minister of Lebanon, in which he expresses his appreciation of the speed and high standards with which this housing reconstruction was initiated and carried out. As a token of its great satisfaction with the project, the Lebanese Government will contribute USD 1 million towards the reimbursement of the CERF advance and appeal for USD 5 million that would be used for replication by UNDP and UNCHS (Habitat) of this type of housing reconstruction project elsewhere in Lebanon.

PROPOSALS FOR UNDP/UNCHS FOLLOW-UP PROJECTS

1. The evaluation mission met with representatives of High Relief Committee, Council for the South, Ministry of Displaced Persons, Council for Development and Reconstruction, and municipalities of South Lebanon.
2. Based on these discussions and on the report prepared by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies¹, several proposals for UNDP/UNCHS follow-up projects were identified. They are summarized hereunder.

Support to the Ministry of Displaced Persons

41. Project LEB/93/001 - Reintegration and socio-economic rehabilitation of the Displaced - was signed on 8 March 1994. UNDP and cost-sharing financing amounts to USD 1.7 million. This project is supposed to facilitate the return of 450,000 presently displaced people. The main components of the project are housing and employment generation.
42. UNCHS (Habitat) could participate in the project as cooperating agency, and thus transfer the experience gained in Southern Lebanon to the Ministry of Displaced Persons.
43. It has been agreed that a proposal for reformulation of the project document (including an amended budget) would be immediately drafted by the Project Manager in close collaboration with the concerned Ministry and UNDP.
44. An additional project document could also be prepared, to complement the present one in the areas of housing construction and employment generation. UNCHS (Habitat) is ready to field a short-term mission in May 1994 for finalizing such a document. Confirmation from UNDP is expected as soon as possible.

Urban and municipal management

45. Municipalities in Lebanon suffer from inefficient organizational structures and operating procedures, lack of clear decision-making authority, and a scarcity of expertise on important matters such as land-use planning, solid waste and waste water management, and municipal finance. A Ministry of Municipal and Village Affairs has been established to help building municipal capacities and initiate a decentralization process.

1. Findings and recommendations on housing construction and urban management needs and possibilities for assistance, March 1994.

46. Technical assistance is required at both central and local government levels. At central level, policy advice should be provided to several ministries and the Council for Development and Reconstruction in the areas of financial transfers and taxation, as well as infrastructure development and environmental regulations. At the municipal level, technical capacities should be strengthened, mainly in the areas of infrastructure operation and maintenance, land management and environment protection.
47. It has been agreed that a UNDP/UNCHS project should be prepared, which would address these issues both at the central level and in selected municipalities of the South. A formulation mission will be organized by UNCHS, under UNDP funding, in April-May 1994. Terms of reference for this mission will be worked out immediately by the Project Manager, in collaboration with the CDR, the Ministry of Municipal and Village Affairs and UNDP.

Housing construction in the South

48. The Council for the South provides financial assistance to returnees in that part of the country, up to USD 12,000 per household. It is also responsible for the rehabilitation of basic infrastructure and services. Based on the experience of project LEB/93/E01, a Habitat Advisory and Management Unit could be created within the Council for the South to monitor and coordinate construction activities carried out in that region.
49. A clear expression of interest from part of the Council for the South is however still expected. So far, the Council seems to be looking for financial assistance rather than technical support.

CONCLUSION

50. The experience drawn from this joint review mission shows that an evaluation has to be carried out by all parties concerned, including staff from the headquarters of the UN agencies/offices concerned.
51. Cooperation with UN forces has highlighted their very useful and timely input in the very first stages of reconstruction involving in particular demolition work.
52. The establishment of a project office in the affected area resulted in a high level of project execution and effective cooperation between national authorities, non-governmental organizations and the UN System. Judging by statements at different levels of the national governmental structure, it can be affirmed that this project has strongly enhanced the image of the UN in Lebanon.

ANNEX 18

Save The Children (USA)

UNCHS-Habitat Emergency Housing
Reconstruction Project In South Lebanon

Final Report

June 1994

Submitted by Haytham Annan
Project Manager
Lebanon Field Office

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ANNEX 19

UNCHS-HABITAT

EMERGENCY HOUSING RECONSTRUCTION PROJECT

In Southern Lebanon

Young Men's Christian Association
(YMCA)

Final Report

(June 1994)

UNARDOL

23 JUN 1994