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(C.P.S.P.S.)

CENTRAL INSPECTION
General Policy Framework

Draft Document
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CENTRAL INSPECTION

1. Background Overview

1.1 The PMC Inception Report

PMC assistance to various core administrative agencies under ARLA-Programme has for objectives performance improvement through the modernisation of mandates, missions and organisational functions. This would be accomplished through the establishment of a Task Force at each agency for fact-finding surveys, the review of basic laws, the design of performance improvement and modernisation plans and the implementation of such plans.

One of the main features of the Lebanese public administration is the existence of an array of central government bodies with coordinating, control and advisory functions. The establishment and functioning of these bodies were in line with the dominant thinking at that time (back to fifties) on the appropriate role of the State. Since 1959, a largely incomprehensible system has been resulted with overlaps in mandates, roles and responsibilities of public agencies. Most notable in regard to the role, function and mandate of the core administrative agencies. A starting point for re-designing the overall Lebanese administrative architecture will be a comprehensive review of the mandates, functions and roles of these agencies and a set of recommendations for their re-organisation.

More specifically, the main objective for the Central Inspection will be to develop a more modern concept of inspection instead of focussing on catching mistakes and punishing violators.¹

1.2 The PMC Workplan July 2000- June 2001.

The assistance to the core agencies , according to the PMC Workplan July 2000- June 2001, is related to the strengthening and modernisation, that is the re-structuring of the organisation and performance improvement including roles, mandates, functions, structures, human resources, information and communications technology. In parallel, the aim is to bring the agencies at the level where they can start dealing more effectively with reform.

For the achievement of the above objectives, Task Forces would be established in the core agencies to carry out fact-finding surveys and draft operational plans for re-structuring of the organisation and performance improvement and modernisation.²

¹ More in PMC Inception Report, December 2000, pp. vi, 7, 32, 48, 52-53, 79. Also, previous version of the Inception Report, April 2000.

² For more detailed information, see PMC Workplan July 2000- June 2001, December 2000, pp. 23-24. Also, Draft Workplan, September 2000, pp. 15-16.

A Task Force has been established in the Central Inspection³ for conducting the fact-finding survey and designing the operational assistance programme in accordance with an agreed-upon work methodology for performance and modernisation plans (See Annex).

1.3 Fact-finding Surveys

a) The fact-finding survey for the Central Inspection conducted by the above Task Force was completed in November 2000 (See Annex). This survey tries, not very consistently and comprehensively, to identify causes of administrative pathology, problems and blockages, set priorities and recommend feasible solutions. However, the survey is mainly referring to a swallow description of the actual situation and some of the problems observed. The problems are not analysed ; alternative solutions or appropriate options are lacking ; no justifications.

After reviewing, it is permissible to say that ultimately the survey cannot be used as solid basis for further developing a quality strategic or operational plan leading to the necessary changes required to reform and renew the Central Inspection.

A more comprehensive and brainstorming survey, which provides an overall and more reliable picture of perceived strengths and weaknesses in the Central Inspection, has also been conducted by a joint working group in November 1999 (See Annex).

b) Taking into account the results of the above-mentioned two surveys, but also earlier work undertaken by the Institutional Development Unit (IDU) of the OMSAR and other relevant studies,⁴ the main problems of the present situation can be summarised as follows :

*** Legal Framework : Problems:**

- The Legislative Decree No. 115/59 (The Establishment of the CI) starts immediately by stating the activities of the CI without defining the objectives and mission of this central body.

-LD 115 overemphasizes the legalistic aspect of the inspection function. The major role of the inspectors focuses on chasing violations of rules and regulations made by employees. The policing role overrules the performance improvement role.

-Many public agencies and funds are exempted by their laws of establishment from the control of the CI.

³ This Task Force consisted of : George Choukair (General Inspector), Mountaha Aoun (Inspector), Geert Tuinier (PMC Sr. Public Administration Expert), Melissa Cardahi (Assistant Policy Analyst-OMSAR) and Samer Hankir (Assistant Policy Analyst – OMSAR). First meeting with the CI Task Force held on 6 October 2000, chaired by the Head of the CI Mr. Fouad Haydamous.

⁴ See e.g. " Institutional Development Strategy ", drafted by OMSAR/IDU, pp. 17-20 (November 1998). Also, " Interim Strategy Report ", drafted by Nick Manning/IDU, pp. 37, 74-75 (October 1997).

*** Organizational Structure : Problems:**

-The internal organisational structure of the CI lacks of coherence and shows many deficiencies. Three distinct functions are located in one central body:

*Inspection (controlling function)

*Research and Guidance (organizational function)

*Procurement (executive function).

The Research and Guidance Administration will be transferred to the Civil Service Board. The Law has been passed, but the RGA is still waiting for the issuance of the organizational decree.

-In addition, the CI has 3 General Inspectors without portfolios. The L.D. 115 does not define their role.

-The structure and cadre of the CI do not meet anymore the volume of work.

-The structure lacks some specializations that are required by the CI (eg. pharmacy, environment, topography, the new educational curriculum). New types of inspectors needed by the CI are not recognised.

-No immunity (Inspectors have no permanent tenure).

-The big volume of work generated by the General Inspectorate overburdens the CI Board which has to study and decide on all the reports submitted by the inspectors through the General Inspectors concerned.

-There is a wide span of control. For instance, the General Educational Inspector supervises the work of 80 inspectors. The General Inspectors, in general, are overburdened with reports and follow-up activities.

-The Educational Inspectors are interfering in the administrative and financial issues of the public schools. They neither have the qualifications to exercise such control, nor are supposed to exercise it according to the mandate.

-Three distinct types of inspection are grouped in one General Inspectorate which is the "General Health, Educational and Agricultural Inspectorate".

*** Planning, Monitoring and Evaluation Systems : Problems:**

-It is very difficult for the CI to fulfill its annual programme. Special requests for investigation interrupt the full implementation of the programme. Complaints and special investigations' authorizations have priority.

The CI is overwhelmed with complaints received from the citizens. Most of the complaints investigated are filed by the citizens. Most of them are anonymous and charged against employees. Besides, most of the complaints received by the Complaints Office in the Presidential Palace are transferred to the CI.

-The main concern of the Central Inspection is to deal with mistakes and violations made by civil servants and employees rather than satisfy the citizen's demands, or speed up transactions' processing (Citizens complain that the CI does not meet their demands).

-The superior-subordinate hierarchical authority is not exercised effectively in the administrations. Disciplinary authority is not practiced fully by the superiors. In order to avoid embarrassment, Directors-General of administrations transfer the violation cases related to the discipline of civil servants to the Central Inspection for investigation. This has negatively affected and overburdened the CI.

-The procedure is very lengthy from the time that the inspector discovers a violation, investigates it, prepares the final report until the Board takes a final decision.

-The CI does not follow up on the implementation of recommendations.

*** Human Resources : Problems:**

-The current cadre, even if totally filled, does not meet anymore the inspection requirements. When the CI was established in 1959, the size and scope of the public administration were smaller. The bureaucracy has been proliferating since then without expanding the cadre of the Central Inspection.

- The CI is not able to recruit its own staff. The process for the recruitment of personnel takes place through the Civil Service Board (CSB).

-The abolishment of the appointment conditions for the General Inspectors has negatively affected the effectiveness of the inspection function.

-The inspectors are relatively old (the average age of inspectors is 50 years old). No new blood has been injected. The inspector job is not attractive, neither rewarding despite the additional ranks that the inspectors enjoy.

*** Training :Problems.**

The inspectors are not provided with regular and continuous training programs that are relevant to the specialized fields of inspection. The training provided by the NIAD is very general and lacks specialization.

*** Work Processes and Procedures : Problems:**

The current Board is composed of the Head of the CI Administration, the General Educational Inspector and the Head of the Research and Guidance Administration. When the RGA is transferred to the CSB, the General Financial Inspector will replace him because according to LD 115, the most senior general inspector shall be member of the Board. Hence, there is no separation between investigation and judgment. The General inspector who is involved in preparing the inspection reports, based on the report of the inspectors, will participate in taking the final decision at the Board meeting.

*** Information Technology: Problems:**

A decree has been issued a few years ago establishing an IT Bureau. However, it is still vacant waiting for the examinations to be conducted by the CSB. Meanwhile, the available Head of IT Bureau is employed on a contractual-basis. There is also one technician.

*** Equipment: Problems :**

Shortage of volumes of legislations; shortage of computers; shortage of office furniture.

1.4 The Operational Plan.

Based on the results of the performance review and the analysis of findings, the Task Force established in the Central Inspection, after extensive discussions, has completed its activities by December 2000 and endorsed the PMC proposals⁵ for the design of a short term operational plan for performance improvement and modernisation of the Central Inspection with general policy recommendations on reform issues, objectives and specific activities.⁶

⁵ A document prepared by Mr. Geert Tuinier, PMC Public Administration Expert (19 December 2000).

⁶ See PMC Quartely Report October- December 2000, January 2001, pp. 18-19. Also, PMC Annual Report 2000, February 2001, pp. 25-26.

This operational plan (See Annex), endorsed by the OMSAR and the Minister of State for Administrative Reform, was formally approved by the Head of the Central Inspection in his letter of 3rd January 2001 (See Annex). The plan is considered as a concrete approach for the implementation of the proposals for performance improvement and modernisation of the Central Inspection. Regarding the general objectives, the proposed performance improvement plan aims at the modernisation of the institutional basis of the Central Inspection in terms of its future mandate, mission, role and responsibilities and at functional improvements of its managerial and organisational capabilities.

The approved operational plan, with a proposed indicative time-frame and the technical assistance required for its implementation, consists of the following scheduled activities :

Activity 1 : Development of a general policy framework document describing the principles and rules applying to a modern Central Inspection Organisation.

Activity 2 : Organisational Development Planning.

Activity 3 : Modernisation of the legal framework.

Activity 4 : Development of an ICT masterplan ; development of a strategy for using ICT in the field of inspection practices.⁷

Activity 5 : Development/ design of a training programme on inspection methodology and techniques.

Activity 6 : Drafting of training manuals on management audits and organisational audits.

Activity 7 : Implementation of the training programme.

Activity 8 : Designing and realisation of ICT investment plan.

1.5 A General Policy Framework

Given this state of affairs, with decisions already taken and plans for action already approved at the political level as well as by the leadership of the beneficiary concerned, the author of this document, as decided in a joint PMC/OMSAR meeting of the 18th January 2001, has undertaken the responsibility (as a former Inspector-General, Head of the Inspectors-Controllers Body for Public Administration of Greece) to deal with the above first activity, that is the preparation of a document for the development of a general policy framework for the Central Inspection in Lebanon.

This document, as stated in the proposed and approved operational plan, will basically deal with the formulation or rather re-formulation of the general policies and objectives of the Central Inspection and the development of a framework of goals and performance targets to be applied to a modern central inspection institution in terms of its future role and mission.

⁷ In a PMC/OMSAR meeting with the Minister of OMSAR dated 12 March 2001, it has been decided, before setting up an ICT masterplan in the core agencies, it would be better to start with some basic IT interventions.

2. Redefinition of Mandate and Mission

The Central Inspection (CI) was created by virtue of Legislative Decree No. 115 dated 12 June 1959. The CI is connected to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. The L.D 115 stipulates the mandate and mission of the CI as follows : a) inspecting public administrations, agencies and municipalities; b) seeking to improve administrative work methods and procedures ; c) providing advice to administrative authorities; d) coordinating work among various administrations, and e) conducting studies, investigations and activities assigned by the government.

(A Summary of Legislative Decree No. 115/1959 and amendments is attached to this document as Annex).

The inspection activities undertaken by the Central Inspection focus on controlling violations and ensuring the verification of compliance with the laws and regulations. The major role of the inspectors focuses on inspecting the actual work of employees in order to make sure that it conforms to the legal requirements. So, the inspection function prevailing in the CI focuses on catching mistakes and chasing violations of rules and regulations or procedural irregularities committed by civil servants and employees, taking disciplinary measures and imposing punishments on offending employees in case of violations. It means that the main role of the CI is concentrated on supervising the work of administrations, especially with regard to performance and discipline of employees as well as the legality of their work.

The CI has consequently become “the judge and the foe”⁸ at the same time. Hence, the onus of the organisation’s work is mainly related to “policing inspection”⁹. This type of control , no doubt, degrades the legal basis and orientation of a central inspection institution, like the Central Inspection, in terms of its main functions. On the other hand, in spite of this broad mandate and “corrective” approach, the CI’s inspection function is failing to a great extent to detect irregularities in a system that is perceived to involve endemic problems of corruption and lack of accountability.

As can be observed from the above situation, the existing legal framework (the L.D. 115 of the establishment of the CI) overemphasizes the legalistic aspect of the inspection function¹⁰. The CI has been transformed into a real investigative and punitive body at the expense of its performance improvement role. The modern control concept does not mean revealing violations and errors.

In most countries central control institutions are gradually trying to broaden their role , their functions and their working methods without letting go of the core of formal control which constitutes their “raison d ‘être “. So we find a broad movement from controls of legality and procedural compliance to evaluation .

Control criteria are changing and control requirements are moving from the traditional control of legality , transparency and compliance with administrative procedures to the direction of broader concerns - like improving the quality of administrative work through

⁸ OMSAR/IDU “Institutional Development Strategy”, p.17 (November 1998).

⁹ See Fact-Finding Survey/Central Inspection, p.1 (November 2000).

¹⁰ Ibid, p.1.

efficiency scrutinies and management controls. However, no countries are leaving formal controls (legality / procedural controls) and in some countries where problems of corruption and other irregularities are still endemic necessarily lead to a strengthening of those controls .

The obscure mandate of the CI, as stipulated in the present legislation, is ranked as number one point of weakness. There is an imperative need to redefine and update the mandate which dates back to 1959. The role of the CI should be re-focused and strengthened. A priority action includes the re-consideration of the legislation of the CI so that it can move into a more positive role. The new role aims at guiding the administrations to improve performance and reduce weaknesses, instead of a negative role that focuses on monitoring violation cases and imposing penalties on the violating officers. A more future-oriented vision of the CI should be developed. The emphasis for change should be put on performance improvement and the quality of work.

3. Development of a Strategic Framework

A natural starting point for the Central Inspection in the sphere of strategy is to set up the broad framework and a comprehensive vision that sum up a series of goals, strategies and performance targets. This framework for change and improvement will focus on a set of strategies that aim at fine-tuning the Central Inspection to thrive in the face of the envisaged changes in the country's administrative environment over the next few years.

The Legislative Decree 115/ 1959 starts immediately by stating the activities of the CI without defining the objectives and mission of this central institution.¹¹ A logic that has been developed in most controlling bodies around the world can be summarised as follows :

a) **Vision** : The Central Inspection will be an up-to-date professional institution working in specialised units carrying out homogeneous and high-quality inspections with a view to :

- Furthering efficient governmental administration ;
- Promoting answerable, honest and productive government that reflects a commitment to sustainable administrative development.

b) **Mission** : The mission of the Central Inspection is to :

- Conduct independent inspections and controls that provide objective information, advice and assurance to the Parliament and the Government ;
- Stimulate advances in accountability concepts and improve accountability practices in government operations ;
- Secure the smooth and effective functioning of the administration.

¹¹ See Fact-Finding Survey/Central Inspection, p.1 (November 2000).

c) **Objectives** : The key objectives of the Central Inspection's work are as follows:

- To consolidate a result-oriented public administration.
The Central Inspection's principal objective is to contribute dynamically to the transformation of the current bureaucratic model of administration into an efficient "result-oriented" public administration, which will be able over time to meet the needs of the public sector, the structural changes taking place in the economy and the ever increasing demands and requirements of the Public.
- To promote the effectiveness of administrative action and enhance the efficiency and productivity in the public service ;
The greatest possible efficiency and productivity of the public services and the maximisation of the employee performance constitute a major priority for the Central Inspection.
- To improve the quality and scale of services provided by public administration;
The Central Inspection aims at the qualitative upgrading of the functions and procedures of public administration, on the basis of inspection standards, evaluation criteria and best practices.
- To economise the operations of public administration;
The aim is for more effective administrative action, the maximum possible results, lower administrative costs and reduction of wasted resources.
- To protect the principles of legality and integrity and deter fraud and dishonesty;
- To safeguard transparency in the workings of public administration.
- To assess the quality of the work produced, identify problematic or counterproductive areas in public administration, specify problems and blockages and recommend feasible and realistic solutions for remedies;
- Finally, a major objective of the Central Inspection is to become a factor of change in the effort to modernise public administration : (a) by participating in the various administrative reform programmes, and (b) by linking inspection findings with the designing of administrative reform programmes.

d) **Guiding Principles** : The following principles should guide the Central Inspection in achieving its mission :

- Serving the public interest to achieve a positive impact for the benefit of the Lebanese people;
- Caring about and treating people fairly;
- Commitment to excellence by developing a relationship of respect and trust with the public services and the citizens;
- Contributing to the advancement of the legislative and regulatory discipline;

- Being cost-conscious by making the best use of resources and minimising costs without compromising quality or service;
- Promoting the use of innovative thinking, evaluative techniques and state-of-the-art technology to continuously improve the quality of controls.

4. The Nature and Types of Controls

It is a common place in all French-inspired countries to be adhered to a very French concept of the government administration which cultivates a formal respect for legal rules. Thus the inspectorship's role in terms of mission basically involves a supervisory and interrogative view. Inspection and controls are mainly performed on the basis of the regulatory conformity (le cotrole de conformite).¹²

A first examination of the activities of the Central Inspection in Lebanon leads to the conclusion that this control agency has put over the years more emphasis on inspections aiming at revealing cases of illegality and law-breaking by the employees. Most of the resources of the Central Inspection are allocated to legality controls. This clearly identifiable role of the CI does not correspond with the true needs of a modern central control institution.

Of course, the supervisory role of the central inspectorates is the cornerstone of their mission. The objective is to uncover legal irregularities and discomfit unscrupulous civil servants. It is clear that the origin of these controls (the word control is derived from "contre role" with a view of double-checking) is based on the respect for the rule of law.

It is nonetheless true that the strict supervision of legality cannot and should not be the only activity of the inspectorates. It is still true that at times like these, notable for the temptations of "easy money", the supervisory mission and legality controls must remain one of the foundations of the job of the inspector.

However, all central inspectorates now pride themselves that their missions take on a new dimension and a strategic importance. Their tasks have been systematically widened involving efficiency and effectiveness controls.

The Central Inspection in Lebanon will achieve its mission by conducting controls in the broad sense of the term, having the twofold objective of contributing to the renewal and improvement of public administration on the one hand, and identifying cases of mal-administration, procedural irregularities, incompetence, low productivity and poor quality of services on the other.

Inter alia, the Central Inspection shall :

- check that administrative action conforms with the law and the stipulation of formal procedure, and ascertain any cases of infringement, illegality or irregularity;

¹² See " About French Administration " (The View of the General Inspectorates), p. 159, *La Documentation francaise*- Paris, 1998.

-identify and rectify operational problems in public administration and investigate factors that have an adverse effect on administration, the management of resources, the efficiency and effectiveness of operations and the quality of services provided;

- control the organisation and operation, the work-flow and the procedures followed, with a view to improving the services offered to the public and observing the criteria of economic and effective administration; and

- control the cases of mal-administration. Mal-administration includes cases of abuse of power, bad administration, illegal procedures, arbitrariness, violation of the principle of equality, negligence or refusal to offer services, opaque procedures, failure to enforce court decisions, and other omissions and defective performance of administration.

The specific aspects of the multifarious work of the Central Inspection shall include :

- a) **Inspections**, based on the on-site inspection/investigation and personal observation in order for the inspector to form an opinion and collect first-hand information concerning the good functioning of the civil service department or the specific department's division undergoing control;
- b) **Controls**, aiming at examining the working of structures, individuals, situations, actions and procedures;
- c) **Researches or surveys**, including the careful study of organisations, programmes or situations, for the identification of sources of administrative pathology; structural analysis and prioritisation of problems; and recommended solutions, based on scientific documentation , modern techniques and tailor-made research procedures.
- d) **Counselling**. Moreover, part of Central Inspection's activities involves " providing advice to administrative authorities" (L.D. 115/59). In practice, the related prerogatives seem to be an issue of lesser importance to the CI in its various day-to-day tasks. On the other hand, a negative connotation has been developed in the minds of the people who are subject to inspection. Administration and employees have a negative idea about inspectors. They regard them as outsiders who look for their mistakes to punish them.

However, regarding a future mission of the Central Inspection, advice shall be an issue of paramount importance. Advice is close to inspection in its practicalities. It is not a question of finding faults with an individual or a service, but cooperating to seek a solution to their difficulties without emphasizing the weaknesses of individuals or the system. Counselling activities involve giving advice to the Administration and rather drawing the attention of the responsible employees to the weaknesses and strenghts and helping to correct any deviations.

4.1 Concept of Operations

Selection of the appropriate method or type of inspection is based on the nature of the task and the intended results. The general trend and cosmopolitan orientation for all central inspectorates now is to move from traditional inspection and carry out performance audits. But what does " performance audit " mean? To some degree, there

are confusions about the nature and primary goals of performance audit among the authors in the academic literature. From another point of view, performance audits are conducted by both external audit institutions (Courts of Accounts, National Audit Offices, Offices of the Auditor-General) and internal control bodies (Central Inspections, Inspectors-General, Inspectors of Finance etc.).

Performance audit differs substantially from traditional inspection and control. Traditional inspection is characterised in terms of conformity with laws and rules, compliance accountability, verification of information, finding of mismatches and discrepancies between actual practice and general norms and inferring consequences. But also identifying cases of mal-administration.

On the other hand, a performance audit is to evaluate aspects of the organisation under review, requires a scrutiny, exercises judgement about whether or not organisational practices are optimised and aligned with goals, such as the efficient utilisation of resources and the effective targeting of client groups. Performance auditors therefore exercise instrumental judgment. Performance audit is an evaluative activity. By contrast, the dominant role of the traditional inspector is verification not evaluation.¹³

In actual practice, the terms “inspections” and “ audits” are often used interchangeably. However, a performance audit connotes an inquiry or investigation into issues relating financial management. On the other hand, the chief function of a modern inspection involves a performance scrutiny how well the organisational unit under review is functioning with regard to efficiency, effectiveness and economy.

A clear distinction should also be made between the performance measurement systems and the various types of “ inspection”. Performance measurement is an evaluative activity through a chain of processes (inputs- processes- outputs- outcomes/results).

The principal goal of performance measurement is conformity with performance quality standards and evaluation whether inputs (such as personnel, equipment, materials, money) are being transformed into outputs and results (that is the effects of the outputs) in an optimal way, especially with regard to costs. In this process-oriented schema, economy means eliminating waste of inputs, efficiency means achieving an optimal process for transforming inputs into outputs, and effectiveness means achieving or improving outcomes /results through the delivery of the outputs.

Performance measures are systematic quantitative and qualitative assessments over time of what an organisation is doing, how well it is doing it, and what the effects of its activities are. Performance measures constitute performance standards or indicators, benchmarked against comparable public or private organisations, “ which are used in accounting for past activities, managing current operations and assessing progress towards planned objectives” (U.S.A. General Accounting Office, May 1992).

The various types of inspection cannot be considered performance measurement by reference to certain quality standards/ benchmarks or performance audit related to financial auditing. The most widespread type of inspection today is the so-called “efficiency scrutiny”. The Central Inspection in Lebanon should expand its mandate and

¹³ See “ Performance Auditing and the Modernisation of Government “, OECD-PUMA, pp. 17-19, Paris, 1996.

broaden its mission to undertake and develop a system for these types of scrutinies to improve the quality of service and promote the effectiveness of the Lebanese public administration through corrective measures.

4.2 Types of Inspection

In view of the above defined concepts, the Central Inspection in Lebanon can play its multidisciplinary role, fulfill its mission, meet expectations and make a difference from old-practices by performing the following types of inspection :

1. **Efficiency Scrutinies**, aiming at the objective and systematic review of structures, functions, internal procedures, organisational environment, clients' satisfaction and the quality of service delivery within a civil service unit, with a view to improving its efficiency through the optimisation of actions, procedures and quality of services, focusing in particular on the reduction of waste and budgeted costs.

There are three main aims of the efficiency scrutinies :

(a). *Value for Money* – the achievement of more output for the same input, the same output for reduced input .

(b). *Quality of Service* – increased efficiency and effectiveness remain important objectives, but here the focus is upon improving quality of service than looking primarily for savings.

(c). *Management and Organisation* - the examination of wider organisational issues within departments and agencies, to look for scope to improve managerial effectiveness.

Some scrutinies may, of course, have more than one aim. For example :

- Getting rid of the burden of excessive paperwork and streamlining forms.
- Cutting out duplication and overlapping.
- Better management of resources.
- Creating anti-fraud culture.

The purpose of scrutinies is :

Firstly- to examine a policy, an activity or a function with a view to making savings or increasing effectiveness, by asking questions such as :

Why is the problem happening or why is this work done at all ? Why is it done as it is ? Could it be done in a different way ? Who is responsible for the work ? Are lines of accountability and personal responsibility clear ?

Secondly- to propose solutions to identified problems, by asking :

What is the scope for simplification ? For reducing duplication ? For combining functions ? For ceasing some work altogether ? What steps are needed to strengthen the process ?

Finally- to implement the agreed solutions, by developing a prioritised improvement action plan with agreed milestones, by asking :

How are decisions made and turned into action ? Are they made by the right people ? How progress on implementation is monitored ? How are the results assessed ?

2. **Legality Controls**, designed to control the actions of public administration with regard to the correct interpretation and implementation of laws, rules and regulations. The purpose of this control is to verify the compliance of public organisations and employees with the legal requirements governing their organisation, operation and action in general, and emanates from the principles of legality, protection of those affected by the administrative action and best possible service of public interest. This type of control may also incorporate compliance with procedures, and transparency in the workings of the administration.

The above legality controls also include **mal-administration**: fraud, bribery, bias (because of colour, sex, religion, ethnic grounds etc.), neglect, undue delay, incompetence, turpitude, arbitrariness and so on.¹⁴

3. **Better Regulation Controls**, reviewing the quality and sufficiency of rules and regulations in a specific sector, and the impact and the effects of regulation on the administration and the users.
4. **Best Practice Horizontal Controls**. These controls are performed simultaneously in various public organisations whose activities are similar or identical; they comprise, in particular, controls on the basis of on-the-spot checks for identifying those organisations that have achieved exceptional performance in a selected function or a particular task (theme-controls), analysis of practices leading to such excellent results and the formulation of sector-specific "standards" for other similar cases in the sector.
5. **Programme Effectiveness Controls**, where action programmes or projects undertaken by public organisations are examined and evaluated (programme design- programme operation/implementation- programme effectiveness). Among other things, it is investigated whether the tasks are solved in the best possible manner, and whether they comply with the programme objectives. This control may follow, or be conducted in parallel with, the evaluation of the programme by the agency whose responsibility is to carry out the programme.

¹⁴ See " The Ombudsman in Your Files "-Annex A : What is Maladministration ?, U.K., Cabinet Office, December 1995.

6. **Performance Management Capacity Controls**, to assess capacity to achieve generic goals of efficiency, effectiveness and economy.
7. **Inter-ministries Controls** need not cover every ministry, but may be restricted to a group of ministries with similar organisational, managerial or procedural problems.
8. **Specific-controls**, aiming to clarify a specific problem or question at a particular public institution.
9. **Follow-up Controls** are performed in order to review the measures taken by the public organisations in response to previous controls, findings and recommendations, assess the progress made and the results achieved on the basis of these actions. Follow-up controls may involve inspections (have measures been taken ?) or evaluations (are the measures taken satisfactory ?).

In the above new concept of inspection, a distinction should be made between three different levels - A, B and C inspection, where C is the more thorough and detailed inspection. The public organisations and institutions should also be grouped according to risk and materiality thus ensuring that all state activities are subject to a C-level inspection at least once within a 5-year time frame.

From another point of view, inspections will be applied mainly in the following five most important areas :

(1) **Work Organisation** . It includes :

- Organisation Identification (Governing Laws; Management Board; Executive Concept Analysis; Management Concept Analysis; Material Resources; Financial Resources).
- Structure (Organisational Flowchart; Operating Services; Critical Support Services; Interdepartmental Relations).
- General Organisation (Personnel Cadre; Internal Regulations; Activity Plan; Management/Productivity Indicators).
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(2) **Human Resources Management**. It includes :

- Personnel Cadre.
- Cadre Approval and Subsequent Modifications.
- Planned Manpower v.s. Actual Manpower.
- Legal- Operating Structure.
- Staffing /Recruiting.

- Male/Female Distribution.
- Age Distribution.
- Education Level.
- Service Time in Public Sector.
- Deviations of Work Assignment.
- Training and Training Plans.
- Work Regimes.
- Work Schedules.
- Job Overlap.
- Abstention-Ratio.
- Internal and External Mobility.
- Disciplinary Action.
- Reliability and Information Circuits.
- Personnel Expenditures.
- Classification of Personnel Wages.
-

(3) Administrative Upgrade. It includes:

- Redtape and Procedures.
- Internal Communication.
- Means of Formality Disclosure.
- Application of a Code of Administrative Procedures.
- Programmes and Quality Charts.

(4) Organisational Environment. It includes :

- Institutional Culture.
- Professional Motivation and Satisfaction.
- Work Organisation.
- Legal/Functional Conflict Management.
- Environmental and Work Conditions.
- Safety and Hygiene.
-

(5) User's Satisfaction. It includes :

- User's Receptivity.
- User's Surveys.
- Reception and Assistance

5. Financial Controls

5.1 *The International Experience*

An effective budgeting implies effective controlling instruments. This requirement cannot be fulfilled by internal controlling. Effective controlling requires an independent external control mechanism, which supplies the Parliament with fundamentals for its political decisions as budgeting legislator.

(1). The internal administrative ex-ante control of the Ministry of Finance.

The budget enforcement is primary the duty of every single government minister. However, the Minister of Finance is always given essential participation rights. The participation authority of the Minister of Finance lies in his responsibility to supervise the entire budget.

More specifically, the Minister of Finance has the duty to ensure that the necessary expenditures for the fulfillment of the commitments can only be provided in connection with the respective receipts at disposal considering the principles of economy, efficiency and suitability.

In respect to its participation rights regarding the budget enforcement, the budget department of the Ministry of Finance is the most appropriate institution for the ex-ante financial controlling .

(2). Internal administrative financial controlling through the competent government minister.

The government ministers have two services to ensure the financial control : a) the accounting department and b) the internal audit department of the respective ministry.

The accounting departments take care of some important controlling tasks. The “ internal audit “ of the accounting departments comprises :

- a) The pre-examination : every payment obligation has to be checked in regard to its reason and its amount. On the basis of economy, efficiency and suitability, the substantiveness and the calculatory correctness have to be tested.
- b) The examination: if the enforcement procedures complies with the budgetary and other statutory provisions.
- c) The post-examination : it has to be controlled if the money transfers and the settlement have been effected duly, if the vouchers are duly registered according to the provisions etc

The audit departments have mainly controlling tasks regarding the so-called “ audit system “ (e.g. give advice in regard to financial planning and realisation of projects, participate in contracting orders, supervise the contracting procedures etc.)

In order to establish the compliance between the governmental programme and the budget frame as well as to guarantee the success of the budget consolidation programme, a ministry specific budget controlling provides data to the various hierarchical levels for different purposes, identifies weak spots, mentions their causes and finds solutions.

(3). The Court of Audit

The supreme audit institution is responsible for the external audit and reports to the Parliament and not to the Government. It is an independent government body responsible for examining government operations and transactions, advising the executive administration on the basis of its audit experience and reporting on its findings to Parliament through its annual report.

The Court of Audit is also responsible to conduct the so-called "regularity audit", that is compliance with budgetary legislation and other regulatory provisions.

The regularity audits deal with the audit of financial management. It is examined whether the commitments, expenditures and receipts of the government departments have orderly arisen in accordance with the budgetary regulations and other statutory provisions. For example : the commitments and expenditures must not exceed the approved budgetary amount and must be attributed to the relevant budgetary year.

5.2 .Financial Auditing by the Central Inspection

The organisational structure of the Central Inspection, according to L.D. 115/59, includes the General Financial Inspectorate which audits :

- a) the implementation of financial laws and regulations (setting and collection of taxes, fees and other revenues; expenditures and management of public financial resources);
- b) the maintenance of public financial resources and accounts;
- c) the conformity of the work of employees involved in financial management and execution of the budget with laws and regulations.

The prerogatives of the General Financial Inspectorate include the judiciary, the army, the interior security forces in addition to public administrations, agencies and municipalities. It also controls the proper implementation of agreements concluded with health and social institutions and inspects any activity that may have financial consequences.

It is argued sometimes that the multi-levelled bureaucratic system for the control of public expenditure, according to the regulatory framework currently applicable in Lebanon, is a typical case of conflict of competence. Three or four levels of audit (Line Ministries, Ministry of Finance/Expenditure Controllers, Central Inspection, Court of Audit) for the state expenditure is unnecessarily expensive and bureaucratic and confirms the need for improvements. There is no justification for the public expenditure auditing by 3 or 4 agencies.

Consequently, there is an urgent need for a comprehensive study on the Financial Controlling System in Lebanon aiming at the re-allocation of responsibilities and harmonisation of tasks among the Court of Audit (external audit), the Ministry of Finance (internal ex-ante control), the Financial Inspectorate of the Central Inspection, the financial controlling departments of the individual ministries.

Most countries have split the responsibility of financial control/economic audit over public administrations and public agencies between the Court of Audit (external

administrative/judicial audit) and the Ministry of Finance (internal administrative audit). In contrast to the above trends, financial inspections including financial discipline (no matter the labeling of these controls) are entrusted and performed by the Central Inspection resulting in possible overlaps and tension in the domain of the CI with the mandate of the Court of Audit (CoA). The fact (if so) that the financial inspection conducted by the CI is based on field-work whereas the audit function of the CoA is based on papers' review is not a serious argument or a sound justification.¹⁵

In the context of the above proposed study, the following topics need to be dealt with and carefully investigated :

a) The feasibility of transferring the responsibility for financial inspections/ financial discipline – a responsibility overlapping with the MoF/Expenditure Controllers- from the Central Inspection to the Ministry of Finance.

An alternative might be to retain the above tasks within the Central Inspection taking in parallel concrete measures to avoid overlaps and duplications with the Court of Audit and the Ministry of Finance (e.g. establishing of protocols of communication). Clarification of functions is urgently required so that a strong relationship can be developed between them.

Of course, it is out of the question and we are absolutely opposed to any ideas of transferring, even in the long run, the overall inspection functions of the Central Inspection to the Court of Audit as is sometimes proposed.¹⁶

b) The possible transformation of the Expenditure Controllers of the Ministry of Finance to a well-organised "Corps of Financial Inspectors", such as in France, for the better evaluation of financial management (if funds are used for the right purposes and in an efficient manner).

c) A possibility of the fusion of the economic services of the individual ministries with the respective units/or controllers of the Ministry of Finance into a unified department at the ministries' level.

d) The feasibility for the abolishment or not of the pre-audit on the legality of state expenditure currently exercised by the Court of Audit, with clear justifications of pros and cons for both solutions. Abolishment of the said preventive and repressive control of the state expenditure might not be so advantageous in the present financial environment of the Lebanese public sector.

e) A possibility of de-centralised audit system of the CoA. A "tutelage" unit of the CoA could be established within the ministries¹⁷ or a Controller of the CoA attached to each ministry will conduct audits over any type of expenditure.

¹⁵ See Minutes of the PMC/OMSAR/CI Meeting dated 14 November 2000.

¹⁶ See PMC Inception Report, p. 52 , December 2000 (as well as previous version of April 2000, p. 50). Also, " Interim Strategy Report " by Nick Manning/IDU, p. 37 (October 1997).

¹⁷ See OMSAR/IDU " Institutional Development Strategy ", p.46, November 1998.

6. The Citizens' Complaints

Based on the results of the fact-finding surveys, one can observe that one of the main weaknesses of the Central Inspection is its responsibility to investigate the citizens' complaints. Most of the inspection missions are based on complaints received from the citizens. So, the Central Inspection is overwhelmed with the citizens' complaints since those complaints have a priority. Most of them are anonymous, vague or ungrounded and levelled against public employees. In addition, most of the complaints received by the Complaints Office in the Presidential Palace are also transferred to the Central Inspection. On the other hand, the administrations and autonomous agencies have been increasingly relying on the Central Inspection by sending it lots of complaints, so that the latter would investigate them.

However, investigation of such an excessive load of complaints is time consuming and overburdens the Central Inspection in a negative way. It hinders significantly the implementation of the annual programme that the Central Inspection develops on its own. It is an insuperable obstacle facing the inspection function.

It should also be added that the main concern of the Central Inspection is to deal with violations made by civil servants rather than satisfy the citizens' demands, or speed up the processing of transactions. Investigations are concerned with the legality of the work of the employees; not with the protection of the citizens' rights and the solution of their problems. The inspectors do not investigate individual cases that violate the legal interests of the person concerned (upon signed petition of any directly interested person).

6.1 An Ombudsman for Lebanon

Worldwide there is the so-called "*Ombudsman*" (or *Ombudswoman*) that receives the complaints of the citizens and investigate them. In fact, the function of the Ombudsman has been institutionalised in many countries to defend the citizens' rights against the growing and powerful machine of Public Administration. Citizens, who felt they had suffered of in- justice as a result of mal-administration by a government department, can reasonably seek remedies for their complaints and grievances.

The only positive solution to the problem for Lebanon is to review international best practices and establish, as a proper channel for citizens' complaints, a model of an Ombudsman in the country (re-configured to local conditions) aiming at the protection of the Public in their relationships with the Administration.¹⁸

" Main functions shall be to defend and promote the rights, freedoms, safeguards and interests of the citizens and secure through informal means that the exercise of public powers shall abide by justice and the law".¹⁹ The existence of an Ombudsman will be a catalyst for good governance. Ombudsman is the " guardian of legality, equity and propriety".

¹⁸ See relevant recommendations in : OMSAR/PMC "Strategy Paper ", p.13, October 2000 ; OMSAR/IDU "Institutional Development Strategy", p.70, November 1998 ; PMC Inception Report, p. 52, December 2000.

¹⁹ Ref. Statute of the Portuguese Ombudsman.

In the meantime, a provisional solution could be the establishment of a support unit to assist the inspectors in studying the files and filter the complaints that are submitted by the citizens in order not to waste the time and effort of the Central Inspection by investigating unrealistic or irrelevant cases.²⁰

7. Disciplinary Authority

Under the present legal framework (L.D. No. 115), the Central Inspection (through the General Administrative Inspectorate) supervises the work of administrations with regard to discipline of employees. It includes the inspectors who investigate the violations committed by the employees and propose disciplinary measures. The General Inspectors and Inspectors can propose specific penalties.

The Board of the Central Inspection examines the inspection reports and takes the final decision on penalties to be imposed on the violating employees condemned by the General Administrative Inspectorate. The CI Board can impose harsher penalties. Penalty decisions taken by the CI are compulsory. The Board can also transfer the employees to the General Disciplinary Council (GDC), the Court of Audit (COA) and the Cassation Public Prosecution (CPP).

The types of the proposed disciplinary sanctions range between reprimand, salary reduction, delay of promotion, transfer to the GDC or COA, and end of contract. The following is a sample of the proposed penalties by the General Administrative Inspectorate, as included in its 1999 Annual Report : Reprimand 31; salary reduction 122; delay of promotion 29; transfer to GDC 3; transfer to COA 7; transfer to CPP 4; end of contract 2. It is note- worthy to mention that many of the files that are related to wastage of financial resources and corruption have been investigated by the Central Inspection.

As opposed to practices in most other countries, inspection in Lebanon is performed by a central body connected to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers, which can impose penalties on the heads of the administrative units as well as on their staff in public administrations and agencies. As stated in a previous section of this document, this type of investigative and punitive function has transformed the Central Inspection into a disciplinary authority deviating from its main role with regard to performance inspections.

Anodyness should be a rationalisation only of roles among the main actors involved. In this corrective context, the following are recommended :

-Disciplinary authority should first be practiced internally by the administrations and the superiors concerned ; the administations should not avoid responsibility, but should rather exercise their legal competence and tackle the violations and punishments instead of transferring all cases to the Central Inspection. The internal hierarchical control within the administrations should be activated.

²⁰ See Fact-Finding Survey/Central Inspection, p. 13, November 1999.

-It should be emphasised the necessity to transfer the most grave violation cases and the offending employees to the General Disciplinary Council for investigation, as per its prerogatives (Law No. 54/65). It should be mentioned in this respect that the number of cases investigated by the GDC (according to the data available) was only 21 in 1995 and 37 in the years 1996 and 1997.²¹ This indicates that the administrations concerned prefer to keep such cases in their hands aiming at impunity.

-Additional changes should be made in the law for the establishment of the GDC requiring that all employees accused of corruption should immediately notified to the Council.

An alternative approach to be discussed (rather at political level) might be the abolishment of the prerogatives of the Central Inspection to exercise disciplinary authority chasing violations and imposing penalties on the civil servants. Instead, the General Disciplinary Council (keeping the central nature for major offences) could be decentralised by the creation of “ *departmental disciplinary councils*” at the ministries level (including public agencies under the tutelage of the ministries) to deal with cases of violations committed by civil servants. The affected employee will have, of course, the right to appeal the decision before the General Disciplinary Council.

It should be self-evident that the inspectors of the Central Inspection, discharging their duties, shall be entitled to recommend disciplinary action to be taken against civil servants for violation of duty. More specifically :

-If an illegal act or behaviour or any other violations, which in the opinion of the inspector constitute disciplinary offences, are ascertained during an inspection, the inspector's report shall be forwarded by the General Inspector to the competent organs (e.g. departmental disciplinary councils or the General Disciplinary Council), with a recommendation that disciplinary action be taken against the culpable employee.

-If sufficient evidence for the perpetration of a punishable act by a functionary or employee or member of the administration of the controlled service emerges from the inspection, the General Inspector shall forward the report to the competent Public Prosecutor.

8. Human Resources

The recent findings of the survey conducted in the Central Inspection reveal a number of infrastructure weaknesses related to the structure of the personnel cadre. The actual cadre of the Central Inspection, which dates back to 1959, is obsolete ; it does not meet anymore the requirements of a modern inspection institution. On the other hand, administrations and bureaucracy have proliferated since the establishment of the Central Inspection, without re-structuring and enlargement of the cadre. Therefore, the Central Inspection, with its current cadre, is not performing its mission as regards the quality and effectiveness of the inspection functions.

²¹ See OMSAR/IDU “ Institutional Development Strategy “, p. 24, November 1998.

Based on the results of the above-mentioned survey (but also relevant work done in the past),²² the following major weaknesses as found in the Central Inspection are listed below :

- Job descriptions / job specifications do not exist.
- The cadre lacks some specialisations.
- The recruitment of personnel rests with the Civil Service Board.
- A percentage of 26.4% of the established positions are vacant.
- The average age of inspectors is 50.5.
- Specialised training is missing.
- Shortage of administrative staff hampers the work of the inspectors.

A set of challenging interventions for upgrading the core functions of the Central Inspection are suggested below :

1. The Central Inspection will have a classification structure that will comprise separate groups for inspectors, managers and non-inspection staff. According to international best practices, re-configured to local conditions, this classification may include the introduction of a *Roles and Responsibilities Framework* and a *Competency Model*.

8.1 The Roles and Responsibilities Framework²³

A Roles and Responsibilities Framework will include work descriptions of the Central Inspection staff (General Inspectors, Inspectors of grades 2 and 3, Assistant Inspectors, Administrative staff etc.) ; it calls for clarification of agreed-upon roles and responsibilities. Today, for example, regardless of being grade 2 or grade 3 inspectors, they perform the same kind of work. The Framework defines what is to be done and the results that are expected. Roles should be defined at three levels: leads, shares and contributes.

“ Leads” means having the primary responsibility for carrying out a responsibility. The person who has the lead role will have the necessary authority for quality and results. The “shares” role means sharing some degree of responsibility with the person who leads. The persons who share may have full responsibility for some portion of an assigned activity,

²² See Fact-Finding Survey/Central Inspection (Human Resources), November 2000.

²³ Source of information, the Office of the Auditor General of Canada. Presentations to the author of this document during his official visit to the OAG/Ottawa in September 1999 in his capacity as Head of the Central Inspection of Greece. The above Roles and Responsibilities Framework and Competency Model could be introduced to both the Central Inspection and the Court of Audit .

but, in all cases, they answer to the person with the lead role. The responsibility and obligations of the person who “contributes” would normally be less well defined.

The allocation of responsibilities in the Framework represents the way we expect things to be managed in a steady-state environment. In practice, however, work and expectations should constantly be re-arranged to reflect changing circumstances.

The Framework includes three main components :

a. *Corporate Management* : The Corporate Management responsibilities focus on leading and managing at the Central Inspection level. Some of these responsibilities deal with governance matters and planning for the future, while others deal with the day-to day job of running the CI Administration.

b. *People Management* : The People Management responsibilities focus on setting the Human Resources Framework, identifying staffing needs, managing staff workload / working arrangements, designing performance management structure, setting annual performance objectives, evaluating annual performance, developing career options etc.

c. *Product Management* : The Product Management responsibilities focus on developing inspection strategies and plans, conducting inspections, providing inspection findings, ensuring compliance with inspection policies, inspection reporting, evaluating inspection results, developing performance indicators etc.

The introduction and establishment of such a system for all staff of the Central Inspection arises from the strong need for determination and clarification of their generic work descriptions, roles and responsibilities.

8.2 The Competency Model²⁴

The Competency Model will be an excellent step in moving toward one consistent set of performance standards and an integrated performance management system for all staff in the Central Inspection. The Model identifies the critical competencies for the groups of inspectors, managers and administrative staff offering them the opportunity to use the Model to self-assess their level of proficiency and to indicate the competencies they feel are most critical for their work. The Model will be a reference tool for all the Central Inspection staff.

The Competency Model will define the competencies that are integral to the work of the Central Inspection. With reference to international practices, the Model may include twenty (20) critical competencies which can be summarised as follows :

A. Organisational Effectiveness.

(1) Vision. (2) Influence. (3) Developing others. (4) Environment and sustainable development (external).

²⁴ See footnote (23).

B. Professional Competencies.

(5) Governance. (6) Professional mastery. (7) Technical skills. (8) Problem-solving and decision-making. (9) Client knowledge. (10) Product Management. (11) Service delivery.

C. Relationship Building.

(12) Team player/builder. (13) Dealing with clients and others.

D. Communications Expertise.

(14) Discussion and presentation. (15) Writing and reporting. (16) Informal communications.

E. Personal Effectiveness.

(17) Values and commitment. (18) Initiative. (19) Capacity. (20) Environment and sustainable development (internal).

2. As required by the field of action and the complexity of their tasks, the staff of the Central Inspection should be multidisciplinary drawn from a wide range of specialities. First, qualified administrative inspectors representing about 50 percent. Another 40 percent have postgraduate degrees or professional qualifications in other disciplines, and include engineers, lawyers, economists, environmental specialists, sociologists, health services specialists, topographers, statisticians, education specialists etc. And 10 percent have both public administration and other postgraduate qualifications.

Higher qualifications and more specialisation are required of the CI's members, in order that they satisfy the requirements for the work of inspection and control in respect of know-how, experience and prestige. On account of their inter-ministerial and inter-service competence and their entitlement to visit any public service for control, the inspectors should be in a position to gain a comprehensive knowledge and overall view of public administration in its entirety. This should be reflected in the quality of reports, the reliable identification of administrative malfunctions and the nature of the solutions recommended for addressing particular problems.

3. Joint investigating groups consisted of various specialities of inspectors can be established to control a multidimensional case.

4. The appointment conditions of the Central Inspectorate require updating. The Central Inspection should be able to recruit its own staff. It is suggested that the Head of the Central Inspection and the General Inspectors will be nominated by the Council of Ministers upon a proposal of the Prime Minister. The Inspectors will be recruited by an Administrative Committee of the Central Inspection (consulting possibly with the Civil Service Board), while the Assistant Inspectors will be appointed by the same Committee

from among the graduates of the Public Administration Section of the new Institute of Public Administration (IPA)²⁵.

On the other hand, vacant positions at the level of inspector could also be filled (after a public call for submission of applications) in a proportion 2 : 10 among the permanent civil servants, who have completed at least 20 years of service and occupied the post and grade of director in the central administration for at least 2 years.

5. Although of an indirect relationship with the staff structure, it is highly recommended that the Central Inspection should embark on a space renewal and office modernisation project. The purpose of this project is to provide more interesting and functional work environments for the staff (This project could be completed by June 2001).

9. Training Development.

Training issues are not part of this particular assignment. The approved operational plan calls for an EU expert on inspection practices to design a comprehensive training programme for the Central Inspection on modern principles, methodology and controlling techniques.²⁶ However, a number of by-work observations might be essential for the on-coming training activities.

The findings of the surveys conducted in the Central Inspection indicate that the inspectors are not provided with regular and continuous professional training. The training provided by the NIAD/IPA is very general and lacks specialisation. It is not enough to have general administrative training about the valid laws and regulations that govern the civil service. Specialised training is needed to meet the job requirements²⁷ and bring the knowledge and skill of inspectors up to date with regard to new developments.

As can be observed from the above surveys, at functional organisation level there is little evidence of a formal training structure. Of course, once job descriptions and specifications are in place, a linkage with the training function will be established. Weaknesses can be categorised into two training needs areas : generic training issues and specific training requirements.

Generic Training may include :

- *Technical Training*

- Inspection Methodology and Techniques
- Efficiency Scrutiny Process
- Quantification Methods

²⁵ 75% of the inspection staff of the French " Inspection Generale de l' Administration " is consisted today of graduates of the ENA.

²⁶ In parallel, a letter has been addressed to the Inspection Generale de l' Administration (IGA) in France requesting their assistance for training of the CI professional staff.

²⁷ See Fact-Finding Survey/Central Inspection, November 2000. Also, Report on Initial Findings/Central Inspection Board, pp. 10, 14, November 1999.

- Management Training

- Team Work (Supervision, Facilitation, Team Building, Coaching)
- Creative Problem-solving
- Influencing Skills
- Management of Change

- Communications Training

- Presentation Skills
- Client Relations
- Interviewing
- Inspection Writing Reports
- Writing for the Public.

Specific Training can be provided to specialised groups of inspectors in the field of their respective expertise (e.g. engineering, health, agriculture, education etc.).

In addition, a study tour could and should be undertaken to two countries (one West European/ preferably France and another within the region) for the purpose of illustrating how modern inspection practices are operating.

10. Organisation Structure

It is a logical sequence that the organisation structure of the Central Inspection will follow major choices and decisions on key issues, in response to the proposals on the future role and mission of this central controlling institution. Organisational changes should necessarily be tackled in the light of the new roles that might be undertaken by the Central Inspection. In this respect, the operational plan deals with this subsequent activity as a separate issue following first the redefinition of the mandate and mission of the Central Inspection.

However, in the margin of this document, it might be helpful to mention that the basic elements of an organisational chart for the Central Inspection should include :

1. *The Executive Office* : provides legal services/support, professional practice, and international activities.

2. *The Corporate Services Branch* : provides direct support to the inspection activities (Strategic Planning; Professional Development; Human Resources Management; Word Processing, Report Production and Graphics; Communications; Library and Records; Contracting and Facilities Management; Finance; Compensation and Services; Liaison Services).

3. *The Inspection Operations Branch* is responsible for carrying out all inspection activities. It consists of " Inspection Groups " (or General Inspectorates) and Regional Offices (A functional study is required for the establishment of two "satellite" regional offices for North Lebanon (Tripoli) and South Lebanon (Saida).

4. Possibly, a " *Panel of Senior Advisors* " attached to the Head of the Central Inspection.

At this stage, a positive organisational development is that the Research and Guidance Administration is dis-connected and transferred from the Central Inspection to the Civil Service Board.²⁸

11. International Cooperation

The Central Inspection, alongside its main work, has to make moves to forge channels of communication, information and cooperation with respective institutions in other countries, so that international experience and comparison with parallel institutions may contribute to the consolidation and optimisation of the Central Inspection in Lebanon for controlling public administration.

The implementation of a programme of mutual exchanges, the development of a "communication protocol" network for the transfer of information, personal contact, the organisation of meetings of mutual interest with foreign counterparts and seminars on modern inspection techniques should all be included in the list of objectives of the Central Inspection to be carried out in the near future.

²⁸ See Law No. 222, Article 7, dated 29 May 2000.